1. There can be no right deduction made, nor no right consequence drawn, where there is no dependency in causality, nor no connexion of dependency. For as in the Relative and Correlative, the denying of the one necessarily destroys the other, yet fundamentum Relationis non destruitur; so a father without a child, as a father, doth neither exist nor is known, and yet the foundation of those two terms, of Paternity and Childship, which is Man, doth remain. So he that denieth Creation, doth destroy the Relative, which is Creator; yet the foundation, which is God, doth remain: and the denying of the Creation, doth not infer the necessary conclusion of denying the Being of a God, because there might be a God, though there were no Creation, because God is supposed to be, both in respect of causality and duration, before Creation. So what relation can Mr. Glanvil feign betwixt the Being of God and the Being of Angels or Spirits? For they both belong to the Predicament of Substance, and not that of Relation; and there is less relation betwixt the Being of a Witch and the Being of Spirits: so that the denying of the one doth not infer the denying of the other. And though there were relation (which Mr. Glanvil cannot shew) the foundation of that Relation (which is so necessary, that Relatives cannot subsist without it) might remain, though the Relatives were taken away: and therefore the denying of the existence of Angels or Spirits, doth not infer the denying of the Being of God; and therefore the Authors of this opinion are wrongfully and falsely charged with Atheism: and the denying of the existence of a Witch (in the sense specified) doth not infer the denying of the Being of Spirits; and therefore Scot, Osburne, and the like, are falsely and wrongfully charged with Sadducism.

Argum. 2.

Mat. 22. 23. Act. 23. 8.

2. Though it be a true Maxime, that de posse ad esse non valet argumentum; yet on the contrary, the possibility of that can never be rationally denied, that hath once been in esse. But it is apparent, that the Sadducees denied the Resurrection, and that there were either Angels or Spirits, that is, they denied that Angels or Spirits, whether good or bad, did separately exist, and that they were nothing but the good or bad motions in mens minds: yet these men were no Atheists; for though they denied the Resurrection, and held that there were no Angels or Spirits, yet they held and believed there was a God, and did allow of, and believed the five Books of Moses, else would not our Saviour have used an argument, whose only strength was drawn from a sentence in the third Chapter of Exodus, the sixth verse. So that even the denying of the Existence of Angels and Spirits, doth not infer the denying of a God; much less doth the denying the Existence of a Witch, infer the denial of the Being of Angels and Spirits; and therefore the charge of Atheism and Sadducism is false, injurious, and scandalous.

Argum. 3.

3. Those things that in their Beings have no dependence one upon another, the denying of the one doth not takeaway or deny the being of the other; but where the being doth meerly exist in dependency upon another superior Cause, there take away or deny the being of the first Cause, and thereby you take away and deny the being of all the rest that depends upon it. So he that denies the Being of a God, doth necessarily deny the Being of Angels or Spirits; but not on the contrary. For he that denieth the Existence of Angels and Spirits, doth not therefore necessarily take away or deny the Being of a God, because the Being of a God is independent of either Angel or Spirit, and doth exist solely by it self. And therefore if Wierus or Scot had denied the Existence of Angels and Spirits (which they did not) yet it would not have inferred that they were Atheists; and therefore are falsely accused by Dr. Casaubon and Mr. Glanvil. And though they should have denied the Existence of Witches (which they did not simpliciter, sed tali modo) yet it would not have inferred, that they were guilty of Sadducism, because Spirits or Demons have their Existence without any dependence of the being of Witches; and therefore it is but a poor fallacia consequentiæ to say, he that denies a Witch, denies a Demon or Spirit.

Argum. 4.

4. The denying of the Existence of Spirits, doth not infer the denying of the Being of a God, because in the priority of duration God was when Spirits were not, for they are not immortal à parte anté. So likewise the denying of the Existence of Witches, doth not infer the denial of the Being of Spirits, for in the priority of duration Spirits were existent before Witches; for Adam and Eve could not be ignorant that there were Spirits, both good and bad, and yet then there were no Witches. So that a Spirit having, in respect of duration, a Being before that a Witch can have any; the denying the Existence of the latter, doth not infer the denying of the Being of the former, but is meerly inconsequent, agreeable to no Rules of Logick, except that of Logger-head Colledge.

Argum. 5.

5. Many properties or proper adjuncts may be ascribed unto a substance, the denying of which adjuncts, doth not infer the denying of the being of the substance. So that to deny that a Horse hath fins like a fish, or wings like a bird, doth not infer the denying of the being of a Horse. Therefore it is injurious and scandalous in Dr. Casaubon and Mr. Glanvil, to charge Dr. Wierus and Mr. Scot with Atheism and Sadducism, when indeed (as we shall prove hereafter) their own Tenents tend to blasphemy, impiety, vanity, and uncharitableness.