Thirdly, p. ix. They have no legislative power, because Mr. Washington, in his "Observations on the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of the Kings of England," sheweth, from "undeniable authorities, that in the time of William the Conqueror, and several of his successors, there were no laws enacted concerning religion, but by the great council of the kingdom." I hope, likewise, Mr. Washington observeth that this great council of the kingdom, as appeareth by undeniable authorities, was sometimes entirely composed of bishops and clergy, and called the parliament, and often consulted upon affairs of state, as well as church, as it is agreed by twenty writers of three ages; and if Mr. Washington says otherwise, he is an author just fit to be quoted by beaux.
Fourthly,—But it is endless to pursue this matter any further; in that, it is plain, the clergy have no divine right to make laws; because Henry VIII, Edward VI, and Queen Elizabeth, with their parliaments will not allow it them. Now, without examining what divine right the clergy have, or how far it extendeth; is it any sort of proof that I have no right, because a stronger power will not let me exercise it? Or doth all, that this author says through his preface, or book itself, offer any other sort of argument but this, or what he deduces the same way?
But his arguments and definitions are yet more supportable than the grossness of historical remarks, which are scattered so plentifully in his book, that it would be tedious to enumerate, or to shew the fraud and ignorance of them. I beg the reader's leave to take notice of one here just in my way; and, the rather, because I design for the future to let hundreds of them pass without further notice. "When," says he, p. x. "by the abolishing of the Pope's power, things were brought back to their ancient channel, the parliament's right in making ecclesiastical laws revived of course." What can possibly be meant by this "ancient channel?" Why, the channel that things ran in before the Pope had any power in England: that is to say, before Austin the monk converted England, before which time, it seems, the parliament had a right to make ecclesiastical laws. And what parliament could this be? Why, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons met at Westminster.
I cannot here forbear reproving the folly and pedantry of some lawyers, whose opinions this poor creature blindly followeth, and rendereth yet more absurd by his comments. The knowledge of our constitution can be only attained by consulting the earliest English histories, of which those gentlemen seem utterly ignorant, further than a quotation or an index. They would fain derive our government as now constituted, from antiquity: And, because they have seen Tacitus quoted for his majoribus omnes; and have read of the Goths' military institution in their progresses and conquests, they presently dream of a parliament. Had their reading reached so far, they might have deduced it much more fairly from Aristotle and Polybius, who both distinctly name the composition of rex, seniores, et populus; and the latter, as I remember particularly, with the highest approbation. The princes, in the Saxon Heptarchy, did indeed call their nobles sometimes together upon weighty affairs, as most other princes of the world have done in all ages. But they made war and peace, and raised money by their own authority: They gave or mended laws by their charters, and they raised armies by their tenures. Besides, some of those kingdoms fell in by conquests, before England was reduced under one head, and therefore could pretend no rights, but by the concessions of the conqueror.
Further, which is more material, upon the admission of Christianity, great quantities of land were acquired by the clergy, so that the great council of the nation was often entirely of churchmen, and ever a considerable part. But, our present constitution is an artificial thing, not fairly to be traced, in my opinion, beyond Henry I. Since which time it hath in every age admitted several alterations; and differeth now as much, even from what it was then, as almost any two species of government described by Aristotle. And, it would be much more reasonable to affirm, that the government of Rome continued the same under Justinian, as it was in the time of Scipio, because the senate and consuls still remained, although the power of both had been several hundred years transferred to the emperors.
REMARKS ON THE PREFACE.[12]
[Footnote 12: References to Tindal's book, and remarks upon it, which the author left thus indigested, being hints for himself to use in answering the said book.]
Page iv, v. "If men of opposite sentiments can subscribe the same articles, they are as much at liberty as if there were none." May not a man subscribe the whole articles, because he differs from another in the explication of one? How many oaths are prescribed, that men may differ in the explication of some part of them? Instance, &c.
Page vi. "Idea of Government." A canting pedantic way, learned from
Locke; and how prettily he sheweth it. Instance—
Page vii, "25 Hen. VIII. c. 19 is a bar to any such divine right [of a legislative power in the clergy.]" Absurd to argue against the clergy's divine right, because of the statute of Henry VIII. How doth that destroy divine right? The sottish way of arguing; from what the parliament can do; from their power, &c.