Wherein the general conduct of human life is taxed, for placing learning in such things as are little or nothing perfective of the understanding.
1.AS there are two faculties in man, understanding and will; so there is a double conduit of human life, intellectual and moral. The moral conduit of men has been continually exposed, ever since preaching and writing have been in the world. But it has fared otherwise with the intellectual, which stands not so fair a mark, nor has been so often his. Not that it is really less faulty, but because its faultiness is less notorious, lies further in, and must be drawn forth into view by a chain of consequences, which few have either discernment enough to make, or patience enough to attend to.
2. The chief irregularities of it are three, respecting the end, the means, and the degree of affection.
First, The placing learning in such things as are little or nothing perfective of the understanding.
Secondly, The undue and irregular method of prosecuting what is really perfective of it; and
Thirdly, The too importunate pursuit of knowledge in general.
3. First, Men generally place learning in such things as are little or nothing perfective of the understanding. This, I confess, is a severe charge, as it fastens an imputation of folly upon the learned order: and not only so, but in that very thing wherein they think their wisdom consists. Learned men do indeed often, not only own but affect ignorance in things beside their profession. But to censure them as defective in that one thing they pretend to, to make that their blind side where they think they see clearest, to maintain, that they are not only not really knowing, but that generally they don’t so much as know what true knowledge is; this is so high a charge, that even those who may be convinced of the truth, will scarce forgive the boldness, of it.
4. That the truth of it may appear, I shall first briefly observe, what knowledge is perfective of the understanding, and then shew, that the generality of the world place learning in that which is not so.
5. And, first, I grant the knowledge of all those truths is perfective of the understanding, which are the matter of those arts and sciences, that are built upon stable and immoveable foundations, such as divinity, metaphysics, geometry, together with those unchangeable rules and measures of reason and consequence, which lead us to all other knowledge, and are the subject of that art we term logic. And accordingly I allow him to be a truly learned and knowing man, who has furnished his mind with bright and clear ideas, lodged them orderly and regularly in his head, and settled the relations and consequences of one to another. He that is able to think clearly (for so much a man knows, as he understands distinctly, and no more) to judge truly and solidly, and to reason dependently and consequentially.
6. But this is not the measure which the [♦]generality of the world has thought fit to proceed by. Learning is generally placed in a sort of knowledge, widely different from this. The world does not esteem him a learned man, whose learning has cleared his understanding, who is arrived at distinctness of conception, and is a thorough master of notion and discourse. No, it will cost great pains, great labour of mind, and closeness of thinking to attain to this. This therefore must not be learning, but something else must, that is easier to be attained, though little or nothing perfective of the understanding. And in such knowledge it is generally placed.