Chapter XIII.—Incidents of the passage of the river
Alexander himself embarked on a thirty-oared galley, and went over accompanied by Ptolemy, Perdikkas, and Lysimachos, his body-guards, and by Seleukos, one of the companions, who was afterwards king, and by one half of the hypaspists, the other half being on board of the other galleys of like size. As soon as the soldiers had passed beyond the island, they steered for the bank, being now full in view of the enemy, whose sentinels on seeing their approach galloped off at the utmost speed of each man’s horse to carry the tidings to Pôros. Meanwhile Alexander was himself the first to disembark, and taking the horsemen who had been conveyed over in his own and the other thirty-oared galleys, he at once formed them into line as they kept landing, for the cavalry had orders to be the first to disembark. At the head of these duly marshalled he moved forward. Owing, however, to his ignorance of the locality he had unawares landed not on the mainland, but upon an island, the great size of which prevented it all the more from being recognised as an island. It was separated from the mainland by a branch of the river in which the water was shallow; but the violent storm of rain which had lasted the most of the night had so swollen the stream that the horsemen could not find the ford, and he feared that the latter part of the passage would be as laborious as the first. When at last the ford was found he led his men through it with difficulty; for the water where deepest reached higher than the breasts of the foot soldiers, and as for the horses their heads only were above the river. When he had crossed this piece of water also, he selected the mounted corps of body-guards, and the best men from the other squadrons of cavalry, and brought them from column into line upon the right wing.[103] Then in front of all the cavalry he posted the horse archers, and next in line to the cavalry and in front of all the infantry the royal hypaspists commanded by Seleukos. Next to these again he placed the royal foot guards, and then the other hypaspists, each in what happened to be the order of his precedence for the time being. At each extremity of the phalanx were posted the archers and the Agrianians and the javelin men.
Chapter XIV.—Skirmish with the son of Pôros at the landing-place
Alexander having made these dispositions, ordered the infantry, which numbered nearly 6000 men, to follow him at the ordinary marching pace and in regular order, for when he saw that he was superior in cavalry, he took with himself only the horsemen, about 5000 in number, and led them forward at a rapid pace. Taurôn, the captain of the archers, he ordered to hasten forward with his men to give support to the cavalry. He had come to the conclusion that if Pôros engaged him with all his troops he would either, without difficulty, overpower him by charging with his cavalry, or would remain on the defensive till the infantry came up during the action, or that if the Indians, terrified by the marvellous audacity of his passage of the river, should take to flight, he would be able to pursue them closely, and the slaughter being thus all the greater there would not be left much more work for him to do.
Aristoboulos says that the son of Pôros arrived with about 60 chariots before Alexander made the final passage from the large island, and that he could have hindered Alexander from landing (for he made the passage with difficulty even when no one opposed him), if the Indians had but leaped down from their chariots and fallen upon those who first stepped on shore. The prince, however, passed by with his chariots, and allowed Alexander to accomplish the passage in complete safety. Against these Indians Alexander, he says, despatched his horse archers, who easily put them to a rout which was by no means bloodless. Other writers say that while the troops were landing an encounter took place between the Indians who had come with the son of Pôros and Alexander at the head of his cavalry, and that as the son of Pôros had come with a superior force Alexander himself was wounded by the Indian prince, and that his favourite horse Boukephalas was killed, having been wounded, like his master, by the son of Pôros. But Ptolemy, the son of Lagos, with whom I agree, gives a different account, for he states, like the others, that Pôros sent off his son, but not in command of merely 60 chariots; and indeed it is not at all likely that Pôros, on learning from the scouts that either Alexander himself, or, at all events, a part of his army, had made the passage of the Hydaspês, would have sent his own son with no more than 60 chariots, which, considered as a reconnoitring party, would have been too numerous, and not rapid in retreat, but considered as meant to repel such of the enemy as had not yet crossed the river, and to attack those who had already landed, an altogether inadequate force. He says that the son of Pôros arrived at the head of 2000 men and 120 chariots, and that Alexander had made even the final passage from the island before the prince appeared upon the scene.
