| Spanish-American interpretations of "the Monroe Doctrine." |
The Spanish Americans had taken the cautious utterances of President Monroe, in his December message of 1823, for much more than he meant them. They thought, or professed to think, that the Government had pledged itself to meet any intervention of the Allied Powers of Europe in American affairs by any resistance necessary to defeat it. They were also acquainted with the fact that both Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay were more pronounced than President Monroe in favor of going to the support of the new republics of South and Middle America. Naturally then, when these two men came to the head of the Government, on March 4th, 1825, the Spanish Americans felt encouraged to expect some substantial aid from the United States in the further course of their struggle with Spain and her possible allies.
| Military Confederation of the Spanish-American states. |
Already in the summer of 1822 the Republic of Colombia had initiated the plan of a Confederation of the Spanish-American states. By a treaty with Peru, bearing date of July 12th, 1823, by another with Chili of the same date, by another with the United Provinces of Central America, of April 12th, 1825, and by another with Mexico, of September 20th, 1825, the Republic of Colombia had established a military confederation between these five states, and had pledged them to send plenipotentiaries to a "general assembly of American states ... with the charge of cementing, in the most solid and stable manner, the intimate relations which ought to exist between all and every one of them." According to this agreement the assembly of plenipotentiaries was to serve as a council in conflicts, as a rallying-point in common dangers, as a faithful interpreter of treaties between their respective states, and as an umpire and conciliator in the disputes and differences which might arise between their respective states.
| Invitation to the United States to send representatives to the congress at Panama. |
During the spring of the year 1825 the Ministers of Colombia and Mexico sought Mr. Clay, and communicated to him the desires of their respective governments to have the United States send representatives to this proposed congress; but before giving the formal invitation they asked to know if it would be accepted. They stated to Mr. Clay that they did not expect the United States to abandon the attitude of neutrality, or to take part in those deliberations of the congress which might relate to the prosecution of the existing war.
| The President's hesitation to accept the invitation. |
Clay's genial spirit was much excited by the grand prospect of a league of the American states under the hegemony of the United States. It satisfied the plan of his daring imagination. It filled the bounds of his far-reaching vision. He immediately communicated the propositions of the two ministers, Mr. Salazar and Mr. Obregon, to President Adams, and urged the President to allow him to give them the assurance that the invitation to send representatives to the congress, to be held the following October at Panama, would be accepted by the United States. The President, however, proceeded rather cautiously. He was, indeed, very friendly in his feelings toward the Spanish-American states, and was ready to aid their cause in any manner consistent with the duties of a neutral. But he had a calmer way of regarding things than his brilliant Secretary of State, and, moreover, upon him rested the ultimate responsibility. He required Mr. Clay to procure from Messrs. Salazar and Obregon some information in regard to the subjects which would be considered by the congress, the nature and form of the powers to be given to the diplomatic agents which were to compose it, and the mode of its organization and procedure. At the same time he allowed Mr. Clay to encourage them to believe that, if satisfactory answers should be returned to these inquiries, their invitation would be accepted. He also caused Mr. Clay to warn them that the United States could not become a party to the existing war with Spain, or give any counsel in regard to its further prosecution.