But who does not perceive that the obvious way to escape from the supposed difficulty, is to remember that neither Sophocles nor Plato was inspired!... Mr. Jowett's difficulty is occasioned by his assumption that the Bible stands on the same level as Plato and Sophocles.
(viii) Again,—"If it is not held to be a thing impossible that there should be agreement in the meaning of Plato and Sophocles, neither is it to be regarded as absurd, that there should be a like agreement in the interpretation of Scripture?" (p. 426.)—The whole force of this argument clearly consisting in the strictly equal claims of these books to Inspiration.—Elsewhere, Mr. Jowett expresses the same thing more unequivocally:—The old "explanations of Scripture," (he says,) "are no longer tenable. They belong to a way of thinking and speaking which was once diffused over the world, but has now passed away." Having quietly assumed all this, the Reverend writer proceeds:—"And what we give up as a general principle, we shall find it impossible to maintain partially; e.g. in the types of the Mosaic Law, and the double meanings of Prophecy, at least in any sense in which it is not equally applicable to all deep and suggestive writings." (p. 419.)
(ix) "Still one other supposition has to be introduced, which will appear, perhaps, more extravagant than any which have preceded. Conceive then that these modes of interpreting Sophocles (!) had existed for ages; that great institutions and interests had become interwoven with them; and in some degree even the honour of Nations and Churches;—is it too much to say that, in such a case, they would be changed with difficulty, and that they would continue to be maintained long after critics and philosophers had seen that they were indefensible?" (pp. 336-7.)
I suppose we may at once allow Mr. Jowett most of what he asks. We may freely grant that if the Tragedies of Sophocles had exercised the same wondrous dominion over the world which the Books of the Bible have exercised:—if [OE]dipus and Jocasta and Creon; if Theseus and Dejanira and Hercules; if Ajax, Ulysses and Minerva;—had done for the world what Enoch and Noah;—what Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob;—what Joseph, and Joshua, and Hannah, and Samuel, and David;—what Elijah and Elisha; what Isaiah and Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Daniel, and the rest;—what St. Peter, and St. John, and St. Paul;—what the Blessed Virgin and her name-sakes, have done:—In a word: had Homer's gods and heroes altogether changed the face of society, and revolutionized the world; so that "great institutions and interests had become interwoven with them, and in some degree even the honour of Nations and Churches;" (p. 336;)—if, I repeat, all this had really and actually taken place;—great "difficulty" would, no doubt, (as Mr. Jowett profoundly suggests,) be experienced, at the end of 2000 years, in getting rid of them.
But since it unfortunately happens that they have done nothing of the kind, we do not seem to be called upon to follow the Regius Professor of Greek into the supposed consequences of what he admits to be an "extravagant supposition;" and which we humbly think is an excessively foolish one also.
When, however, the Reverend Author of this speculation establishes it as a parallel with what has taken place with regard to the Word of God, we tell him plainly that his insinuation that "critics and philosophers are maintaining the present mode of interpreting Scripture long after they have seen that it is indefensible"—is a piece of impertinence which seems to require a public apology. A man may retain Orders in the Church of England, if he pleases, while yet he repudiates her doctrines: may declare that he subscribes her Articles ex animo, and yet seem openly to deny them. But he has no right whatever to impute corresponding baseness to others. The charge should be either plainly made out, or openly retracted[147].
By such considerations then does Professor Jowett attempt to shew that we ought to "interpret Scripture like any other book." The gist of his observations, in every case, is one and the same,—namely, from à priori considerations to insinuate that the Bible is not essentially unlike any other book.
Now, quite apart from its Inspiration,—which is, obviously, the one essential respect wherein the Bible is wholly unlike every other book in the world; (inasmuch as, if it is inspired, it differs from every other book in kind; stands among Books as the Incarnate Word stood among Men,—quite alone; notwithstanding that He spoke their language, shared their wants, and accommodated Himself to their manners;)—apart, I say, from the fact of its Inspiration, it is not difficult to point out several particulars in which the Bible is utterly unlike any other Book which is known to exist; and therefore to suggest an à priori reason why neither should it be interpreted like any other book.
1. The Bible then contains in all (66-9=) 57 distinct writings,—the work of perhaps upwards of forty different Authors[148]. Yet, for upwards of fifteen centuries those many writings have been all collected into one volume: and, for a large portion of that interval, on the writings so collected the Church Universal has agreed in bestowing the name of the Book,—κατ' ἐξοχήν,—the Bible.
2. The Bible is divided into two parts, which are severed by an interval of upwards of four centuries. On these two great divisions of the Bible, respectively, has been bestowed the title of the Old and the New Covenant. And, what is remarkable,—The same phenomena which are observable in respect of the whole Bible, are observable in respect of either of its parts. Thus,