And the tempers and passions of a child, differ only from the tempers and passions of a man, as the reason of a child differs from the reason of man.
So that our passions and tempers, are the natural real effects of our reason, and have no qualities, either good or bad, but such as are to be imputed to it.
A laudable good nature, or a laudable aversion, is only reason acting in a certain manner: a criminal good nature, or a criminal aversion, is nothing else but reason acting in another certain manner.
But still it is reason, or our understanding that is the only agent in our bad passions, as well as good passions; and as much the sole agent in all our passions and tempers, as in things of mere speculation.
So that the state of reason in human life, is nothing else but the state of human tempers and passions; and right reason in morality, is nothing else but right love, and right aversion.
All that therefore which we commonly call the weakness, blindness, and disorder of our passions, is in reality the weakness, blindness, and disorder of our reason. For a right love, or wrong love, denotes only reason acting in a certain, particular manner.
So that if any thing can be said of love, aversion, good nature, or ill nature, as common to mankind; the same may be said of reason, as common to mankind.
For the distinction of our reason from our passions, is only a distinction in language, made at pleasure; and is no more real than the desire and inclination are really different from the will. All therefore that is weak and foolish in our passions, is the weakness and folly of our reason; all the inconstancy and caprice of our humours and tempers, is the caprice and inconstancy of our reason.
It is not properly avarice that makes men sordid; it is not ambition that makes them restless; it is not bribery that makes men sell their consciences; it is not interest that makes them lye, and cheat, and perjure themselves. What is it therefore? Why it is that absolutely perfect faculty, which our author sets up as the unerring standard of all that is wise, holy, and good; it is reason, the use of reason, human reason, that does all this.
For whether any thing be fit to be done, it is as he says, “reason alone which must judge; as the eye is the sole judge of what is visible, the ear of what is audible, so reason of what is reasonable.”