The Missouri decision made thus both for good and for evil—for good, surely, in that it produced clearer ideas upon the character of federal government, and preserved the East from an illiberal political policy toward the West; and in that it secured the great Northwest for free labor;—for evil, possibly, in that it estranged the two sections of the Union, and put a stop to any movement in the South for the gradual and peaceable emancipation of the slaves, or for the substantial amelioration of their condition. It is not very likely, however, that any such movement would have proved successful, and it is, therefore, probable that what appears on the outside to have been an evil was in reality a good, in that it drove the disease in the body politic of the South onward toward the crisis, which must be passed in order that the permanent cure might be effected.
CHAPTER V.
THE BEGINNING OF THE PARTICULARISTIC REACTION
[Slavery and the Industrial Policies of the Union]—[President Monroe and Protection after 1820]—[The Committee on Manufactures]—[The Tariff Bill of 1823]—[The General Character of the Bill, and its Failure to Pass]—[President Monroe's Message of 1823, and Protection]—[The Tariff Bill of 1824]—[Mr. Clay's Argument in its Support]—[Mr. Clay's Argument Answered]—[The First Expression of the Doctrine that Protection and Slavery were Hostile Interests]—[The Bill Amended and Passed]—[The Tariff of 1824 not yet Considered Sectional Legislation]—[South Carolina and the Tariff of 1824]—[The Historical Development of the Doctrine of Internal Improvements]—[Madison's Ideas upon Internal Improvements]—[The Bill of 1822 for Internal Improvements]—[Passage of the Bill, and Analysis of the Vote upon it]—[The Bill in the Interests of the West]—[President Monroe's Veto, and Communication of May 4th, 1822]—[President Monroe's Argument, and the Vote upon the Veto]—[Congressional Act of 1824 for Distinguishing National from Local Improvements]—[Foreign Relations During Monroe's Second Term]—[Russia and the Northwest Coast of America]—[The Holy Alliance]—[The Congress at Verona]—[Mr. Adams' Declaration to Baron Tuyl]—[Mr. Canning's Proposal to Mr. Rush]—[Mr. Canning's Declaration to Prince Polignac]—[The "Monroe Doctrine"]—[The Meaning of the Monroe Propositions in 1824]—[Failure to Commit Congress to these Propositions]—[The Particularistic Reaction Scarcely Discoverable before 1824.]
| Slavery and the industrial policies of the Union. |
It was hoped and believed that the settlement of the Missouri question and the compromise in reference to the remainder of the Louisiana cession had put the problem of negro slavery out of the realm of national politics. In fact, however, the struggle over these questions had introduced it into that realm, and had first opened the eyes of the slaveholders to the bearings of the slavery interest upon all the questions of constitutional law and public policy. From the point of view of that interest their attitude toward all these questions was more and more determined as they came to understand more and more clearly the relation of these questions to that interest. While, therefore, the settlement and the compromise served to withdraw the question of slavery from the direct and immediate issue, they, at the same time, left it the secret influence over views and actions in many, if not most, directions.
At the next session, beginning in December of 1821, propositions were introduced into the Senate to limit and decrease the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts, to make the Senate itself a court of appeal from the regular Judiciary in cases where a "State" should be a party, and to limit to two hundred the number of members in the House of Representatives.