The details of the action are as follows:—At about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 15th, the Russian force commenced debouching from the forests which border the main road, between Mingosy and Boimie, and deploying to the right and left, took position. In a short time the field was covered with the enemy's masses. His force consisted of twelve regiments of infantry (f), six of cavalry (g), and sixty pieces of cannon. It was at about noon that the enemy placed his artillery upon the heights (A) above the bridge and commenced his fire. After continuing for some time this fire, which was but occasionally answered by our artillery, the enemy sent several battalions in column, upon the bridge, a part of which force engaged in the repair of the bridge, and the rest attempted to make the passage. Every approach of the enemy was met with a warm fire from behind the defence of trees above mentioned, and our artillery at the same time opened a destructive fire of grape upon the bridge. The attempts of the enemy were renewed for some hours, in vain.
Finding the impossibility of forcing this passage, he directed his efforts to that on his right (D), and sent a cloud of light infantry and cavalry to attempt to pass the marshes, and ford the stream. But this passage was equally impossible, and several Russian regiments, who were engaged in the attempt, exposed themselves to a severe fire of platoons from our troops, and several staff officers of the enemy were killed at the head of those regiments. In these renewed and bloody attempts, the day passed away, and as the night approached, our troops quietly evacuated their position, and took another a few miles in the rear.
As to the affair at Wengrow, it was only an engagement with the rear guard of the corps of general Skrzynecki. That general, knowing his position to be too far advanced, decided to retire as far as the environs of Dobre. This retreat was so orderly that it seemed rather an evolution than a retreat. All the movements were executed with perfect coolness, and the alternate retreat and fire of the different battalions, the displaying and closing of the columns, the change of front, &c., were executed with such precision that it impressed the enemy with a certain degree of respect, and though three times superior in force he did not attempt to push his attack. In this manner the corps arrived at the village of Makowiec, where it took position. On the next day, with the exception of a few light skirmishes between the outposts, nothing of importance took place. The right wing received on that day the order to fall back as far as Minsk, some miles in the rear of their former position. On the evening of that day the line of operation of our army was as follows:—Our left wing was at Zegrz, the centre in the environs of Dobre, and the right wing at Minsk.
On the 17th, the enemy attacked our centre at Dobre and our right at Minsk. It was a day of great bloodshed along our whole line, but, like the preceding, highly honorable to our arms.
BATTLE OF MAKOWIEC AND DOBRE. (See Plan IV.)
This battle is generally known by the name of the battle of Dobre; but as it was fought in two different positions, and with two different plans of operation, I have given the name of the two general positions, in speaking of the battle. General Skrzynecki was, as we have already remarked, in a position too far in advance of our right wing; and as the enemy on that day had attacked, as we have also stated, the right wing and the centre simultaneously, and could have made, as will be seen by the plan, a demonstration on Stanislawow, and thus have acted on the rear of Skrzynecki, which was nearest to him, that general had two objects to effect. First to make the attack of the enemy as costly to him as possible, and next to arrange his retrograde movement in such a manner as to be able to reach Stanislawow by night. Both of these designs were exceedingly well executed. Upon each of his positions he was master of his own movements, and quitted them at his own time. This affair of the 17th of February was the occasion of the first development of the remarkable talents of this commander. It was then that he first awakened the high expectations and gained the confidence of the nation, which soon after committed to him the trust so honorably and faithfully executed by him. In regard to the first position at Makowiec, the reader will observe, on examining the plan, that the Polish forces were principally engaged in defending a triangular space embraced between the two roads (f) which lead from Wengrow and Kaluszyn and meet behind Makowiec (h). This space, over which small elevations covered with brush-wood were scattered, afforded good positions for artillery as well as infantry: but the principal advantage of this peculiarity of the ground was, that it concealed the inferiority of our forces. In this position, the village of Makowiec was made a point d'appui upon our left wing, and it was defended by five companies (d), under the command of colonel Dombrowski. Six pieces of artillery (e) placed in the rear of this village, reached with their fire the village and the plain in front of it. The Russian position was an open plain.
IV Makowiec
V. Dobre