1. That a new truth may seeme absurd and impossible not onely to the vulgar, but to those also who are otherwise wise men, and excellent schollers; and hence it will follow, that every new thing which seemes to oppose common Principles is not presently to be rejected, but rather to be pry’d into with a diligent enquiry, since there are many things which are yet hid from us, and reserv’d for future discovery.
2. That it is not the commonnesse of an opinion that can priviledge it for a truth, the wrong way is sometime a well beaten path, whereas the right way (especially to hidden truths) may bee lesse trodden and more obscure.
True indeed, the strangeness of this opinion will detract much from its credit; but yet we should know that nothing is in its selfe strange, since every naturall effect has an equall dependance upon its cause, and with the like necessity doth follow from it, so that ’tis our ignorance which makes things appeare so, and hence it comes to passe that many more evident truths seeme incredible to such who know not the causes of things: you may as soone perswade some Country peasants that the Moone is made of greene Cheese (as wee say) as that ’tis bigger than his Cart-wheele, since both seeme equally to contradict his sight, and hee has not reason enough to leade him farther than his senses. Nay, suppose (saith Plutarch) a Philosopher should be educated in such a secret place, where hee might not see either Sea or River, and afterwards should be brought out where one might shew him the great Ocean telling him the quality of that water, that it is blackish, salt, and not potable, and yet there were many vast creatures of all formes living in it, which make use of the water as wee doe of the aire, questionlesse he would laugh at all this, as being monstrous lies & fables, without any colour of truth. Just so will this truth which I now deliver appeare unto others; because we never dreamt of any such matter as a world in the Moone, because the state of that place hath as yet been vailed from our knowledge, therefore wee can scarcely assent to any such matter. Things are very hardly received which are altogether strange to our thoughts and our senses. The soule may with lesse difficulty be brought to believe any absurdity, when as it has formerly beene acquainted with some colours and probabilities for it, but when a new, and an unheard of truth shall come before it, though it have good grounds and reasons, yet the understanding is afraid of it as a stranger, and dares not admit it into its beliefe without a great deale of reluctancy and tryall. And besides things that are not manifested to the senses, are not assented unto without some labour of mind, some travaile and discourse of the understanding, and many lazie soules had rather quietly repose themselves in an easie errour, then take paines to search out the truth. The strangenesse then of this opinion which I now deliver will be a great hinderance to its beliefe, but this is not to be respected by reason it cannot bee helped. I have stood the longer in the Preface, because that prejudice which the meere title of the booke may beget cannot easily be removed without a great deale of preparation, and I could not tell otherwise how to rectifie the thoughts of the Reader for an impartiall survey of the following discourse.
I must needs confesse, though I had often thought with my selfe that it was possible there might be a world in the Moone, yet it seemed such an uncouth opinion that I never durst discover it, for feare of being counted singular and ridiculous, but afterward having read Plutarch, Galilæus, Keplar, with some others, and finding many of mine owne thoughts confirmed by such strong authority, I then concluded that it was not onely possible there might bee, but probable that there was another habitable world in that Planet. In the prosecuting of this assertion, I shall first endeavour to cleare the way from such doubts as may hinder the speed or ease of farther progresse; and because the suppositions imply’d in this opinion may seeme to contradict the principles of reason or faith, it will be requisite that I first remove this scruple, shewing the conformity of them to both these, and proving those truths that may make way for the rest, which I shall labour to performe in the second, third, fourth, and fifth Chapters, and then proceede to confirme such Propositions, which doe more directly belong to the maine point in hand.
Proposition 2.
That a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of reason or faith.
Tis reported of Aristotle that when hee saw the bookes of Moses he commended them for such a majesticke stile as might become a God, but withall hee censured that manner of writing to be very unfitting for a Philosopher because there was nothing proved in them, but matters were delivered as if they would rather command than perswade beliefe. And ’tis observed that hee sets downe nothing himselfe, but he confirmes it by the strongest reasons that may be found, there being scarce an argument of force for any subject in Philosophy which may not bee picked out of his writings, and therefore ’tis likely if there were in reason a necessity of one onely world, that hee would have found out some such necessary proofe as might confirme it: Especially since hee labours for it so much in two whole Chapters. But now all the arguments which he himselfe urges in this subject, De Cœlo l. 1. c. 8. 9. are very weake and farre enough from having in them any convincing power. Therefore ’tis likely that a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of reason. However, I will set downe the two chiefe of his arguments from his owne workes, and from them you may guesse the force of the other. The 1. is this, Ibid. since every heavy body doth naturally tend downwards, and every light body upwards, what a hudling and confusion must there bee if there were two places for gravity and two places for lightnesse: for it is probable that the Earth of that other World would fall downe to this Center, and so mutually the aire and fire here ascend to those Regions in the other, which must needes much derogate from the providence of nature, and cause a great disorder in his workes. To this I answere, that if you will consider the nature of gravity, you will plainely see there is no ground to feare any such confusion, for heavinesse is nothing else but such a quality as causes a propension in its subject to tend downewards towards its owne Centre, so that for some of that earth to come hither would not bee said a fall but an ascension, since it moved from its owne place, and this would bee impossible (saith Ruvio) because against nature, De Cœlo l. 1. c. 9. q. 1. and therefore no more to bee feared than the falling of the Heavens.
Another Argument hee had from his master Plato, Metaphys. l. 12. c. 8.
Diog. Laert. lib. 3. that there is but one World, because there is but one first mover, God.
But here I may deny the consequence, since a plurality of worlds doth not take away the unity of the first mover. Vt enim forma substantialis, sic primum efficiens apparentem solummodo multiplicitatem induit per signatam materiam (saith a Countreyman of ours.) Nic. Hill. de Philosop. Epic. partic. 379. As the substantiall forme, so the efficient cause hath onely an appearing multiplicity from its particular matter. You may see this point more largely handled, and these Arguments more fully answered by Plutarch in his Booke (why Oracles are silent) and Iacob Carpentarius in his comment on Alcinous.
But our opposites the Interpreters themselves, (who too often doe jurare in verba magistri) will grant that there is not any strength in these consequences, and certainely their such weake arguments could not convince that wise Philosopher, who in his other opinions was wont to bee swayed by the strength and power of reason: wherefore I should rather thinke that he had some by-respect, which made him first assent to this opinion, and afterwards strive to prove it. Perhaps it was because hee feared to displease his scholler Alexander, of whom ’tis related Plutarch. de tranq. anim. that he wept to heare a disputation of another world, since he had not then attained the Monarchy of this, his restlesse wide heart would have esteemed this Globe of Earth not big enough for him, if there had beene another, which made the Satyrist say of him,