The Theory does not suppose a divine Influence to Evil.—It is not necessary to suppose that God ever influences men to evil; the supposition is inconsistent with the divine character, with all we know and conceive of Deity. Nor is any such influence over man necessary in order to the accomplishment of evil, but, on the contrary, much is needed to restrain and prevent him from sin. Sufficient already are the motives and influences that incline him to go astray; feeble and inefficient, the inducements to a better life. Could we suppose, however, any influence of this sort to be exerted over man, inclining him to evil, we can still see how such influence might be perfectly consistent with his entire freedom. It is not the integrity of human freedom, but the integrity of the divine character, that forbids such a supposition.
Does not interfere with Responsibility.—Does such a power over human conduct, as that now attributed to the supreme Being, interfere with human responsibility? Not in the least. Responsibility rests with him who acts freely and as he pleases, doing that which is right or wrong, of his own accord, knowing what he does, and because he has a mind to do it. And it is thus man acts, under whatever decree of divine influence we may suppose him placed.
§ II.—Man's Power over Himself.
Unjust to require what it is impossible to perform.—Have I power, in all cases, to do what the divine will requires; power to do right? It would seem to be the verdict of reason, and the common sense of mankind, that to require of any man what is literally and absolutely beyond his power, is unjust, and that such a requirement, if it were made, would impose no obligation, since obedience would be impossible. We cannot suppose God to be guilty of such manifest injustice. His commands are right. They carry with them the judgment and reason of men. Conscience approves them. Obligation attends them. They must, therefore, be such commands as it is possible for us to obey. It would be manifest injustice and wrong to require of me what it is actually and absolutely out of my power to do.
Supposed Disinclination.—But suppose I have really no inclination, no disposition, to do right. My affections and desires are all wrong, inclining me to evil, and my sense of duty or moral obligation is not strong enough to prevail against these natural desires and evil inclinations; suppose this, which, alas! is too often true, and what then becomes of my power to do right? Does it any longer exist? Have I any power to change those affections and inclinations; or, they remaining as they are, have I any power to go contrary to them? A question this, at once profoundly philosophical, and intensely practical.
Position of the Fatalist.—The fatalist has no hesitation in replying no, to these questions. Man has no power to change the current of his own inclinations, nor yet to go against that current. He is wholly under the influence of motives; they turn him this way and that. He has power to do as he wills, but no power over the volitions themselves. He has power to do only what he has a mind to do. He has no mind, no inclination to do right, therefore, no power to do so.
This Position at Variance with a true Psychology.—A correct psychology, as we have already seen, gives a different answer. It is not true, as a matter of fact in the philosophy of the human mind, that man has no power to do what he has no disposition to do; nor is it true that his inclinations and affections are wholly out of his power and control. In both respects, fatalism is at war, not more with the common sense of mankind, than with a sound and true philosophy.
Confounds Power with Inclination.—To say that man has no power to do what he is not inclined to do, is to confound power with inclination. They are distinct things. The one may exist without the other. I have power to do what I have no disposition to do; on the other hand, I may have the disposition to do what is not in my power. I have power to set fire to my own house, or to my neighbor's, or to cut off my right hand; power, but no disposition. Present a motive sufficiently weighty to change my mind, and incline me to the act, and you create, in that way, a new disposition, but no new power. This point has been fully discussed in the previous chapter, and I need not here repeat the argument. It was shown that in order to the actual doing of a thing, two things are requisite, namely, the power to do, and the inclination to exert that power; and that neither involves the other. Where the power alone exists, the thing can be done, but will not be; where both exist, it both can and will be done. It is not true, then, in any proper use of terms, that want of inclination is want of power.
Our Inclinations not wholly beyond our Control.—Equally incorrect is the position that our inclinations and affections are wholly out of our own control. Within certain limits it is in our power to change them. Inclination is not a fixed quantity. It may change. It ought to change. In many respects it is constantly changing. We take different views of things, and so our feelings and inclinations change. Circumstances change, the course of events changes; and our disposition is modified accordingly. So that while the affections and inclinations are certainly not under the direct and immediate control of the will, it is still, in a great measure, in our power to modify and control them. While they remain as they are, it is quite certain that we shall do as we do; but it is not necessary that they should, nor certain that they will, remain as they are.
The true Answer.—To the question, then, can the man whose inclinations are to evil, whose heart is wrong, do right? a true psychology answers yes. He can do what he is not inclined to do; nor is that evil inclination itself a fixed quantity; he can be, he may be, otherwise inclined.