* For if the fitness of actions is founded in the nature of things and persons, and this fitness be the sole rule of God’s actions, it is certain that the rule by which he acts, must in many instances be entirely inconceivable by us, so as not to be known at all, and in no instances fully known, or perfectly comprehended.
* For if God is to act according to a fitness founded in the nature of things, and nothing can be fit for him to do, but what has its fitness founded in his own incomprehensible nature, must he not necessarily act by a rule above all human comprehension? If he must govern his actions by his own nature, he must act by a rule that is just as incomprehensible to us as his own nature.
* And we can be no farther competent judges of the fitness of the conduct of God, than we are competent judges of the divine nature; and can no more tell what is, or is not infinitely wise in God, than we can raise ourselves to a state of infinite wisdom.
So that if the fitness of actions is founded in the particular nature of things and persons, and the fitness of God’s actions must arise from that which is particular to his nature, then we have from this argument, the utmost certainty that the rule or reasons of God’s actions must in many cases be entirely inconceivable by us, and in no cases perfectly apprehended; and for this very reason, because he is not an arbitrary being, that acts by mere will, but is governed in every thing he does, by the reason and nature of things.
How mistaken therefore is this author, when he argues after this manner. If God requires things of us, whose fitness our reason can’t prove from the nature of things, must he not be an arbitrary being? For how can that prove God to be an arbitrary agent, which is the necessary consequence of his not being arbitrary?
Supposing God not to be an arbitrary being, but to act constantly, as the perfections of his own nature make it fit and reasonable for him to act, then there is an utter impossibility of our comprehending the reasonableness and fitness of many of his actions.
* For instance; look at the reason of things, and the fitness of actions, and tell me how they moved God to create mankind in the state and condition they are in. Nothing is more above the reason of men, than to explain the reasonableness of God’s providence in creating man of such a form and condition, to go through such a state of things as human life is. No revealed mysteries can more exceed the comprehension of man, than the state of human life itself.
Shew me according to what fitness, founded in the nature of things, God’s infinite wisdom was determined to form you in such a manner, bring you into such a world, and suffer and preserve such a state of things, as human life is, and then you may have some pretence to believe no revealed doctrines, but such as your own reason can deduce from the nature of things.
But whilst your own form, whilst creation and providence are depths which you cannot thus look into, ’tis strangely absurd to pretend, that God cannot reveal any thing to you as a matter of religion, except your own reason can shew its foundation in the nature and reason of things.
Revelation, you say, is on your account, and therefore you ought to see the reasonableness and fitness of it. And don’t you also say, that God has made you for your own sake; ought you not therefore to know the reasonableness and fitness of God’s forming you as you are? Don’t you say, that providence is for the sake of man? Is it not therefore fit and reasonable, in the nature of things, that there should be no mysteries, or secrets, in providence, but that man should so see its methods, as to be able to prove all its steps to be constantly fit and reasonable?