A West Pointer with the Boers /

by John Y. Fillmore Blake

Here I must mention a little incident in which Mike Halley was the principal actor. At the time that the bridges and railways had been blown up in good form and we had crossed Sand River and arrived at Riet Spruit very near the Sand River, General Botha had sent for Sergeant Joe Wade, Mike Halley and Dick Barry to give them further instructions. Strange to say, General Botha always waited until the last moment, in fact, to the moment when it was too late to do good work. The boys were always on the alert and sometimes acted without orders, blew up the bridges according to my instructions and felt much satisfaction. Now, when they were called up, General de la Rey happened to meet Mike Halley and bounced on him for too much enthusiasm. Mike did not know the general, and thinking he was an ordinary Boer, said "What in hell do you know about it, anyhow?" This settled the general and he replied, "Go ahead. You know your business, my boy."

When Mike was informed that he was addressing General de la Rey, he promptly went to him to offer his apology.

The boys were now given full swing and rails, ties and bridges were constantly flying in the air till we reached the Vaal River, the Transvaal border, where orders were received from General Louis Botha to destroy nothing more. What a puerile display of military knowledge! Lord Roberts moved along this long line across the flats of the Free State. He had three columns, each 30,000 strong. One followed the road along the railway line and the other two were on the right and left flanks. There were not over 2,500 Boers and three or four cannon to oppose him on these wide open flats, yet it took him twenty-three days to drive that little band of patriots a distance of 110 miles, and every foot of the distance was hotly contested.

When we reached Kroonstad all were very tired, but the Irish boys wished to do some more work before they left the town. The English, of course, were at our heels, but that did not concern them in the least. We rigged up a spring wagon with six mules, loaded it with provisions and ammunition and were ready to move out just after blowing up the bridge and thoroughly alarming the town, when it suddenly occurred to Mick Ryan to destroy the provision depot. It was an immense building filled with sufficient supplies to support an ordinary army for many days. I told Mick to go ahead and do his work well. He built a good fire against the building, and some Englishmen came up with water and put it out. Mick then warned them not to try to do it again. He kindled another fire, and when it blazed up, one of the same Englishmen dashed up with a bucket of water and put it out. Mick struck him on the head with his rifle, knocked him senseless and then warned the others that if any attempt was made to put out his fire again he would give them some bullets. He made up his fire again, and this time no one disturbed it. When the building was well on fire, some one yelled out that there were several cases of dynamite near the burning part of the building. Everybody fled for their lives, and Mick saw that immense supply depot burn to the ground. It was about eleven o'clock at night, and the great light was plainly visible to Lord Roberts and his army who were about three miles distant. The English are not yet through damning the Irish Brigade for their good piece of work.

The main part of the brigade went forward with the cannon, and it was just thirty of us that remained behind to finish up the good work.

After the supply depot was burned we left town and camped about three miles out on the Heilbron road. We had learned that the English had put themselves between us and the Boer forces, so we had to take this route. Early next morning we were just ready to move out when we saw about 400 cavalry coming for us. We hastened off and kept ourselves in safety although the English pursued us as rapidly as they dared. They did not give up the chase until we were near the little town of Heilbron.

