And thus we come back to the theme originally proposed. "A national Church," we are informed, "need not, historically speaking, be Christian (!); nor, if it be Christian, need it be tied down to particular forms which have been prevalent at certain times in Christendom (!). That which is essential to a National Church is, that it should undertake to assist the spiritual progress of the nation and of the individuals of which it is composed, in their several states and stages. Not even a Christian Church should expect all those who are brought under its influence to be, as a matter of fact, of one and the same standard; but should endeavour to raise each according to his capacities, and should give no occasion for a reaction against itself, nor provoke the individualist element into separation." (p. 173.) Of what sort the Ministers of such a "chartered libertine" are to prove, may be anticipated. "Thought and speech, which are free among all other classes," must be free also "among those who hold the office of leaders and teachers of the rest in the highest things." The Ministers of the Church ought not "to be bound to cover up, but to open; and having, it is presumed, possession of the key of knowledge, ought not to stand at the door with it, permitting no one to enter unless by force. A National Church may also find itself in this position, which, perhaps, is our own." (p. 174.)—What a charming picture of the duties and the method of that class to which the Vicar of Great Staughton himself belongs!... The writer proceeds to set an example of that freedom of inquiry which he vindicates as the privilege of his Order; and without which he is apprehensive of being left isolated between "the fanatical religionist," (p. 174,) (i.e. the man who believes the truths he teaches,) and "the negative theologian," (i.e. those who, "impatient of old fetters, follow free thought heedlessly wherever it may lead them.") (Ibid.) "The freedom of opinion[89]," (he says,) "which belongs to the English citizen should be conceded to the English Churchman; and the freedom which is already practically enjoyed by the members of the congregation, cannot without injustice be denied to its ministers." (p. 180.) Let us see how the Reverend Gentleman exercises the license which he claims:—
The phrase "Word of God," (he says,) is unauthorized and begs the question. The epithet "Canonical" "may mean either books ruled and determined by the Church, or regulation books; and the employment of it in the Article hesitates between these two significations." (p. 176.) The declaration of the sixth Article simply implies "the Word of God is contained in Scripture; whence it does not follow that it is co-extensive with it." (p. 170.) "Under the terms of the Sixth Article one may accept literally, or allegorically, or as parable, or poetry, or legend, the story of a serpent-tempter, of an ass speaking with man's voice, of an arresting the earth's motion, of a reversal of its motion[90], of waters standing in a solid heap, of witches, and a variety of apparitions. So under the terms of the Sixth Article, every one is free in judgment as to the primeval institution of the Sabbath, the universality of the Deluge, the confusion of tongues, the corporeal taking up of Elijah into Heaven, the nature of Angels, the reality of demoniacal possession, the personality of Satan, and the miraculous particulars of many events." (p. 177.) "Good men," we are assured; (the Inspired Writers being the good men intended;) "may err in facts, be weak in memory, mingle imaginations with memory, be feeble in inferences, confound illustration with argument, be varying in judgment and opinion." (p. 179.) [A "free handling" this, of the work of the Holy Ghost, truly!... It would, I suppose, be deemed very unreasonable to wish that a catalogue of facts misstated,—of slips of memory,—of imaginary details,—of feeble inferences,—of instances of logical confusion,—and so forth, had been subjoined by the Reverend writer. I will only observe concerning his method that such "frank criticism of Scripture" (p. 174.) as this, is dogmatism of the most disreputable kind: insinuating what it does not state; assuming what it ought to prove; asserting in the general what it may be defied to substantiate in particular.] It follows,—"But the spirit of absolute Truth cannot err or contradict Himself; if He speak immediately, even in small things, accessories, or accidents." (p. 179.) To this we entirely agree. Where then are the "errors?" and where the "contradictions?"
We cannot "suppose Him to suggest contradictory accounts:" [not contradictory, of course; because contradictories cannot both be true:] "or accounts only to be reconciled in the way of hypothesis and conjecture."—(Ibid.) Why not[91]?
"To suppose a supernatural influence to cause the record of that which can only issue in a puzzle, is to lower indefinitely our conception of the Divine dealings in respect of a special Revelation." (Ibid.)—Why more of a lowering puzzle in God's Word than in God's Works[92]?
Mr. Wilson proceeds:—"It may be attributed to the defect of our understandings, that we should be unable altogether to reconcile the aspects of the Saviour as presented to us in the first three Gospels, and in the writings of St. Paul and St. John. At any rate, there were current in the primitive Church very distinct Christologies."—(Ibid.) Queer language this for a plain man! I, for my own part, have never yet discovered the difficulty which is here hinted at; but which has been prudently left unexplained.
It follows:—"But neither to any defect in our capacities, nor to any reasonable presumption of a hidden wise design, nor to any partial spiritual endowments in the narrators, can we attribute the difficulty, if not impossibility, of reconciling the genealogies of St. Matthew and St. Luke; or the chronology of the Holy Week; or the accounts of the Resurrection: nor to any mystery in the subject-matter can be referred the uncertainty in which the New Testament writings leave us, as to the descent of Jesus Christ according to the flesh, whether by His mother He were of the tribe of Judah or of the tribe of Levi."—(pp. 179-180.) I, for my part, can declare that I have found the reconcilement in the three subjects first alluded to, as complete as could be either expected or desired. The last part of the sentence discovers nothing so much as the writer's ignorance of the subject on which he presumes to dogmatize.
