"The suspicion of Deism, or perhaps of Atheism, awaits inquiry. By such fears, a good man (!) refuses to be influenced: a philosophical mind (!) is apt to cast them aside with too much bitterness. It is better to close the book, than to read it under conditions of thought which are imposed from without." (p. 343.)
Well surely, the proximity to Balliol College of the scene of Cranmer and Ridley's martyrdom, must have turned the brain of the Regius Professor of Greek!—Let him be well assured however that not rational "Inquiry," but irrational assumption; not the modest cogitations of "a philosophical mind," but the arrogant dreams of a weak and confused intellect, are what have excited such general indignation of late, among "good men," from one end of the Kingdom to the other. Nor could anything probably of equal pretensions be readily appealed to, which is nevertheless more truly unphilosophical, fallacious, and foolish, than the Essay now under consideration.
(iv) Subsequently, (p. 344,) Mr. Jowett professes to grapple with the phenomenon of Inspiration. His method is instructive. He begins by inadvertently advancing a direct untruth: for he asserts that for none "of the higher or supernatural views of Inspiration is there any foundation in the Gospels or Epistles." (p. 345.)—Had he then forgotten St. Paul's statements in Gal. i. 1, 11-17: ii. 2, 7-9. 1 Cor. xv. 3. Ephes. iii. 3, &c., &c.? But I have established the contradictory of the Professor's position in the ensuing Sermons, p. 53 to p. 57, to which the reader must be referred.—This done, he proceeds to assert that,
(α) Inspiration does not preserve a writer from inaccuracy. And the charge is substantiated by the following ridiculous enumeration:—"One [Evangelist] supposes the original dwelling-place of our Lord's Parents to have been Bethlehem[227], another Nazareth[228]." (This from a Lecturer on Divinity! Does Mr. Jowett then suppose that his readers have never opened the Gospels, and do not know better? Why, both his statements are simply false!)—"They trace His genealogy in different ways." (Yes. In two. And why not in twenty? Is Mr. Jowett not aware that a genealogy may be differently traced through different ancestors?)—"One mentions the thieves blaspheming: another has preserved to after ages the record of the penitent thief:" (And why should he not?)—"They appear to differ about the day and hour of the Crucifixion." (Yes, they appear to differ: but they do not differ!)—"The narrative of the woman who anointed our Lord's feet with ointment is told in all four, each narrative having more or less considerable variations." (There is no conceivable reason why this should not have been as Mr. Jowett relates; but, as a matter of fact, we have here another of this Gentleman's private blunders,—shewing what an uncritical reader he must be, of that book concerning which he presumes to dogmatize so freely.)—"These are a few instances of the differences which arose in the traditions of the earliest ages respecting the history of our Lord." (Nay, but this is to beg the whole question!)—"He who wishes to investigate the character of the sacred writings should not be afraid to make a catalogue of them all, with the view of estimating their cumulative weight." (p. 346.) (Truly, it would be well for Mr. Jowett if he had as little to fear from such "investigations" as the Evangelists!)
"In the same way, he who would understand the nature of Prophecy in the Old Testament, should have the courage to examine how far its details were minutely fulfilled. The absence of such a fulfilment may further lead him to discover that he took the letter for the spirit in expecting it." (p. 347.) But really this is again simply to beg the whole question. Unbecoming in any writer, how absurd also is such a sentence from the pen of one who, (as we have lately seen,) no sooner descends to particulars than he makes himself ridiculous by betraying his own excessive ignorance.... "The letter for the spirit," also! which is one of the 'cant' expressions of Mr. Jowett and his accomplices in 'free handling,'—based evidently on a misconception of the meaning of 2 Cor. iii. 6. The contrast recurs at pp. 36, 357, 375, 425, &c., &c.
(β) Still bent on shewing that Inspiration does not secure Scripture from blots and blemishes, Mr. Jowett proceeds as follows. (I must present him to the reader, for a short space, in extenso; since by no other expedient can the complicated fallacies of his very intricate and perverse method be exposed.)
