One object of the present Essay is to insist that since Miracles belong to the world of matter, "we must recognize the due claims of Science to decide" upon them. We are reminded that "beyond the domain of physical causation and the possible conceptions of intellect or knowledge, there lies open the boundless region of spiritual things, which is the sole dominion of Faith:" (p. 127:) and that "Advancing knowledge, while it asserts the dominion of Science in physical things, confirms that of Faith in spiritual." (p. 127.) It is proposed that "we thus neither impugn the generalizations of Philosophy, nor allow them to invade the dominion of Faith; and admit that what is not a subject for a problem, may hold its place in a Creed." (p. 127.)
But the fatal consequences of this plausible fallacy become apparent the instant we turn the leaf, and read that "the more knowledge advances, the more it has been, and will be acknowledged, that Christianity, as a real religion, must be viewed apart from connexion with physical things." (p. 128.) That "the first dissociation of the spiritual from the physical was rendered necessary by the palpable contradictions disclosed by astronomical discovery with the letter of Scripture. Another still wider and more material step has been effected by the discoveries of Geology. More recently, the antiquity of the Human Race, and the development of Species, and the rejection of the idea of 'Creation' (!) have caused new advances in the same direction." (p. 129.) ... From this it is evident, not only that the object of Science in thus taking the Miracles of Scripture into her own keeping, is (like an unnatural step-dame) to slay them; but that downright Atheism is to be the attitude in which men are expected to survey that "boundless region of spiritual things" which is yet proclaimed to be "the sole dominion of Faith!"
Faith, on the other hand, does not object to the constant visits of Science to any part of her treasure. She does but insist that all discussion shall be conducted according to the rules of right Reason. Vague insinuations about "a progressing Age," (p. 131,)—"new modes of speculation," (p. 130,)—"the advance of Opinion," (p. 131,)—and so forth, are as little to the purpose, apart from specific objections, as sneers at "the one-sided dogmas of an obsolete school, coupled with awful denunciations of heterodoxy on all who refuse to listen to them," (p. 131,) are unsuited to the gravity of the occasion. Faith insists moreover that a divorce between the miraculous parts of Scripture, and the context wherein they stand, is simply impossible. The unbeliever who boldly says, "I disbelieve the Bible,"—however much we may deplore his blindness and pity his misery,—is yet intelligible in his unbelief. But the man who proposes to believe the narrative of the Exode of Israel from Egypt, (for instance,) apart from the supernatural character of the events which are related to have attended it; who believes the history of the Gospels, (holding the Evangelists to have been veracious writers,) yet rejects the Divine nature of the Miracles which the Gospels relate; and proposes, after eliminating from the historical narrative everything which claims to be miraculous, to make what remains of that historical narrative, the strength and stay of his soul in life and in death:—that man we boldly affirm to be one who cannot have studied the Bible with that ordinary attention which would entitle him to dogmatize concerning its contents: or else, whose logical faculty must be so hopelessly defective that discussions of this class are evidently not his proper province.
Finally, we are presented in this Essay with the same offensive assumption of intellectual superiority on the part of the writer, which disfigures the entire volume. "It becomes imperatively necessary that views should be suggested really suitable to better informed minds." (p. 126.) "Points which may be seen to involve the greatest difficulty to more profound inquirers, are often such as do not occasion the least perplexity to ordinary minds, but are allowed to pass without hesitation." (p. 125.) (And this, from one of those "profound inquirers," one of "those who have reflected most deeply," (p. 126,) who yet cannot get beyond a resuscitation of Hume and Spinoza's exploded objections to the truth of Miracles!)—Butler's unanswerable arguments, (for the allusion is evidently to him,) are spoken of as "a few trite and commonplace generalities as to the moral government of the World and the belief in the Divine Omnipotence; or as to the validity of human testimony; or the limits of human experience." (p. 133.) And yet the author is for ever informing us that his hostility to Miracles "is essentially built upon those grander conceptions of the order of Nature, those comprehensive primary elements of all physical knowledge, those ultimate ideas of universal causation, which can only be familiar to those thoroughly versed in cosmical philosophy in its widest sense." (p. 133.) "All highly cultivated minds, and duly advanced intellects," are supposed to find their exponent in Professor Baden Powell. All other thinkers have "minds of a less comprehensive capacity," "accustomed to reason on more contracted views." (p. 133. See also p. 131, top.) Is this the modesty of real Science? the language of a true Philosopher and Divine?
