Ten Years' Captivity in the Mahdi's Camp 1882-1892

by Josef Ohrwalder; Sir F. R. Wingate

HICKS PASHA.

It appears that Consul Hansal also wrote a letter to the Mahdi, but the latter said nothing to us about it. Amina, one of our black girls whom the Mahdi had taken as a concubine, said she saw in the Mahdi's hand a letter with a large seal, on which the "double-headed eagle" was represented; but the Mahdi does not appear to have taken much notice of it. In Darfur the news of the intended Hicks expedition had considerable effect. Slatin, the Governor-General, had been fighting continuously against the natives of Darfur and against the Rizighat, Habbanieh, and other Arab tribes; he was now in the north, then in the south, combating with bravery and unusual rapidity the various revolts which sprang up throughout his province. He was a scourge to the Arabs and killed thousands of them; he even pursued them into the almost inaccessible hills and valleys of Jebel Marra. His powers of endurance were wonderful, and he would often be twenty-four hours in the saddle, constantly fighting, and with nothing to eat or drink. He slept on the bare floor or ground beside his native soldiers, and lived on dhurra soaked in water; he was just, never took bribes, generous, ever ready to assist the poor and needy, and never refused admittance to old and young who sought his help. In spite, however, of his having—as he himself told me—fought in twenty-seven battles against the Arabs, he could not crush them, for they were like fungus growing out of the earth.

In action Slatin was most heroic. On one occasion he was struck by a bullet which shattered one of his fingers; but, undismayed, he seized the hanging remnant with his other hand and ordered the man standing next him to cut it off with his knife; then he joined again in the fight, and cheered his men on to victory. Not only in Kordofan, but throughout the entire Sudan, he was celebrated for his bravery in the face of the enemy. Still he was powerless to cope with the extensive revolt in his province, and obtained little support from his Egyptian officers, who were jealous and constantly intrigued against him; yet it was the wonder of all that he succeeded in holding out so long. At length, when his ammunition was almost finished, came the news of Hicks's projected expedition, and to gain time he resorted to the following expedient. His vakil was a man named Mohammed Zogal, uncle to the Mahdi, and a man of sense; with him Slatin came to a private understanding, and it was agreed that Zogal should pay a visit to the Mahdi, inform him that Slatin was prepared to submit, provided he was permitted to hold his present position, and then he was to return and bring back full information regarding the Mahdi, his power, &c., and at the same time endeavour to arrange for a suspension of hostilities pending the arrival of Hicks. Should Hicks be victorious then Slatin and Darfur would be saved, otherwise all would be lost; but this plan, if successful, would enable Slatin to hold out until Hicks came, which he could not otherwise have done. Zogal set out on his journey and arrived at El Obeid early in September 1883, where he was warmly welcomed by the Mahdi. The latter was much pleased with Slatin's proposition, and ordered a salute of one hundred guns to be fired to announce his surrender.

The Mahdi could now turn his entire attention to his preparations to resist the advance of General Hicks, concerning the number of whose troops the wildest reports were circulated. On learning of his departure from Omdurman on the 9th of September, he issued a proclamation instructing his emirs to read it to their followers. In it he, as usual, styled himself the Mahdi sent by God to defeat the Turks, who were the enemies of God and His Prophet, and that his mission was to conquer the world; he extolled the virtues of holy war and promised paradise and its joys to all those who fell fighting in the holy cause. He now quitted El Obeid and pitched his tent under a large Adansonia tree outside the walls; his three Khalifas and their followers copied his example, and this was the signal for the whole town to be evacuated. The life of ease and comfort was abandoned and people collected round their emirs' flags, so that in a short time an enormous camp was formed in anticipation of the great battle. Couriers were sent in all directions to proclaim that anyone who refused to follow the Mahdi would have his hand and foot cut off; all men joined willingly, the Mahdi's camp daily grew larger, and straw huts (or tokuls) soon covered the plain, though the people were allowed in turns to go back to the town at night. Detachments of troops were sent to various parts of Kordofan to collect the Dervishes, and whole tribes streamed from all directions towards El Obeid. Daily man[oe]uvres and reviews were held, and guns fired repeatedly so that the horses should get accustomed to the noise. Thus the Mahdi instilled great enthusiasm into the masses, and we began to have some fear for Hicks.

