A West Pointer with the Boers /

by John Y. Fillmore Blake

SPION KOP.

From the middle of November to the end of December, some one would come around every week to ask for volunteers to rush Ladysmith. The Irish boys responded to a man every time, but for some reason the rush was never made. Personally I considered the scheme idiotic, because every foot of ground in and around Ladysmith was strongly fortified, and our investing force was very small as compared to General White's army of 12,000 men.

At the conclusion of the Battle of Modderspruit, I strongly urged the Boers to storm the town, and I continued to urge them every day for the ten following days, but Generals Erasmus and Schalk Burger thought that all such talk was nonsense. The English as yet had practically no defences that we could not overcome. As soon as White got everything in apple-pie order and had finished all his defences and well surrounded them with barbed wire, then it was that Generals Erasmus and Schalk Burger and their kind were most anxious to rush and take Ladysmith. They really thought that the burghers would then refuse, but they didn't. So it happened that on January 5th a fellow came to the Irish camp, as they had often done before, for volunteers, and received the same answer, "We'll be with you." General Erasmus sent around the necessary orders—and may have sent one to White, too, as far as I know,—and all the men were to be in positions agreed upon by 3 a.m. the following morning, January 6th. During the night General Erasmus sent a countermanding order to some of the Transvaal Commandos, but forgot to let the Free Staters know that he had done so. Much to my surprise, we were ordered to go with four field guns and take position on a small hill near the Pretoria Town laager, and just in front of the English guns and forts on the Rooirand, north of Ladysmith. We were in our position at the proper time, and there sat for hours awaiting further orders and developments.

Just at the first break of dawn we heard the mausers of the Free Staters singing in the distance. There was no pause; it was continuous, and I knew that the brave Free Staters were carrying out their part of the program faithfully and well, because they had brave and dashing commandants and veldtcornets. Pretty soon we heard the mausers begin to sing right in front of us, and then we knew that the brave Pretoria Town boys were right at the English forts, yet it was not light enough for us to see them. Before we could see distinctly, the firing in front of us ceased, but with the Free Staters it continued as lively as ever.

Just before the sun peeped above the horizon, Long Tom on Bulwana, the guns on Lombard Kop, on Pepworth Hill and all the guns about Ladysmith sent shells whistling through the air. Every one fired his gun when he pleased and where he pleased, although the night before it was ordered that the guns should be concentrated on some one point in due time to be named. The artillery boys were not to blame in the least, because they had not received any instructions. Now we saw about 150 of the Pretoria Town boys in a sluit about 100 yards from the English forts. They had tried to scale a high stone wall, and, failing, left four of their number dead at the foot of it and taken refuge in a sluit where we could now see them. Only daring and fearless men would rush that fort and try to scale that twelve-foot wall. Our guns were now trained and turned loose on the forts just above the Pretoria boys. The English with five or six guns made a quick response, and for hours shells were flying back and forth with such rapidity that we were strongly reminded of our experience on Pepworth Hill. The Pretoria boys were in no danger, as long as we were firing, for the English had to keep themselves well protected. There was a Pretoria District Commando, about 700 strong, not more than 1,000 yards to our left. I mounted my horse and went to see them, for help was necessary. I found them lying under shade trees smoking their pipes and drinking coffee, as peacefully and unconcernedly as if there was no firing about Ladysmith. I told them of the position of the Pretoria Town boys, and tried to convince them that if they would turn out we would take the forts on the Rooirand. They simply answered that General Erasmus had told them that they would not be needed, and I rode back feeling disgusted.

