* Now this incomprehensible relation between an eternally fore-knowing Creator and Governor, and his free creatures, is the relation from whence arises the fitness of God’s providence over us. But if the relation itself is incomprehensible, then those actions that have their fitness from it, must surely be incomprehensible. Nothing can be fit for God to do, either in creation or providence, but what has its fitness founded in his fore-knowledge of every thing that would follow, from every kind of creation, and every manner of providence: but if nothing can be fit, but because it is according to this fore-knowledge of every thing that would follow from every kind of creation, and every manner of providence; then we have the utmost certainty, that the fitness of God’s actions as a fore-knowing Creator, and Governor of free agents, must be founded upon reasons that we cannot possibly know any thing of.
* And a child that has but just learned to speak, is as well qualified to state the fitness of the laws of matter and motion by which the whole vegetable world is preserved, as the wisest of men is qualified to comprehend, or state the fitness of the methods, which a fore-knowing Providence observes over free agents. For every reason on which the fitness of such a providence is founded, is not only unknown to us, but by a necessity of nature impossible to be known by us.
For if the fitness of God’s acting in this, or that manner, is founded in his fore-knowledge of every thing that would happen, from every possible way of acting, then it is impossible for us to know the reasons, on which the fitness of his actions is founded, as it is impossible for us to be omniscient.
Who can tell what different kinds of rational creatures, distinguished by variety of natures, and faculties, it is fit and reasonable for God to create, because he eternally foresaw what would be the effect of such different creations? Who can explain the fitness of that vast variety there is amongst rational creatures of the same species, or shew that all their different faculties ought to be as they are? And yet the fitness of this providence has its certain reason in the divine fore-knowledge, and it could not be fit, but because of it.
Who can tell what degree of reason rational creatures ought to enjoy, or what degrees of new and revealed knowledge it is fit and reasonable for God to give, or not give them, because they seem, or seem not to themselves to want it, are disposed, or not disposed to receive it? For as mankind cannot tell why it was fit and reasonable for God to create them of such a kind, and degree, as they are of; so neither can they tell how God ought, or ought not to add to their natural knowledge, and make them as differently accountable for the use of revealed rules of life, as for the use of their natural faculties.
And as the reason why God created them of such a kind, and with such faculties, was because of his own fore-knowledge of the effects of such a creation; so if ever he does reveal to them any supernatural knowledge, both the doing it, the time, the matter, and manner of it, must have their fitness in his own eternal fore-knowledge of the effects of such a revelation.
The reasons therefore on which the fitness of this or that revelation depends, why or when, of what matter, in what manner, and to whom it is to be made, must, from the nature and reason of things, be as unsearchable by us, as the reasons of this or that creation of rational beings, at such a time, of such a kind, in such a manner, in such a state.
This may help us to an easy solution of the unreasonable questions, which this writer puts in this manner.
“If the design of God in communicating any thing of himself to men was their happiness, would not that design have obliged him, who at all times alike desires their happiness, to have at all times alike communicated it to them? If God always acts for the good of his creatures, what reason can be assigned, why he should not from the beginning have discovered such things as make for their good, but defer the doing it till the time of Tiberius; since the sooner this was done, the greater would his goodness appear?”[¹]
[¹] Page 393.