"Inspiration is a fact which we infer from the study of Scripture,—not of one portion only, but of the whole." (p. 347.) (Now even this is not a correct way of stating the case. Still, because the words may bear an honourable sense, we pass on.)—"Obviously then, it embraces writings of very different kinds,—the book of Esther, for example, or the Song of Solomon, as well as the Gospel of St. John." (That the volume of Inspiration is of this complex character, and that it embraces writings so diverse, is beyond dispute.)—"It is reconcileable with the mixed good and evil of the characters of the Old Testament, which nevertheless does not exclude them from the favour of God." (Why the Inspiration of a writer should not be 'reconcileable' with any amount of wickedness in the persons about whom he writes,—I am quite at a loss to perceive. Neither do I see why "the mixed good and evil" of certain "characters of the Old Testament," (or of the New either,) should "exclude them from the favour of God." What else becomes of your hope, and mine, of Eternal Life?)—"Inspiration is also reconcileable," (he proceeds,)—"with the attribution to the Divine Being of actions at variance with that higher revelation which He has given of Himself in the Gospel." (Is this meant as an insult to "the Divine Being?" or simply as a slur on Revelation? Either way, we reject the charge with indignation[229].)—"It is not inconsistent with imperfect or opposite aspects of the Truth, as in the Book of Job or Ecclesiastes:" (Nothing which comes from God should be called "imperfect:" but why different aspects of the Truth should not be brought out, by different writers, as by St. Paul and by James,—it is hard to see.)—"With variations of fact in the Gospels, or the Books of Kings and Chronicles:" (We do not admit that Inspiration is consistent with "variations of fact;" but with different versions of the same incident, it is confessedly compatible.)—"With inaccuracies of language in the Epistles of St. Paul." (With grammatical inelegancies, no doubt; but not with logical inaccuracies.)—"For these are all found in Scripture:" (This statement, by the way, should have been substantiated by at least as many references as there are heads in the indictment,)—"neither is there any reason why they should not be; except a general impression that Scripture ought to have been written in a way different from what it has." (Just as if Mankind for 1800 years had been the victims of an à priori conception as to how Holy Scripture ought to have been written!)—"A principle of progressive revelation admits them all; and this is already contained in the words of our Saviour, 'Moses because of the hardness of your hearts;' or even in the Old Testament, 'Henceforth there shall be no more this proverb in the house of Israel?'" (O if Catholic writers were to expound Holy Scripture with the license of these gentlemen!... That the scheme of Revelation has been progressive, is a Theological truism. What that has to do with the question in hand, I see not.)—"For what is progressive is necessarily imperfect in its earlier stages:" ("Imperfect" in what sense?)—"and even erring to those who come after." (No, not in that sense imperfect, certainly!) ... "There is no more reason why imperfect narratives should be excluded from Scripture than imperfect grammar; no more ground for expecting that the New Testament would be logical or Aristotelian in form, than that it would be written in Attic Greek." (Now why this cloudy shuffling about "imperfect narratives,"—instead of saying what you mean, like a man! Further,—Is Mr. Jowett so weak as not to perceive that there is no force whatever in his supposed parallel? The Discourses of the Incarnate Son, for instance, are certainly anything but "Aristotelian in form." His dialect,—(Angels bowed to catch it, I nothing doubt!)—was that of the despised Galilee. But need the teaching it conveyed have therefore been "imperfect?" Why may not the least perfect Greek be the vehicle for the more perfect Doctrine? What connexion is there between the casket and the jewel which it encloses?)
