In order to determine this question, let us see what constitutes, or in what consists, the power of doing, in any case, what we are disposed to do; and then we may be able to judge whether that power still exists, in case the disposition is wanting.
In what Power consists.—It is admitted that I can do what I wish or am disposed to do. Now, in what consists that power? That depends on what sort of act it is that I am to put forth. Suppose it be a physical act. My power to do what I wish, in that case, consists in my having certain physical organs capable of doing the given thing, and under the command of my will. Suppose it be an intellectual act. My power, in that case, of doing what I like, depends on my having such mental faculties as are requisite for the performance of the given act, and these under control. So long, then, as I have the faculties, physical or mental, that are requisite to the performance of a given act, and those faculties are under the control of my will, so that I can exert them if I please, and when I please, so long my power of doing what I like is unimpaired, and complete, as, e. g., the power of walking, or adding a column of accounts.
But suppose the Disposition wanting.—Suppose, now, the disposition to be wanting; does the power also disappear, or does it remain? I have the same faculties as before, and they are as fully under the control of the will as ever, and that constitutes all the power I ever had. I have the power, then, of doing what I have no inclination to do. Whatever I can do if I like, that also I can do, even if I do not like. In itself considered, the power to do a thing may be quite complete, and independent of the inclination or disposition to do or not to do.
Will it be put in Requisition?—But will this power be ever exercised? Certainly not, so long as the disinclination continues. In order to the doing of any thing, there must not only be power to do it, but disposition. If the latter be wanting, the former, though it may exist, will never be put forth.
Our Actions not consequently inevitable.—Have I, then, no power, that is really available, to do what I do not happen to be, at this moment, inclined to do? Am I shut up to the actual inclinations and choices of any given hour or moment? Am I under the stern rule of inevitable necessity and fate to do as I do, to choose as I choose, to be inclined as I am inclined? By no means. My inclinations are not fixed quantities. They may change. They depend, in part, on the intellectual conceptions: these may vary; in part on the state of the heart: divine grace may change the heart.
Actual Choices not necessary ones.—The actual choice of any given moment is by no means a necessary one. Another might have been in its stead. A different inclination is certainly possible and conceivable, and a different inclination would have led to a different choice. If, instead of looking at the advantage or agreeableness of a proposed course, and being influenced by that consideration, I had looked at the right, the obligation in the case, my choice would have been a different one, for I should have been influenced by a different motive. Two different objects were presented to my mind, a and b. As it is, I choose a, but might have chosen b, and should, had I been so inclined. Why did I choose a? Because, as the matter then presented itself to my mind, I was so inclined. But I might have taken a different view of the whole thing, and then my inclination and my choice would have been different. It was in my power to have thought, to have felt, to have acted differently. What is more, I not only might, but, perhaps, ought to have felt and acted differently. I am responsible for having such an inclination as leads to a wrong choice responsible for my opinions and views which influence my feelings; responsible for my disposition, in so far as it is the result of causes within my own control.
Different Uses of the Term Power.—It ought to be clearly defined in all such discussions what we mean by the principal terms employed. In the present instance what we mean by the words power, ability, can, etc., ought to be distinctly stated. Now, there are two senses in which these words are used, and the question before us turns, in part, on this difference.
1. We may use the word power, e. g., to denote all that is requisite or essential to the actual doing of a thing, whatever is so connected with the doing, that, if it be wanting, the thing will not be done.
Or, 2. In a more limited sense, to denote merely all that is requisite to the doing the thing, provided we please or choose to do it, all that is requisite in order to our doing what we like or wish.