The Earl Rivers had, in the foregoing year, been sent to Hanover, in order to undeceive the Elector, and remove whatever prejudices might be infused into his Highness against Her Majesty's proceedings; but it should seem that he had no very great success in his negotiation: for soon after his return to England, Mons. Bothmar's "Memorial" appeared in the manner I have already related, which discovered the sentiments of his electoral Highness (if they were truly represented in that "Memorial") to differ not a little from those of the Queen. Mr. Harley was therefore directed to take the first opportunity of speaking to the Elector in private, to assure him, "That although Her Majesty had thought herself justly provoked by the conduct of his minister, yet such was her affection for his Highness, and concern for the interests of his family, that instead of showing the least mark of resentment, she had chosen to send him (Mr. Harley) fully instructed to open her designs, and shew his Highness the real interest of Britain in the present conjuncture." Mr. Harley was to give the Elector a true account of what had passed in England, during the first part of this session of Parliament; to expose to his Highness the weakness of those with whom his minister had consulted, and under whose directions he had acted; to convince him how much lower that faction must become, when a peace should be concluded, and when the natural strength of the kingdom, disencumbered from the burthen of the war, should be at liberty to exert itself; to shew him how his interest in the succession was sacrificed to that of a party: that his Highness had been hitherto a friend to both sides, but that the measures taken by his ministers, had tended only to set him at the head of one in opposition to the other: to explain to the Elector, how fully the safety of Europe was provided for by the plan of peace in Her Majesty's speech; and how little reason those would appear to have, who complained the loudest of this plan, if it were compared either with our engagements to them when we began the war, or with their performances in the course of it.
Upon this occasion Mr, Harley was to observe to the Elector, "That it should rather be wondered at, how the Queen had brought France to offer so much, than yet to offer no more; because, as soon as ever it appeared, that Her Majesty would be at the head of this treaty, and that the interests of Britain were to be provided for, such endeavours were used to break off the negotiation, as are hardly to be paralleled; and the disunion thereby created among the allies, had given more opportunities to the enemy, of being slow in their concessions, than any other measures might possibly have done: That this want of concert among the allies, could not in any sort be imputed to the Queen, who had all along invited them to it with the greatest earnestness, as the surest means to bring France to reason: That she had always, in a particular manner, pressed the States General to come into the strictest union with her, and opened to them her intentions with the greatest freedom; but finding, that instead of concurring with Her Majesty, they were daily carrying on intrigues to break off the negotiation, and thereby deprive her of the advantages she might justly expect from the ensuing peace, having no other way left, she was forced to act with France as she did, by herself: That, however, the Queen had not taken upon herself to determine the interests of the allies, who were at liberty of insisting on farther pretensions, wherein Her Majesty would not be wanting to support them as far as she was able, and improve the concessions already made by France; in which case, a good understanding and harmony among the confederates, would yet be of the greatest use for making the enemy more tractable and easy."
I have been more particular in reciting the substance of Mr. Harley's instructions, because it will serve as a recapitulation of what I have already said upon this subject, and seems to set Her Majesty's intentions, and proceedings at this time, in the clearest light.
After the cessation of arms declared by the Duke of Ormonde, upon the delivery of Dunkirk, the British plenipotentiaries very earnestly pressed those of Holland to come into a general armistice; for if the whole confederacy acted in conjunction, this would certainly be the best means for bringing the common enemy to reasonable terms of peace: but the States, deluded by the boundless promises of Count Zinzendorf, and the undertaking talent of Prince Eugene, who dreaded the conclusion of the war, as the period of his glory, would not hear of a cessation. The loss of eighteen thousand Britons was not a diminution of weight in the balance of such an ally as the Emperor, and such a general as the Prince. Besides, they looked upon themselves to be still superior to France in the field; and although their computation was certainly right in point of number, yet, in my opinion, the conclusion drawn from it, was grounded upon a great mistake. I have been assured by several persons of our own country, and some foreigners of the first rank, both for skill and station in arms, that in most victories obtained in the present war, the British troops were ever employed in the post of danger and honour, and usually began the attack (being allowed to be naturally more fearless than the people of any other country), by which they were not only an example of courage to the rest, but must be acknowledged, without partiality, to have governed the fortune of the day; since it is known enough, how small a part of an army is generally engaged in any battle. It may likewise be added, that nothing is of greater moment in war than opinion. The French, by their frequent losses, which they chiefly attributed to the courage of our men, believed that a British general, at the head of British troops, was not to be overcome; and the Maréchal de Villars was quickly sensible of the advantage he had got; for, in a very few days after the desertion of the allies, happened the Earl of Albemarle's disgrace at Denain, by a feint of the Maréchal's, and a manifest failure somewhere or other, both of courage and conduct on the side of the confederates. The blame of which was equally shared between Prince Eugene and the Earl; although it is certain, the Duke of Ormonde gave the latter timely warning of his danger, observing he was neither intrenched as he ought, nor provided with bridges sufficient for the situation he was in, and at such a distance from the main army.[16]
[Footnote 16: It is alleged by the continuator of Rapin, that the surprise and defeat of the confederated troops under the Earl of Albemarle, at Denain, was, in a great measure, owing to the Duke of Ormonde having, in spite of all remonstrance, reclaimed and carried off certain pontoons which had been lent to the allies. For Prince Eugene having received intelligence of the design against Albemarle, marched to his succour; but the bridge having broken under the quantity of the baggage which had been transported across the Scheldt, he could only remain the spectator of their misfortune. [S.]