The Mahdi now despatched the three emirs, Abdel Halim Wad el Hashmi, Hajji Mohammed Abu Girgeh, and Omar Elias Pasha, with their followers, to Duem. They were instructed to watch the movements of Hicks's force, and when it left the White Nile, to cut his communication; they were then to harass his march as much as possible, but not to bring on a general engagement. All these orders were admirably carried out.

General Hicks left Duem on the 24th of September, 1883, and marched in a south-westerly direction through Shatt, Zeregga, Aigella, Shirkeleh, and Rahad, which he reached on the 20th of October, leaving Tagalla and Jebel Dair on the left. The inhabitants of the districts through which the troops passed, quitted their villages and carried off all their goods, so that when the troops arrived they found nothing but straw huts, which the soldiers at first set fire to; but General Hicks soon forbade this practice. The ill-fated army scarcely met a living soul, but flocks of vultures followed them as if waiting for their prey. Shortly after the annihilation of the army, a small and incomplete diary belonging to an Austrian officer, Major Herlth, came into my hands, but it was sufficient to give me an insight into the wretched condition of this force. The facts were briefly as follows: It was expected that on the arrival of the army at Shirkeleh, it would be joined by several thousand Tagalla people, and it was hoped that this reinforcement would inspire the troops with some life and energy, which they entirely lacked; but these reinforcements never appeared.

Major Herlth described the troops as anything but good, and frequently refers to the want of agreement between the two commanders—General Hicks with his small body of European officers on the one hand, and Ala ed Din Pasha, Governor-General of the Sudan, a man imbued with the old Turkish system, on the other. The European officers were convinced that the expedition would not be successful; the camels were badly looked after, hundreds died every day, and their loads were piled on to the others which were still alive; saddles were for the most part without straw, so that the bare wood rubbing on their backs made terrible wounds. Almost all the horses had died before the force reached Rahad. General Hicks had also great trouble in keeping the men together; numbers of them had recently been fighting against the English with Arabi Pasha, and had been forcibly sent to the Sudan. It is also strange that the shorter route from Duem to Bara, on which there was plenty of water, was not chosen in preference to the long roundabout road they took. While the latter route led through forests and long grass, the former was entirely free from these obstructions, and, moreover, the friendly Kababish tribe would have supported them on their northern flank. There was still another circumstance which contributed to the final disaster—the guides were treacherous, and led the army into the hands of the Dervishes; indeed, it was an open secret in the camp at El Obeid that the guides had been sent by the Mahdi.

At Rahad, Hicks expected to have been joined by five hundred Baggara horsemen, and it is true a number of horsemen were seen in the distance, and a white flag was shown; but the riders did not approach, and it was soon evident that they were enemies. The force was in such a miserable and wretched condition that the emir, Abdel Halim, begged permission of the Mahdi to be allowed to attack it with his own followers; but this the Mahdi would not permit him to do, as he wanted to have all the honour and glory of victory for himself. Every day information about the movements of the Egyptian troops was sent to the Mahdi; sometimes reports reached him twice a day, and were always of the same tenour, viz. that the men had no heart to fight. Had an expedition been coming which had the elements of success in it, public opinion would have shown itself by numbers deserting the Mahdi's standards; but they had heard nothing of Hicks's early successes, and now the only reports that reached them were that the army was in a hopeless condition. All this only made the Mahdi's prestige the greater, and it must be remembered that the latter was an adept at inspiring fanaticism. One of General Hicks's spies was captured, and he was at once impaled on lances. The following extracts, which I give from memory, from Major Herlth's diary will show how demoralised the expedition had become. The camp was pitched at Rahad on a small eminence near the Khor Abu Habl, whilst the enemy, who were concealed on the opposite side in the high grass and under the trees, fired incessantly at the Egyptians and killed a number of them. One bullet entered Hicks's tent and struck the seat on which he was sitting; he then gave orders that the grass and woods should be at once cleared of the enemy. There was still a little water in the Khor, and as it seemed to be deep, a consultation was held as to how it should best be crossed. The discussion lasted an hour. At length a few, more courageous than the rest, decided to try and wade across, and to their intense surprise found that it was quite shallow and easily fordable; they then crossed over and drove back the enemy, killing seven of them.

While at Rahad, it was discovered that the camp out of which they had marched the previous day had been entered, and everything that they had left behind had been taken. It was now evident that the enemy were in greater force than they had thought, and in consequence General Hicks made an entrenchment and put guns into position, which were fired with some effect, as one shell killed no less than thirteen men. This news was sent to the Mahdi.