Counties in Van Diemen's Land.

Northern.Midland.Southern.
Devon, Westmoreland, Kent,
Dorset, Somerset, Buckingham,
Cornwall. Glamorgan, Pembroke,
Cumberland. Monmouth.

[170] The writer was present when a newspaper was delivered, directed from Sydney to "Launceston, Cornwall." It was conveyed to England, where the Cornish postmaster wrote, "Try Van Diemen's Land."

[171] 53 Geo. iii. cap. 153.

SECTION XI

Sir Thomas Brisbane,[172] to facilitate the employment of prisoners, required that the grantee should, for every 100 acres of land granted, enter into bonds to employ one convict for the term of his transportation, or the average, ten years. By receiving a second convict for one year, he was promised a bonus of a second 100 acres.

This condition was a serious obstacle to the ready sale of location orders. It was not, however, unnecessary: many casual visitors and masters of merchantmen obtained grants, which they sold instantly and cleared a considerable sum. Land speculators were greatly disconcerted by the incumbrance: many were anxious to throw up land orders, and attempted to recover money for the goods given in exchange. A trial (1825), in which Mr. Underwood, of Sydney, was the plaintiff, is a curious example of this traffic. The defendant had given in payment for 21 cwt. of sugar, an order for 200 acres of land; but when the convict clause was promulgated, the land was deemed worthless, and the plaintiff sued for £59, the price of the sugar. The judge, however, resisted the claim, and declared that the order had paid for the sugar, although its sale was clandestine and illegal.

The occupation of land was considered a sufficient proof of ownership, if not disputed within a short period, or negatived by written evidence. To resume a location, as the courts were then constituted, required the issue of a special commission, and could be only effected through a jury. On a trial, in which the Rev. Robert Knopwood was defendant, Judge Field stated that the conditions of early grants were practically void. Knopwood had agreed to sell the estate of Cottage Green for £2,000, to Captain Jones, who paid £1,000 in hand, and entered into bonds for £1,000 for payment of the residue. Knopwood bound himself in a similar penalty to give up the premises when the whole sum should be paid. The widow of Jones sued for release from this bond (1821). The lawyers urged that Knopwood had violated the clause against alienation, and was liable to forfeit the whole. The judge refused to entertain this plea; but set aside the forfeiture as unequal: the estate, according to witnesses, was not worth more than £1,000. The judge strongly condemned the unclerical rigour of the defendant. The celebrity of Cottage Green, now occupied by extensive mercantile establishments, gives special interest to the judgment.

Efforts to resume land, not properly conveyed, were successfully resisted; and jurors appear to have determined, at all times, to deny a verdict to the crown. In 1824, in an action for intrusion (Rex v. Cooper), the jury delivered a verdict, that "the defendant had obtained possession in the usual manner." The judges asserted that no title was good, except such as passed under the great seal. A locatee, in an action of ejectment (Birchell v. Glover), who possessed from 1811 until 1823, was supplanted by a person in 1824, who obtained a grant: the judge directed for the defendant, but the jury found for the plaintiff. A similar case (Martin v. Munn, 1833), was tried three times with the same issue. The judge directed, that although long occupation by the plaintiff were proved, the grant to the defendant was a virtual resumption by the crown: this the jury considered inequitable, and found for the original occupier.