The Marquis de Torcy had likewise the same sentiments, of what mighty consequence those few British battalions were to the confederate army; since he advised his master to deliver up Dunkirk, although the Queen could not perform the condition understood, which was a cessation of arms of all the foreign forces in her pay.
It must be owned, that Mons. de Torcy made great merit of this confidence that his master placed in the Queen; and observing Her Majesty's displeasure against the Dutch, on account of their late proceedings, endeavoured to inflame it with aggravations enough; insinuating, "That, since the States had acted so ungratefully, the Queen should let her forces join with those of France, in order to compel the confederates to a peace." But although this overture were very tenderly hinted from the French court, Her Majesty heard it with the utmost abhorrence; and ordered her secretary, Mr. St. John (created about this time Viscount Bolingbroke),[17] to tell Mons. de Torcy, "That no provocations whatever should tempt her to distress her allies; but she would endeavour to bring them to reason by fair means, or leave them to their own conduct: That if the former should be found impracticable, she would then make her own peace, and content herself with doing the office of a mediator between both parties: but if the States should at any time come to a better mind, and suffer their ministers to act in conjunction with hers, she would assert their just interests to the utmost, and make no farther progress in any treaty with France, until those allies received all reasonable satisfaction, both as to their barrier and their trade." The British plenipotentiaries were directed to give the same assurances to the Dutch ministers at Utrecht, and withal to let them know, "That the Queen was determined, by their late conduct, to make peace either with or without them; but would much rather choose the former."
[Footnote 17: Bolingbroke had understood that he would not lose rank on his promotion, from which he concluded that the earldom of Bolingbroke, extinct in his family, would be revived in his favour. His indignation, however, was very keen when he was created only a Viscount. He wrote to Strafford at Utrecht, that his promotion had been a mortification to him. "In the House of Commons," he said, "I may say that I was at the head of business. ... There was, therefore, nothing to flatter my ambition in removing me from thence, but giving me the title which had been many years in my family, and which reverted to the Crown about a year ago, by the death of the last of the elder house. ... I own to you that I felt more indignation than ever in my life I had done." (Letter to the Earl of Strafford, July 23, 1712). [T.S.]
There was, however, one advantage which Her Majesty resolved to make by this defection of her foreigners. She had been led, by the mistaken politics of some years past, to involve herself in several guaranties with the princes of the north, which were, in some sort, contradictory to one another; but this conduct of theirs wholly annulled all such engagements, and left her at liberty to interpose in the affairs of those parts of Europe, in such a manner as would best serve the interests of her own kingdoms, as well as that of the Protestant religion, and settle a due balance of power in the north.
The grand article for preventing the union of France and Spain, was to be executed during a cessation of arms. But many difficulties arising about that, and some other points of great importance to the common cause, which could not easily be adjusted either between the French and British plenipotentiaries at Utrecht, or by correspondence between Mons. de Torcy and the ministry here; the Queen took the resolution of sending the Lord Viscount Bolingbroke immediately to France, fully instructed in all her intentions, and authorized to negotiate every thing necessary for settling the treaty of peace in such a course, as might bring it to a happy and speedy conclusion. He was empowered to agree to a general suspension of arms, by sea and land, between Great Britain, France and Spain, to continue for four months, or until the conclusion of the peace; provided France and Spain would previously give positive assurances to make good the terms demanded by Her Majesty for the Duke of Savoy, and would likewise adjust and determine the forms of the several renunciations to be made by both those crowns, in order to prevent their being ever united. The Lord Bolingbroke was likewise authorized to settle some differences relating to the Elector of Bavaria, for whose interests France was as much concerned as Her Majesty was for those of the Duke of Savoy; to explain all doubtful articles which particularly related to the advantages of Britain; to know the real ultimatum, as it is termed, of France upon the general plan of peace; and lastly, to cut off all hopes from that court of ever bringing the Queen to force her allies to a disadvantageous peace; Her Majesty resolving to impose no scheme at all upon them, or to debar them from the liberty of endeavouring to obtain the best conditions they could.