Comment. in Conviv. Platon. p. 400.
Vid. De Anim. Brutor. c. 7. p. 73.
2. This opinion of these three parts in Man, to wit Body, Soul and Spirit, is neither new, nor wants Authors of sufficient credit and learning to be its Patrons. For Hermes Trismegistus an Author almost of the greatest Antiquity saith thus: καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεὸς ἐν τῷ νῷ, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐν τῇ ὕλη. That is, God is in the mind, the mind in the soul, and the soul in matter. But Marsilius Ficinus gives it thus: Beatus Deus, Dæmon bonus, animam esse in corpore, mentem in anima, in mente verbum pronunciavit. And further addeth: Deus verò circa omnia, simul atq; per omnia, mens circa animam, anima circa aërem, aër circa materiam. And some give it more fully thus. God is in the mind, the mind in the Soul, the Soul in the Spirit, the Spirit in the blood, and the blood in the Body. But besides this ancient testimony, it is apparent that the whole School of the Platonists, both the elder and later were of this opinion, and also the most of the Cabalists: For Ficinus from the Doctrine of Plato tells us this: Humanæ cogitationis domicilium anima ipsa est. Animæ domicilium spiritus. Domicilium spiritus hujus est corpus. But omitting multitudes of others that are strong Champions for this Tenent, we think for authorities to acquiesce in that of our most learned Physician and Anatomist Dr. Willis, and in those that he hath quoted, which we shall give in the English: First he saith: “Lest I be tedious in rehearsing many, it pleaseth me here only to cite two Authors (but either of which is a Troop) for the confutation of the contrary opinion. The one (he saith) is the most famous Philosopher Petrus Gassendus, who Physic. Sect. 3. lib. 9. c. 11. doth divide, toto Cœlo, (as is said) the mind of man, from the other sensitive power, as much as is possible to be done, by many and most signal notes of discrimination, yea disjoining of them (as it is said in the Schools) by specific differences: Because when he had shewed this to be corporeal, extended, nascible and corruptible, he saith the other is an incorporeal substance, and therefore immortal, which is immediately created, and infused into the body by God; to which opinion he sheweth Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and for the most part all the ancient Philosophers, except Epicurus, did much agree; excepting notwithstanding that they did hold, as not knowing the origin of the Soul, which they judged to be immortal, that it being cropt off from the soul of the world, did slide into the body, and that it was poured again into the Soul of the world either immediately, or at the last mediately, after its transmigration into other bodies.”
Ibid. p. 74.
The other suffrage (he saith) upon this matter, is of the most learned Divine Dr. Hamond, our Countryman, who opening the Text Epist. Thessalo. 1. c. 5. v. 23. to wit, your whole spirit and soul and body &c. “He saith that Man is divided into three parts. 1. To wit, into the body, by which is denoted the flesh and the members. 2. Into the vital soul, which in like manner being animal and sensitive is common to man with the bruits. 3. Into the spirit, by which the rational soul, that was first created of God, is signified, which also being immortal doth return unto God. Annot. in Nov. Testam. lib. p. 711.” This his exposition he confirmeth by Testimonies brought from Ethnick Authors, and also from the ancient Fathers. From all which the learned Dr. doth make this conclusion: “And from the things above (he saith) it is most evidently manifest, that man being as it were an Amphibious animal, or of a middle nature and order betwixt the Angels and bruits, with these he doth communicate by a corporeal soul, framed of the vital blood and the stock of animal spirit, joyned likewise in one; and with the other he communicates by an intelligent soul immaterial and immortal.” And thus much for arguments brought from humane authority, which are prevalent, if they be brought affirmatively (as these are) from learned men or Artificers, and so we shall proceed to further kind of proofs.
1 Thes. 5. 23.
Ephes. 4. 17.
3. But an argument arising from Divine Authority is of the most force of all, and therefore let us a little survey the Text it self, which in our English Translation is thus: And the very God of peace sanctifie you wholly: And I pray God your whole Spirit, and Soul, and Body be preserved blameless, unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. The Apostle having given the believing Thessalonians all the spiritual counsel that could be necessary, to bring them to the perfection of sanctification, doth pray for them, that the God of peace would sanctifie them wholly, or as the word ὁλοτελοῖς signifieth (as Arias Montanus hath rendered it) omninòperfectos, altogether perfect, And that the whole, ὁλόκληρον, that is the whole part, portion or lot (for so the word properly signifieth) which he nameth by Spirit, Soul and Body, to be preserved blameless, unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. And therefore to this doth learned Beza add this note: “Tum demùm igitur (ait) homo integer sanctificatus fuerit, quum nihil cogitabit spiritus, nihil appetet anima, nihil exequetur corpus, quod cum Dei voluntate non consentiat.” And before he had said: “Therefore Paul by the appellation of spirit doth signifie the mind, in which the principal stain lieth: and by the Soul the rest of the inferior faculties, and by the body the domicile of the Soul.” And in another place he saith: “The mind is become vain, the cogitation obscured, the appetite hardened.” And to the same purpose doth learned Rollock upon the place say thus much: “Sanctification, or transformation is not of any one part, but of all the parts, and of the whole man. For there is no part or particle in man, which was not deformed in that first fall, and made as it were monstrous. Therefore μεταμόρφωσις, or transformation ought to be of the whole man and of every singular part of him. And further he saith: For the whole man the Apostle hath here the enumeration of his principal parts. And they are three in number, Spirit, Soul and Body. By the spirit (he saith) I understand the mind, which the Apostle Eph. 4. 24. calleth the spirit of the mind, and this is no other thing than the faculty of the rational mind, which is discerned in invention, and in judging of things found out. By the name of soul (he saith) I understand all those inferior faculties of the mind, as are the animal which are also called natural. The body doth follow these parts, to wit that gross part which is the instrument by which the spirit and soul do exert their functions and operations.” By all which it is most clear, that though they call them faculties, yet they are distinct essential parts of the whole man, which is most manifest, in that the body, though one of these three, cannot be a faculty, but a meer instrument, and yet is one of the essential parts, that doth integrate the whole man. But whosoever shall seriously consider, how little satisfaction the definition of a faculty given by either Philosophers or Physicians, will bring to a clear understanding, may easily perceive, that distinct parts are commonly taken to be faculties.
Ut supra c. 7. p. 74.
4. The first argument that this learned Physician urgeth, to prove that there are two Souls in man, the one sensitive and corporeal, the other rational, immortal and incorporeal, is in this order. “But (he saith) whereas it is said that the rational soul doth by it self exercise every of the animal faculties, it is most of all improbable, because the actions and passions of all the animal senses and motions are corporeal, divided and extended to various parts, to perform which immediately the incorporeal and indivisible soul (if so be it be finite) seemeth unfit or unable. Further (he saith) what belongeth unto that vulgar opinion, that the sensitive soul is subordinate to the rational, and as it were swallowed up of it, that that which is the soul in brutes, in man becomes a meer power; these are the trifles of the Schools. For how should the sensitive soul of man, which before hath been in act a subsistent, material and extended substance, losing its essence, at the advent of the rational soul, degenerate into a meer qualitie? But if it be asserted that the rational soul, by its advent also doth introduce life and sensation, then man doth not generate an animated man, but only a formless body, or a rude heap of flesh.”