That is, if he is more powerful than we are, he cannot be omnipotent; if he is more perfect than we are, he cannot be all perfection; if he acts upon greater, or higher, or more reasonable motives than we do, he cannot be a reasonable being.

Now if these absurdities are not plain and manifest to every common understanding, it is in vain to dispute about any thing; but if they are, then it is as plain, this writer’s great argument against Christianity, and first principle of his rational religion, is in the same state of undeniable absurdity.

Thus says he, “Natural religion takes in all those duties which flow from the reason and the nature of things.”[¹] That is, natural religion takes in all those things that bare human reason can discover from the nature of things. This is granted; but what follows? Why, says he, “Consequently, was there an instituted religion which differs from that of nature, its precepts must be arbitrary, as not founded on the nature and reason of things, but depending on mere will and pleasure, otherwise it would be the same with natural religion.”[²]

[¹] Page 114.

[²] Page 16.

Here you see all the absurdities just mentioned, are [♦]expressly contained in this argument, God is all humour and caprice, if his revelation is not strictly, in every respect, the same with human reason. That is, he is without wisdom, without reason, if his wisdom and reason exceed ours. He has no reason, nor wisdom, if his reason and wisdom are infinite.

[♦] “expresly” replaced with “expressly” for consistency

Secondly, This argument, if it were allowed, leads directly to atheism. For if a revelation cannot be divine, if it contains any thing mysterious, whose fitness and necessity cannot be explained by human reason, then neither creation nor providence can be proved to be divine, for they are both of them more mysterious than the Christian revelation.

And if every thing is arbitrary, whose fitness and experience human reason cannot prove and explain, then surely an invisible over-ruling providence that orders all things in a manner, and for reasons, known only to itself; that subjects human life, and human affairs, to what changes it pleases; that confounds the best-laid designs, and makes great effects arise from folly and imprudence; that gives not the race to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; that brings good men into affliction, and makes the wicked prosperous; surely such a providence must be highly arbitrary.

And therefore if this argument is to be admitted, it leads directly to atheism, and brings us under a greater necessity of rejecting divine providence, on the account of its mysteries, than of rejecting a revelation that is mysterious in any of its doctrines. And if, God cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he requires any thing of us, that our reason cannot prove to be necessary; surely he cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he over-rules our persons and affairs, and disappoints our counsels, makes weakness prosperous, and wisdom unsuccessful, in a secret and invisible manner, and for reasons and ends that we have no means of knowing.