IV. We are favoured, in the third place, with the “History of this Edition:” in which the point that chiefly arrests attention is the explanation afforded of the many and serious occasions on which Dr. Westcott (“W.”) and Dr. Hort (“H.”), finding it impossible to agree, have set down their respective notions separately and subscribed them with their respective initial. We are reminded of what was wittily said concerning Richard Baxter: viz. that even if no one but himself existed in the Church, “Richard” would still be found to [pg 251] disagree with “Baxter,”—and “Baxter” with “Richard”.... We read with uneasiness that
“no individual mind can ever act with perfect uniformity, or free itself completely from its own Idiosyncrasies;” and that “the danger of unconscious Caprice is inseparable from personal judgment.”—(p. 17.)
All this reminds us painfully of certain statements made by the same Editors in 1870:—
“We are obliged to come to the individual mind at last; and Canons of Criticism are useful only as warnings against natural illusions, and aids to circumspect consideration, not as absolute rules to prescribe the final decision.”—(pp. xviii., xix.)
May we be permitted without offence to point out (not for the first time) that “idiosyncrasies” and “unconscious caprice,” and the fancies of the “individual mind,” can be allowed no place whatever in a problem of such gravity and importance as the present? Once admit such elements, and we are safe to find ourselves in cloud-land to-morrow. A weaker foundation on which to build, is not to be named. And when we find that the learned Professors “venture to hope that the present Text has escaped some risks of this kind by being the production of two Editors of different habits of mind, working independently and to a great extent on different plans,”—we can but avow our conviction that the safeguard is altogether inadequate. When two men, devoted to the same pursuit, are in daily confidential intercourse on such a subject, the “natural illusions” of either have a marvellous tendency to communicate themselves. Their Reader's only protection is rigidly to insist on the production of Proof for everything which these authors say.
V. The dissertation on “Intrinsic” and “Transcriptional Probability” which follows (pp. 20-30),—being unsupported by one single instance or illustration,—we pass by. It ignores [pg 252] throughout the fact, that the most serious corruptions of MSS. are due, not to “Scribes” or “Copyists,” (of whom, by the way, we find perpetual mention every time we open the page;) but to the persons who employed them. So far from thinking with Dr. Hort that “the value of the evidence obtained from Transcriptional Probability is incontestable,”—for that, “without its aid, Textual Criticism could rarely obtain a high degree of security,” (p. 24,)—we venture to declare that inasmuch as one expert's notions of what is “transcriptionally probable” prove to be the diametrical reverse of another expert's notions, the supposed evidence to be derived from this source may, with advantage, be neglected altogether. Let the study of Documentary Evidence be allowed to take its place. Notions of “Probability” are the very pest of those departments of Science which admit of an appeal to Fact.
VI. A signal proof of the justice of our last remark is furnished by the plea which is straightway put in (pp. 30-1) for the superior necessity of attending to “the relative antecedent credibility of Witnesses.” In other words, “The comparative trustworthiness of documentary Authorities” is proposed as a far weightier consideration than “Intrinsic” and “Transcriptional Probability.” Accordingly we are assured (in capital letters) that “Knowledge of Documents should precede final judgment upon readings” (p. 31).
“Knowledge”! Yes, but how acquired? Suppose two rival documents,—cod. a and cod. b. May we be informed how you would proceed with respect to them?
“Where one of the documents is found habitually to contain morally certain, or at least strongly preferred, Readings,—and the other habitually to contain their rejected rivals,—we [i.e. Dr. Hort] can have no doubt that the Text of the first has been [pg 253] transmitted in comparative purity; and that the Text of the second has suffered comparatively large corruption.”—(p. 32.)
But can such words have been written seriously? Is it gravely pretended that Readings become “morally certain,” because they are “strongly preferred”? Are we (in other words) seriously invited to admit that the “strong preference” of “the individual mind” is to be the ultimate standard of appeal? If so, though you (Dr. Hort) may “have no doubt” as to which is the purer manuscript,—see you not plainly that a man of different “idiosyncrasy” from yourself, may just as reasonably claim to “have no doubt”—that you are mistaken?... One is reminded of a passage in p. 61: viz.—