(γ) The Reverend writer promises us help, from "another consideration which has been neglected by writers on this subject." (The announcement makes us attentive.)—"It is this,—that any true Doctrine of Inspiration must conform to all well-ascertained facts of History or of Science." (We scarcely see the drift of this ill-worded proposition; but are disposed to assent.)—"The same fact cannot be true and untrue," (Who ever supposed that it could?)—"any more than the same words can have two opposite meanings." (But why glide at once into a gross falsity? Are there not plenty of words and speeches, of the kind called 'equivocal' or 'ambiguous,' which are of this nature? I am content to refer this writer to his own pages, for the abundant refutation of his own assertion. No man in the world knows better than Mr. Jowett that "the same words can have two opposite meanings.") "The same fact cannot be true in Religion, when seen by the light of Faith; and untrue in Science, when looked at through the medium of evidence or experiment." (Why not? For example,—'He maketh His Sun to rise.' 'If God so clothe the grass of the field.' 'God said, Let there be light.' Who sees not that the view which Faith and which Physical Science respectively take of the same phenomenon, may essentially differ?)—"It is ridiculous to suppose that the Sun goes round the Earth in the same sense in which the Earth goes round the Sun;" (Very ridiculous.)—"or that the world appears to have existed, but has not existed, during the vast epochs of which Geology speaks to us." (Leave out the words, "appears to have," and this also is undeniable.)—"But if so, there is no need of elaborate reconcilements of Revelation and Science." (How does that follow? If what is thought to be Divinely revealed, and what is thought to be scientifically ascertained, seem to be conflicting truths,—why should not an effort be made to reconcile them?) "They reconcile themselves the moment any scientific truth is distinctly ascertained." (Yes: by the Human simply trying to thrust the Divine out of doors!)—"As the idea of Nature enlarges, the idea of Revelation also enlarges:" (I deny that there is any such intimate connexion as this author supposes between Physical Science and Divinity,)—"it was a temporary misunderstanding which severed them." (But when were Nature and Revelation ever for an instant "severed?")—"And as the knowledge of Nature which is possessed by the few is communicated in its leading features at least, to the many, they will receive it with a higher conception of the ways of God to Man. It may hereafter appear as natural to the majority of Mankind to see the Providence of God in the order of the world, as it once was to appeal to interruptions of it." (p. 349.) (As if an increased knowledge of Nature were the condition of Theological enlightenment!... I presume that the latter clause,—so hazy and the reverse of obvious in its meaning!—is intended to convey the sentiment which Mr. Baden Powell expresses as follows:—"The inevitable progress of research must, within a longer or shorter period, unravel all that seems most marvellous; and what is at present least understood will become as familiarly known to the Science of the future, as those points which a few centuries ago were involved in equal obscurity, but now are thoroughly understood[230].")
(δ) We are next informed "that there are a class of scientific facts with which popular opinions on Theology often conflict.... Such especially are the facts relating to the formation of the Earth and the beginnings of the Human Race." (p. 349.) (And pray, what "facts" are these, relative to the "beginnings of the Human Race," which conflict with Scripture?) ... "Almost all intelligent persons are agreed that the earth has existed for myriads of ages:" (Which is perfectly true.)—"The best informed are of opinion that the history of nations extends back some thousand years before the Mosaic Chronology." (Which is decidedly false.)—"Recent discoveries in Geology may perhaps open a further vista of existence for the human species; while it is possible, and may one day be known, that Mankind spread not from one but from many centres over the globe; or, (as others say,) that the supply of links which are at present wanting in the chain of animal life may lead to new conclusions respecting the origin of Man." (A cool way, this, of anticipating that something which 'may'—(or may not!)—be discovered hereafter, will demonstrate that the beginning of the Bible is all a fable!)—"Now," (proceeds our author,) "let it be granted that" "the proof of some of these facts, especially of those last-mentioned, is wanting; still it is a false policy to set up Inspiration or Revelation in opposition to them, a principle which can have no influence on them, and should be kept rather out of their way." (Considerate man!) "The Sciences of Geology and comparative Philology are steadily gaining ground. Many of the guesses of twenty years ago have been certainties; and the guesses of to-day may hereafter become so. Shall we peril Religion (!) on the possibility of their untruth? on such a cast to stake the life of Man, implies not only a recklessness of facts (!), but a misunderstanding of the nature of the Gospel. If it is fortunate for Science, it is perhaps more fortunate for Christian Truth, that the admission of Galileo's discovery has for ever settled the principle of the relations between them."—(pp. 349-50.) ...
Now, what a curious picture of a perverse and crooked mind does such a sentence exhibit! Divine Revelation can "have no influence" of course, on facts of any kind, (including facts in Physical Science,) when once those facts have been well ascertained. But, in the entire absence of such facts, why should we refuse to listen to the well ascertained Revelation of God? Nothing is more emphatic, for example, than the Divine declaration that the whole Human family is derived from a single pair; and the origin of Man is plainly set down in Genesis. Why then oppose to this, the confessedly undiscovered fact that "mankind spread from many centres;" and the purely speculative possibility that, hereafter, a certain theory "may lead to new conclusions respecting the origin of Man?"—As for "Religion" being "perilled on the possibility" of the truth or untruth of the Sciences of Geology and comparative Philology;—we really would submit that God may be safely left to take care of His own; and that "peril," there is,—there can be,—none!