Presently, we read,—"It may be worth while to consider how far a liberty of opinion is conceded by our existing Laws, Civil and Ecclesiastical."—(p. 180.) "As far as opinion privately entertained is concerned, the liberty of the English Clergyman appears already to be complete. For no Ecclesiastical person can be obliged to answer interrogations as to his opinions; nor be troubled for that which he has not actually expressed; nor be made responsible for inferences which other people may draw from his expressions." (Ibid.)—Surely such language needs only to be cited to awaken indignation in every honest bosom! "With most men educated, not in the schools of Jesuitism, but in the sound and honest moral training of an English Education, the mere entering on the record such a plea as this, must destroy the whole case. If the position of the religious instructor is to be maintained only by his holding one thing as true, and teaching another thing as to be received,—in the name of the God of Truth, either let all teaching cease, or let the fraudulent instructor abdicate willingly his office, before the moral indignation of an as yet uncorrupted people thrust him ignominiously from his abused seat[93]!"
The remarks just quoted serve to introduce a series of views on subscription to the Articles, which, if they were presented to me without any intimation of the quarter from which they proceed, I should not have hesitated to denounce as simply dishonest[94].... The Statute 13 Eliz. c. 12, is next discussed with the same unhappy licentiousness; and the declaration that "the meshes are too open for modern refinements." (p. 185.) ... I desire not to speak with undue severity of a fellow-creature: but I protest that I cannot read the Review under consideration without a profound conviction that, (speaking for myself,) I have to do with one whom in the common concerns of life I would not trust. The aptitude here displayed[95] for playing tricks with plain language, is calculated to sap the foundations of human intercourse, and to destroy confidence. If plain words may mean anything, or may mean nothing,—then, farewell to all good faith in the intercourse of daily life. If Articles "for the avoiding of Diversities of Opinions, and for the establishing of Consent touching true Religion[96],"—such Articles especially as the IInd., "Of the Word or Son of God, which was made very Man;" and the Vth., "Of the Holy Ghost," (which the Rev. Mr. Wilson calls "humanifying of the Divine Word," and "the Divine Personalities,") (p. 186,)—may be signed by one who, even in signing, resolves to "pass by the side of them," (p. 186, line 6,)—then is it better at once to admit that no Logic can be supposed to be available with such a writer; that he places himself outside the reach of fair argumentation; and must not be astonished if he shall find himself regarded by his peers simply in the light of an untrustworthy and impracticable person.
The last stage of all in this deplorable paper is an application to Holy Scripture itself of the tricks which the Vicar of Great Staughton has already played, so much to his own satisfaction, with the Articles. "We may say that the value of the historical parts of the Bible may consist, rather in their significance, in the ideas which they awaken, than in the scenes themselves which they depict." (p. 199.) To a plain English understanding, (unperplexed with the dreams of Strauss, and other unbelievers of the same stamp,) such a statement conveys scarcely an intelligible notion. But we are not left long in doubt.
"The application of Ideology to the interpretation of Scripture, to the doctrines of Christianity, to the formularies of the Church, may undoubtedly be carried to an excess; may be pushed so far as to leave in the sacred records no historical residue whatever.... An example of the critical Ideology carried to excess, is that of Strauss; which resolves into an ideal the whole of the historical and doctrinal person of Jesus.... But it by no means follows, because Strauss has substituted a mere shadow for the Jesus of the Evangelists, that there are not traits in the scriptural person of Jesus, which are better explained by referring them to an ideal than an historical origin: and without falling into fanciful exegetics, there are parts of Scripture more usefully interpreted ideologically than in any other manner,—as for instance, the history of the Temptation of Jesus by Satan, and accounts of demoniacal possessions." (pp. 200-201.) "Some may consider the descent of all Mankind from Adam and Eve as an undoubted historical fact; others may rather perceive in that relation a form of narrative into which in early ages tradition would easily throw itself spontaneously.... Among a particular people, this historical representation became the concrete expression of a great moral truth,—of the brotherhood of all human beings.... The force, grandeur, and reality of these ideas are not a whit impaired in the abstract, nor indeed the truth of the concrete history (!) as their representation, even though mankind should have been placed upon the earth in many pairs at once, or in distinct centres of creation. For the brotherhood of men really depends," &c., &c. (p. 201.) "Let us suppose one to be uncertain whether our Lord were born of the house and lineage of David, or of the tribe of Levi; and even to be driven to conclude that the genealogies of Him have little historic value; nevertheless, in idea, Jesus is both Son of David and Son of Aaron, both Prince of Peace, and High Priest of our profession; as He is, under another idea, though not literally, 'without father and without mother.' And He is none the less Son of David, Priest Aaronical, or Royal Priest Melchizedecan, in idea and spiritually, even if it be unproved whether He were any of them in historic fact.—In like manner it need not trouble us, if in consistency, we should have to suppose both an ideal origin, and to apply an ideal meaning, to the birth in the city of David, (!) and to other circumstances of the Infancy. (!) So again, the Incarnification of the divine Immanuel remains, although the angelic appearances which herald it in the narratives of the Evangelists may be of ideal origin, according to the conceptions of former days." (pp. 202-3.) "And," lastly,—"liberty must be left to all as to the extent in which they apply this principle!" (p. 201.)