Chapter XV.—The arrangements made by Pôros for the conflict
Ptolemy states further that Alexander at first despatched against the prince the horse archers, and led the cavalry himself, under the belief that Pôros was advancing against him with the whole of his army, and that this was a body of advanced cavalry thrown forward by Pôros. But when he discovered what the real strength of the Indians was he then briskly charged them with what cavalry he had with him. When they noticed that Alexander himself and his body of cavalry did not charge them in an extended line, but by squadrons, their ranks gave way, and 400 of their horsemen fell, and among them the son of Pôros. Their chariots, moreover, were captured, horses and all, for they proved heavy in the retreat and useless in the action itself, by having stuck fast in the clay. When the horsemen who had escaped from this rout reported one after another to Pôros that Alexander himself had crossed the river with the strongest division of his army, and that his son had been slain in the fight, he was still at a loss what to determine, for the division which had been left with Krateros in the great camp right opposite to his own position appeared to be undertaking the passage, but he at last decided to march with all his forces against Alexander and fight it out with the strongest division of the Macedonians led by the king in person. He nevertheless left there in his camp a few of the elephants and a small force to deter the cavalry under the command of Krateros from landing. He then took all his cavalry, 4000 strong, all his chariots, 300 in number, 200 of his elephants, and 30,000 efficient infantry, and marched against Alexander. When he found a place where he saw there was no clay, but that the ground from its sandy nature was all flat and firm, and suited for the movements of cavalry whether charging or falling back, he then drew up his army in order of battle,[104] posting his elephants in the front line at intervals of at least 100 feet, so as to have his elephants ranged in front before the whole body of his infantry, and so to spread terror at all points among Alexander’s cavalry. He took it for certain besides that none of the enemy would have the audacity to push in at the intervals between the elephants—not the cavalry, since their horses would be terrified by these animals, and much less the infantry, since they would be checked in front by his heavy-armed foot soldiers falling upon them, and trampled down when the elephants wheeled round upon them. Behind these he drew up his infantry, which did not close up in one line with the elephants, but formed a second line in their rear, so that the regiments were only partly pushed forward into the intervals. He had also troops of infantry posted on the wings beyond the elephants, and on both sides of the infantry the cavalry had been drawn up, and in front of it the chariots.
Chapter XVI.—The plan of attack adopted by Alexander
In this manner had Pôros arranged his troops. As soon as Alexander perceived that the Indians had been drawn up in battle order he made his cavalry halt, that he might get in hand each regiment of the infantry as it came up; and even when the phalanx by a rapid march had effected a junction with the cavalry he still did not at once marshal its ranks and lead it into action, and thus expose the men, while tired and out of breath, to the barbarians, who were quite fresh, but he gave them time, while he rode round their ranks, to rest until they could recover themselves. When he had observed how the Indians were arranged he made up his mind not to advance against the centre, in front of which the elephants had been posted, while the intervals between them had been filled with compact masses of infantry, for he feared lest Pôros should reap the advantage which he had calculated on deriving from that arrangement. But as he was superior in cavalry he took the greater part of that force, and marched along towards the left wing of the enemy to make his attack in this quarter.[105] Koinos he sent at the head of his own regiment of horse and that of Dêmêtrios to the right, and ordered him, when the barbarians on seeing what a dense mass of cavalry was opposed to them, should be riding along to encounter it, to hang close upon their rear.[106] The command of the phalanx of infantry he committed to Seleukos, Antigenês, and Taurôn, who received orders not to take part in the action till they saw that the phalanx of infantry and the cavalry of the enemy were thrown into disorder by the cavalry under his own command.
When the Indians were now within reach of his missiles he despatched against their left wing the horse archers, who were 1000 strong, to throw the enemy in that part of the field into confusion with storms of arrows and charges of their horses. He marched rapidly forward himself with the companion cavalry against the left wing of the barbarians, making haste to attack their cavalry in a state of disorder while they were still in column, and before they could deploy into line.