Territorial Organisation.—When family ownership is replaced by communal ownership, the social organisation takes the territorial form. All the people inhabiting a given territory, whether related by blood or not, form the social unit. The Russian “Volost,” the Annamese commune, the Japanese “Mura,” the “Calpulli” of the ancient Toltecs, are examples of this kind of grouping.[292] Sometimes these territorial organisations form by themselves independent states, governed by an elected chief, assisted by the delegates of each commune (Moqui in North America, Krumen and Vakamba in Africa, Samoans in Oceania), or controlled by popular assemblies (New Hebrideans, most of the peoples of Western Africa and the Congo basin). Sometimes also they form part of vaster confederations at the head of which is an elected chief, a council, etc. (Rejangs of Sumatra with their “Pangherans,” or princes, Afghans with their “Khans,” etc.).
Organisation of Castes and Classes.—We may find already in the territorial organisation of society the rudiments of the formation of classes, shown by the development of private property and wealth, and also by the authority of the chiefs and powerful persons who become the “protectors” of the weak. This differentiation of classes is also marked by the appearance of slavery, the result of wars and the right of private property (enslavement for debt). It takes definite form in the class organisation which presupposes the existence of two groups of citizens at least—the lords and nobles, the aristocracy or directing class, and the “people,” the plebeian or directed class. The relations between these classes may extend from the complete servitude of the one and the exercise of the right of life and death by the other, to an almost absolute equality of the two.
There is similarly a perfect gradation for non-free people, as opposed to citizens divided into two or more classes. At the foot of the ladder are “slaves,” in the strict sense of the word, not regarded even as men; while at the top are found those who by birth are not free, but who by fortune or otherwise may come to occupy a position almost equal to that of free citizens of the highest class.
What are the qualifications required in order to become chief in primitive social organisations? Most often, by election, those become chief who are bravest in war, strongest, most skilful in the chase (American Indians, Congolese), or the chiefs are the richest (Indians, Polynesians, Negroes), or simply they are the biggest, the best fed (Athapascans, according to Bancroft). But whatever may be the ground on which they are chosen, the power of these chiefs is often most precarious, and it may disappear with the cause of its origin (war, hunting expedition). Chiefs elected for a stated period are invested with more real power. Sometimes they are elected for life; this is a step towards hereditary power which may degenerate into the purest absolutism (ancient Dahomey). The outward ensigns of authority are of various sorts: clubs and commander’s staffs (Oceania and Europe), parasols (Asia, Africa),[293] etc. In the same way as the clan is responsible for the misdeeds of each of its members, so the absolute monarch, king, sultan, khan, prince, etc., is responsible for the acts committed by his subjects. The corollary of the conception that kings or other potentates represent the most skilful, influential, and bravest men is that of forfeiture of power when the holder becomes aged or infirm, or when he shows himself incapable of reigning (Quechuas, Masai); in certain absolute States the right of revolt against an incapable holder of royal power is expressly recognised (China), at least in theory.[294]
Feudal and Democratic Organisation.—It would be out of place here to dwell on the development of the feudal system and the theocracy which result from the régime of classes. Let us merely say that almost all half-civilised peoples are still in the midst of the feudal régime or are just emerging from it. The recognition of individual liberty forms the first step towards the organisations of modern European states, constitutional monarchies or republics, in which the aim is to reduce to a minimum governmental action and the differences of classes, especially before the law,—to establish, in a word, a democratic régime.
Social morality, or the basis of conduct imposed on the members of society, is a convention recognised by the laws and by public opinion. This is to say that it changes from one people to another, according to the degree of culture, surrounding circumstances, etc. In the most uncivilised tribes life has a relative security, owing to certain rules of conduct to which each member submits from fear of punishment or the disapprobation of public opinion. The right of the strongest is not applied in all its brutal logic even among savages.
Their rules of morality are of course not always in accordance with ours. Among the uncivilised, it is not a question of absolute right, of absolute morality; everything is reduced to a very restricted altruism, not extending beyond kin and immediate neighbours. It is wrong to kill a man of one’s own clan, or to steal something from the collective property of the clan; but it is, on the contrary, very praiseworthy to strike down with a well-directed arrow a stranger to the clan, or to carry off something from a neighbouring clan. Gradually the moral sentiment extends to people of the same tribe, of the same class or caste, of the same religion, but such extension is slow. Among the civilised the moral code sometimes varies as it is applied on this or that side of political or social boundaries.
Besides, in a general way, a number of acts regarded as culpable by the codes of all civilised states, are yet tolerated, and even extolled, in certain particular circumstances; such as the taking of life, for example, in legitimate defence, in a duel, during war, or as capital punishment. Thus in recalling examples of this kind, we shall be less severe on a Dyak who cuts off a man’s head solely that he may carry this trophy to his bride; for if he did otherwise he would be repulsed by all, and would not be able to marry. Among the uncivilised, morality is purely utilitarian; it encourages acts of utility to the clan, to the tribe (hospitality, protection of children, respect for common property, etc.), it reprobates those which are not advantageous (support of the old people, compassion for slaves, etc.).
Right and Justice.—At the origin of societies morals and the action of justice are indistinguishable, public opinion constitutes “common law,” often respected even by the legislations of the civilised. I cannot undertake to speak here of morals based on religious ideas, nor of ethnical jurisprudence.[295] Let it suffice to give some examples of customs which bring into prominence some of the ideas of right and justice of uncivilised peoples.