Here we met President Steyn, and Judge Hertzog, and I can remember that the only subject discussed was the importance of playing on Lord Roberts' line of communication. I finally convinced them that it was the only way they could successfully fight such an immense army, and President Steyn telegraphed President Kruger for permission for the Irish Brigade to remain in the Free State. President Kruger wanted us in the Transvaal, so we said good-bye, and left for Rhenoster River at the railway crossing, where we learned that the Boers had taken up positions. General De Wet, however, went to work on Roberts' communications, and soon established for himself the greatest name of all the Boer officers in the field. Had we done in the Transvaal what De Wet did in the Free State, Roberts would have been driven into famine, and utterly disgraced himself in the eyes of the world; but this is not the place to explain, so we will wait until we reach Pretoria. We left Heilbron early in the morning, and at night we were with General Botha and the Boer forces. We now learned that General Botha had officially reported us as captured in Kroonstad and he was very much surprised when I reported to him. Having told him what we had done in Kroonstad, and assured him that we had not been in any real danger, he instructed me to take position at the road crossing, on the river. These road crossings of rivers are always the warmest places when it comes to a fight, and as the English were then near at hand, I fully expected on the following day to have a most interesting time. On reaching our position, and having taken a good look at it, I was then convinced that the English would not attack, but would go around our flanks. I told General Botha that he would find that I was right, because this Rhenoster River is the best defensive position I had seen in the country. The banks were very deep and steep, and the river bed was caked sand, over which flowed a skim of water. We could gallop our horses for miles in that river without being seen or in any way exposed to artillery fire. To attack the position, the English would have to advance over a grassy plain, gently sloping to the river, and 2,500 Boers in the river could easily have killed as many English without taking any risk whatever. I was certain that the English knew all about the strength of this river position and would therefore dodge it. It was about three o'clock on the following morning when we received orders to retreat, as the English had crossed the river on our left and right flanks. As it was very dark, we concluded to wait until daylight before retreating. Just as it was good light we moved away, and an English battery on a ridge some 2,500 yards distant, sent three shells at us, to move us along more lively. There was no more fighting of any consequence until we reached Klip River, near Johannesburg. The little band of patriots were always in touch with the big English army, and occasionally, some shots would be exchanged near the bridges which the Irish boys were charging with dynamite, but no damage was done. I didn't understand then, nor do I understand now, why that great British army did not at least make an effort to capture that small band of Boers and all their cannon, while crossing the great open plain between Brandford and the Vaal River. For the operations of cavalry and artillery, there is no country in the world more favorable than those immense Free State prairies, and had Roberts made any use of his thousands of cavalry, he could have taken the Boer guns at any time, and the 2,500 Boers with them. He seemed frightened, and I believe he was, for he had not yet forgotten the slaughter at Magersfontein. We could never understand, either, why he followed the small Boer force, and left behind that daring man, General Christian De Wet, with 10,000 men. But more about this after we reach Pretoria. To the south of Johannesburg, General Botha had some short but lively fighting, and forced the English to move around to the west, where General de la Rey warmed them up in good form.

The English also came in on the east, where there was a little skirmishing that did not amount to anything. We passed through Johannesburg, and went to within six miles of Pretoria. The Boers and British were actually camped side by side just north of Johannesburg, but the Boers were the first to find this out at daylight and so managed to escape being captured. General Botha is a pretty reckless man, and he did not get out any too quickly.

I urged the council of war at Vaal River to allow me to blow up certain mines in Johannesburg, but it was no use talking, not one of them would agree to it. They did not believe in the destruction of property. It was the mines of the very men who, with Chamberlain, Milner and Rhodes, had labored so hard to bring on the war, that I was so anxious to blow up, and I regret to this day that we did not destroy them. All the immense stores of provisions in Johannesburg and Pretoria I wished so badly to destroy, that I fairly begged for permission to do it, but all in vain. With De Wet and 10,000 men behind Roberts, and on his line of communications, and all provisions in Johannesburg and Pretoria destroyed, Lord Roberts would have been a defeated man, for the reason that he had no food for his army. As it was, his men came nearly starving to death on half rations. I can never forgive the Boer generals for leaving such quantities of good supplies for the British. The railway and telegraph lines between the Vaal River and Pretoria should have been completely destroyed, yet General Botha gave me strict orders not to disturb either. We were simply playing into the hands of the English, and doing more for them than they could possibly do for themselves. On the fifth of June we had to leave Pretoria, and, strange to say, we left the Pietersburg and Delagoa railway lines, all in good order with plenty of engines and cars for immediate use by the English. Why General Botha insisted on leaving all these lines intact, and well equipped for the English, I cannot understand. There was not a burgher in the field, that did not realize that the destruction of all railway facilities was a matter of grave importance. Much as I admire General Botha, not only as a brave man, but as a first-class fighter and an able general, I must condemn him for his opposition to the destruction of the enemy's communications, and for his failure to destroy the enemy's supply stores. General De Wet had done his work so well that General Roberts was cut off from all communications with the Colony, and there was no food to be had in the country, except in the Boer supply stores.