Party Government

If the orator is a menace to the wise decisions of the people by a referendum, the party organiser and political "boss" can easily be a curse to representative government on party lines. By all manner of unholy devices he can secure votes for his candidate and his party, and he has raised (or lowered) the simple business of getting the people to choose their representative into the art of electioneering. The triumph of political principles by the election of persons to carry out those principles becomes of less importance than the successful working of the party machine, when the boss and the organiser are conspicuous. Patronage becomes the method for keeping the party in power, and the promise of rewards and spoils enables an opposition to defeat the Government and obtain office. To be outside the party is to lose all chance of sharing in the spoils, and to take an interest in politics means, under these circumstances, to expect some consideration in the distribution of honours.

The "spoils system" is notorious in America, but in England it has become practically impossible for a man to take any serious part in politics except by becoming part of the machine. An independent attitude means isolation. To belong to a party—Liberal, Unionist, or Labour—and to criticise its policy, or differ from its leaders, is resented as impertinence. The machine is master of the man. A troublesome and dangerous critic is commonly bought or silenced. He is given office in the Government, or rewarded with a legal appointment; perhaps made a peer if his tastes are in that direction. A critic who cannot command a considerable backing among the electorate will probably be driven out of public life. The disinterested activity in politics that puts the commonwealth before party gain is naturally discouraged by the party organisers.

Yet when public interest in national affairs sinks to the merely sporting instinct of "backing your candidate" at elections as a horse is backed at race meetings, and of "shouting for your party" as men shout for their favourite football team, or sinks still lower to the mercenary speculation of personal gain or loss on election results, then another danger comes in—the indifference of the average honest citizen to all politics, and the cynical disbelief in political honesty.

The warnings of John Stuart Mill against leaving politics to the politicians and against the professional position may be quoted:

"Representative institutions are of little value, and may be a mere instrument of tyranny or intrigue when the generality of electors are not sufficiently interested in their own government to give their vote; or, if they vote at all, do not bestow their suffrages on public grounds, but sell them for money, or vote at the beck of some one who has control over them, or whom for private reasons they desire to propitiate. Popular elections as thus practised, instead of a security against misgovernment, are but an additional wheel in its machinery."

Mill himself was a striking example of the entirely disinterested politician, who, caring a great deal more for principles than for party, finds little favour with the electors, and less with the party managers, and retires from politics to the relief of his fellows.

A general lack of interest in politics can prove fatal to democracy. The party managers, without the fear of the electorate before their eyes, will increase the number of salaried officials and strengthen their position by judicious appointments. Nominally, these inspectors and officers will be required for the public service, and the appointments will be justified on patriotic grounds. There will be little criticism in Parliament, because the party not in power will be anxious to create similar "jobs" when its own turn comes. Besides, as the public pays for these officials, there is no drain on the party funds; and this is a matter of congratulation to party managers, who are always anxious not to spend more than they can help on the political machinery.

Bureaucracy

But the horde of officials and inspectors will change democracy into bureaucracy, and the discovery is sometimes made too late that a land is ruled by permanent officials, and not by elected representatives. The elected representatives may sit and pass laws, but the bureaucracy which administers them will be the real authority.