Finally, after all that has gone before we are not much astonished, but we are considerably shocked, to read as follows:—"The Divine Omnipotence is entirely an inference from the language of the Bible, adopted on the assumption of a belief in Revelation. That 'with God nothing is impossible' is the very declaration of Scripture; yet on this, the whole belief in Miracles is built[74]." Now, it happens that 'the whole belief in Miracles' is built on nothing of the kind: but the point is immaterial. By no means immaterial, however, is the intimation that the Divine attribute of Omnipotence is a mere inference from the language of Revelation,—the very belief in which is also a mere "assumption." If belief in Holy Scripture is to be treated as an assumption,—without at all complaining of the unreasonableness of one who so speaks,—we yet desire that he would say it very plainly; and let us know at least with whom we have to do, and what we are expected to prove. We do not complain, if any one calls upon us to shew that a belief in the Bible cannot be called an assumption; but it makes us very sad: and when the challenge comes from a Minister of the Church, we are unable to forbear the remark that there is something altogether immoral[75] in the entire proceeding. On the other hand, to find ourselves involved in an argument on questions of Divinity with one who believes nothing, is in a manner absurd; and provokes a feeling of resentment as well as of pity.... What need to add that life is not long enough for such processes of proof? "He that cometh unto God must believe that He is!" We cannot be for ever laying the foundation. The building must begin, at last, to grow. And when it has grown up, and is compact as well as beautiful, it cannot be necessary to pull it all down again once or twice in every century in order to ascertain whether the strong foundations be still there!
IV. The next performance is mainly directed against faith in the Church, as a society of Divine origin. "The Rev. Henry Bristow Wilson, B.D., Vicar of Great Staughton, Hunts," claims that a National Church shall be regarded as a purely secular Institution,—the spontaneous development of the State. "If all priests and ministers of religion could at one moment be swept from the face of the Earth, they would soon be reproduced[76]." The Church is concerned with Ethics, not with Divinity. It should therefore be "free from dogmatic tests, and similar intellectual bondage:" (p. 168:) hampered by no traditional Doctrines; pledged to no Creeds: but, on the contrary, should be subject to periodical doctrinal re-adjustments. "Doctrinal limitations" (i.e. the Creeds) "are not essential to" the Church. "Upon larger knowledge of Christian history, upon a more thorough acquaintance with the mental constitution of man, upon an understanding of the obstacles they present to a true Catholicity (!), they may be cast off." (p. 167.) "In order to the possibility of recruiting any national Ministry from the whole of the nation, ... no needless intellectual or speculative obstacles should be interposed." (p. 196. So at p. 198.)
To all this, the answer is very obvious. Viewed as an historical fact, the Church is not of human origin. The Church is a Divine Institution. That a Priest of the Church, charged with a cure of souls, should desire her annihilation,—the reversal of the facts of her past History,—her reconstruction on an unheard-of basis, without even Creeds as terms of communion with her,—and so forth; all this may suggest some very painful doubts as to the objector's honesty in continuing to employ the formularies of that Church, and in professing to teach her doctrines;—but it can hardly be supposed to have any effect whatever on the question at issue.
Foreseeing this, Mr. Wilson begins by asserting,—(for to insinuate is not for so advanced a disciple of "the negative Theology,") (p. 151,)—"the fact of a very wide-spread alienation, both of educated and uneducated persons, from the Christianity which is ordinarily presented in our Churches and Chapels." (p. 150.) "A self-satisfied Sacerdotalism, confident in a supernaturally transmitted illumination," may amuse itself in trying to "keep peace within the walls of emptied Churches:" (p. 150:) but the day for "traditional Christianity" (p. 149.) has gone by. We may no longer ignore "a great extent of dissatisfaction on the part of the Clergy at some portion, at least, of formularies of the Church of England,"—especially at the use of "one unhappy creed." (p. 150.) There has been "a spontaneous recoil" from some of the old doctrines: a distrust of the old arguments: and a misgiving concerning Scripture itself. "In the presence of difficulties of this kind, ... it is vain to seek to check open discussion." (p. 151.)
Why then does not this man proceed openly to discuss? is the obvious rejoinder. Instead of vaguely hinting that either the Reason or the Moral sense is shocked by what people hear "in our Churches and Chapels,"—why has not this writer, first, the honesty to withdraw from the Ministry of the Church of England; and next, the courage to indicate the particular doctrines which offend? To say that "the ordinances of public worship and religious instruction provided for the people of England" are not "really adapted to the wants of their nature as it is," (p. 150,) is a very vague and unworthy style of urging an objection. Why does not the reverend writer explain wherein the Doctrine and Discipline of the English Church are not really adapted to the actual wants of Man's nature?