Some one said during the summer of 1918 when asked how much the American man and woman in the street really knew of what was going on in Europe, that if the headlines of American newspapers were disregarded and the actual telegraphic reports themselves read day by day, nearly everything that anybody from commanding generals down knew was known to that reader. There were, of course, many discussions amongst the guiding intellects, political and military, which never saw the light. There were, naturally, plans discussed and never carried out which the American citizen did not hear of at any time. But the general consensus of opinion seems to be that the {239} American newspaper reader knew almost as much as any one of what was happening and that he certainly knew as much of what was going to happen as the men in the inner circle.

Much that has come out since the armistice shows a condition of affairs almost as the man in the street knew it at the time. In the winter of 1917-18 we knew that a huge drive was scheduled by the Germans on the Franco-Belgian front in the spring. In the following summer we knew the doubtful situation around Château-Thierry. In the middle of July we knew that something was happening, that the Americans were beginning to go in in large numbers, that the German "push" was slowing up; and that a turn had been made. Finally we knew that the German army was suddenly retiring, and for a month before the armistice was signed we knew that it was going to be signed. Indeed so sure was the American public of this last that they celebrated the end of the war throughout this great land a week ahead of time, because of a report which, though literally incorrect, was in essence true and known to be true.

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It is not uninteresting, therefore, to review the sentiments and opinions which Wood found upon his arrival amongst the French and English statesmen and soldiers between January 1 and February 26th, 1918.

In London Lloyd George, the British Premier, knew Wood as the administrator of Cuba and the Philippines. He knew also of Wood's experience with, and knowledge of European armies. He was anxious for Wood to be in Europe. He laid great emphasis upon the shortage of American air service which made it difficult for American troops to work as a separate unit without English or French coöperation. He pled for American troops at the earliest possible moment and offered more transportation facilities--even though England had already transported not only her own men but many of ours across the Atlantic.

General Sir William Robertson stated in January that there was an impending crisis coming in the early spring; that Germany would make an immensely powerful drive toward Paris or the channel ports or both; and that in his opinion the Allied lines would hold until the Americans {241} got into the war with full strength. But he made no concealment of the fact that the next six months would be very critical ones.

Marshal Joffre held similar views. Both officers expressed the opinion that the summer of 1918 would be the crisis and deciding point of the war. They, too, felt the French and English lines would hold, but they laid heavy stress upon the importance of more troops from America.

On the French front Wood lunched and had a long talk with General Gouraud and another at Paris later with General Pétain whom he knew and who knew well the history of Wood's career in organization and administration. Pétain is said to have expressed the hope that Wood might soon be in France on active duty and to have said that when he did come he would put him in command of an army of French and American troops.

As Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor, next to the highest rank in that order--General Wood was naturally received by all French officers and statesmen. This order having been conferred upon him some years before because of his record in Cuba and the Philippines placed him in a small {242} group of men, most of them, naturally, French, who are the distinguished men of Europe. His reception by the President of France, by the premier, Georges Clemenceau, and other French statesmen came as a matter of course. But the conversations which took place between the American soldier and these men have never, naturally, been made public except in some of their bare essentials. Nor will any one ever know just what was said unless one or another of the parties to them shall some time disclose it himself.

There seems to be no doubt, however, of the very warm reception which this senior officer of the American army was given. His record in preparedness work, his record in administrative and organization work were all well known to the statesmen of these two countries who were from their experience with colonial matters so well fitted to judge of what he had accomplished along these lines.