Vid. Schar. de miser. hom. stat. sub peccato, c. 3.
Fulgent. lib. 1. ad Monim
6. That which God is the author of, doth not make Man worse. but sin doth make Man worse, therefore God is not the author of it. And all sin is perpetrated, because thereby it receeded from the order that respecteth God, as the ultimate end of all things; but God doth incline all things unto himself, as to the ultimate end, neither doth he turn them from himself, because he is summum bonum. And further as Fulgentius saith: Deus non est ejus rei autor, cujus est ultor. At Deus est peccati ultor, ergo non autor. And therefore we conclude, that this is a vain pretence of an absurdity, because it is impossible that God should be the author or causer of sin.
Job 13. 7.
This plausible pretence to seem to be zealous, not to make God the author of sin, we commend as allowable; but it is but like the zeal of the Scribes and Pharisees, which was without knowledge, because they pretend that for an absurdity, that is a simple impossibility. And they ought to remember the argument of Job, which is this: will ye speak wickedly for God? and talk deceitfully for him? For as we ought not to suppose, or imply him to be the author of sin; so we ought not to rob him of his Glory, by detracting from his power and providence, nor in ascribing that unto Creatures, that is only due unto the Creator; as those do that hold a nude passive permission in him separate from his will and decree in his providence. Neither doth the denying of this any way imply that he is the author of sin, for a providential permission we allow as the act of his will and decree, as we shall shew hereafter.
Now concerning permission in God, being a suspension of his efficiency in regard of some acts permitted to the creatures, and that for just and good ends, the definition of it and its affections or properties are so darkly handled even by those that make most ado about it, that it would serve rather to divert Men from the right way than to guide them in it, or unto it. Therefore here we shall only note these three things, and pursue it more fully hereafter. 1. There must be the person or power permitting that hath ability, right and authority so to do. 2. There must be the person or power permitted that hath ability to perform the thing permitted, otherwise it would be in vain, and to no purpose. 3. There must be the thing or action that is permitted to be done, or brought to pass, by the person permitted to act, and that must not be impossible.
1. Before the Creation it is meerly improper to attribute permission unto God, because there was no person, nor power besides himself that could act any thing, and therefore could not be permitted, and so the correlative being awanting, both the relative and the relation betwixt them must necessarily fall to the ground, as having no existence; and so it is impossible that permission should be in God when there was no Creature to be permitted, and so could not be attributed unto him before the Creation.
Heb. 1. 3.
Job 34. 14, 15.
Vid. Chrysost. in Loc.