General Erasmus had promised to support the Free Staters and the Pretoria Town boys, but instead of sending them any assistance, he went back about a mile out of danger, and left all to their fate. Some Transvaal Commandos had come up from the Tugela and partly taken the east side of the Platrand. They fought hard and bravely on the east, while the Free Staters who had captured some of the forts on the west side were still in possession, and almost engaged in a hand to hand fight with the English. They were constantly expecting re-enforcements promised by Erasmus, but none ever came. On our side we had simply an artillery duel, while on the east and west side of the Platrand the burghers continued hotly engaged in rifle fire at very close range for the whole day. About four o'clock in the afternoon a terrific rain and hail storm fell upon us. We were ordered to pull down the guns and return to camp, regardless of the fact that the Pretoria Town boys were still held in the sluit by the English. The storm did not effect those on the Platrand, for the firing continued as heavy as ever. During this storm the Pretoria boys made a run for life and liberty, and although the English gave them a hot fire, all came out safely. It was not till late at night that the Free Staters and Transvaalers gave up all hope on the Platrand and returned to their camps. Every one spent the next day in damning Erasmus, yet he was not dismissed, nor laid aside for reflection, because he was very wealthy, and belonged to one of the best families in the Transvaal. We had a heavy loss on that day, fifty being killed and 135 wounded. Of course the Free Staters were heavy losers. The English made a poor defence, and I feel sure that if Erasmus had sent his promised re-enforcements, the Platrand would have been taken, and of course that would have caused the immediate surrender of Ladysmith.

General White reported that he sent back eighty dead to the Boer lines. Another officer wrote that he counted 135 dead on the field. By just such official lying as this the British forces succeeded in killing off the entire Boer forces more than four times during the war, yet almost the entire Boer force was still alive at the end of the war. The military colleges of England must be special schools for turning out trained liars to command in the British army, otherwise the conduct of the British officer in his report of the battles, etc., of the Boer war is beyond my understanding. I have spoken very harshly of Erasmus, Meyer and Burger, but they eminently deserve all I have said. The bravest and the most daring of the Boer commanders will always find the rank and file ready to follow him, but not to lead him. This statement will apply and prove equally true in all armies except the British, and it will not apply there, for the reason that there is such a wide chasm between the British officer and soldier, that the latter has neither respect for the former as an officer, nor confidence in him as such; consequently the British officer must drive the soldier into the fighting line. When once the British soldier has respect and confidence in his officer, he will follow him, without a murmur, into the very jaws of death. But I must here state one condition, and that is, that the British soldier who is ever ready to follow his respected officer must be either an Irishman or a Scotchman, for the Johnny proper, being degenerate, and no longer a warrior, does not believe in risking life for the off-chance of taking life.

Now I return to Buller and his army, and I see them making grand preparations to do something. I thought to myself that he had at last discovered the key, Langwani Hill, that alone would open the gates of the Boer lines, and lead him to Ladysmith, where many thousand starving people were praying for his coming. I was mistaken, for soon he and his whole army were seen coming around the bend of the Tugela towards Spion Kop. It was now evident to all that a big fight must take place to the west of Ladysmith, and in plain view of both besieger and besieged.

He pitched his camp behind what is known to the Boers as the Bosch-rand, a high, wooded mountain ridge that commanded all the hills on our side of the river. This river ran up to the very foot of the Bosch-rand, and then making a pretty sharp curve, wound its way back to the foot of the hills on our side. The river valley was perfectly flat and about 4,000 yards wide, and as the river wound its way through it, first touching the hills on one side and then on the other, it made a succession of U's. This was an ugly river, with steep, muddy banks, and as I looked at it and its beautiful valley, bounded by high hills, it reminded me of a great amphitheatre in which a few scattered Boers were to occupy the top seats, and a big English army the ring. Both the English and Boers were to be actors, and the gods above were alone to witness and judge one of the greatest, most exciting and destructive contests-at-arms of modern times, in which the Boers were destined to wear the crown of victory.

Buller's first attempt was to turn Botha's right, but after five days hard fighting he withdrew and fixed his attention on Spion Kop. General Botha had left only a guard of fifteen men on this kop, and in the very early morning of January 24th, a large force of Buller's men surprised them and drove them off. General Buller now had possession of the kop, and there was no valid reason why he and his big army should not march into Ladysmith with but little trouble or delay. But they didn't, and I will tell why they didn't.