History of the Late Polish Revolution and the Events of the Campaign

by Joseph Hordynski

Marshal Diebitsch, before commencing hostile operations, opened negotiations, and, for this purpose, sent a general of division, Witt, with a flag of truce to our head-quarters. This general was stopped at our advanced post, whither general Krukowiecki was sent by the commander in chief, with full powers, to meet him. General Witt commenced with expressions of the greatest sensibility, and enlarged much upon the friendship which ought to exist between the Poles and the Russians as brother nations. He then spoke in very flattering terms of the heroism of the Poles, lamenting that it was not displayed in a better cause. After much complimentary language, he insensibly passed to the ideas of duty and obedience to the monarch. General Krukowiecki, who understood perfectly well all these professions, which he knew to be insidious, answered nearly in the following laconic terms: 'General, after the sad circumstances which have taken place, after the bloody combats to which we have been forced by the tyranny of fifteen years, by the refusal of justice, and in fine by the violation of our frontier, and the laying waste of our territory,—upon this territory we can make no arrangements. You know well what are the frontiers of Poland. Upon the banks of the Dnieper, four hundred miles hence, we may enter into negotiations.'

Thus all was ready for the sanguinary battle of two days, which followed, and one memorable in the annals of war. It commenced by a combat on the 24th at Bialolenka, and ended on the 25th on the plain of Grochow.

POSITION ON THE 24th, AND BATTLE OF BIALOLENKA

The position of the two armies, on the 24th, was as follows. The Polish army occupied the same ground as when they ceased firing on the 20th; but the force was disposed in a different manner.—The right wing was reinforced by the division of general Szembek; and although Bialolenka, Kawenzyn, and Wavre composed the line of combat, there was this difference, that, while before, the centre was at Kawenzyn, and the left wing at Bialolenka, at present the left wing was at Kawenzyn; the forces which were at Bialolenka were posted as a detached corps, and the centre of the army was at the forest of elders. The right wing occupied the space between the great road and the marshes of the Vistula, called the marshes of Goclaw. This arrangement made our line more concentrated. The first division under Krukowiecki, which was at Bialolenka, with the division of cavalry under Uminski, was directed to observe the great road from Jablonna, and all the roads leading from Radzimin and Zombki to Warsaw. Between Kawenzyn and Bialolenka the debouchment of the enemy was prevented by extensive marshes.

The Russian army was upon the same points as on the 20th. Their greatest force was opposed to our right wing at Wavre.

On the afternoon of the 24th, the enemy attacked with impetuosity the first division at Bialolenka. The corps of the enemy which made this attack was that of the prince Sczachowski, which had recently joined the main army, and for which marshal Diebitsch was supposed to have waited. This corps, as was afterwards ascertained, had missed their road, and became unintentionally engaged with our forces on that day. The orders of that corps were to traverse the forests between Radzimin and Zombki, and to join the army without being observed by our forces. It was the false direction which they took that brought on the engagement at Bialolenka.

This battle consisted, like the former actions at this place, of an attempt by the enemy to force the passage of the dykes, which were defended on our side by about eight battalions, protected by some twenty pieces of cannon. This small force repulsed the enemy in three successive attacks upon the dykes. At about 5, P.M. another Russian corps, under general Pahlen, came to the succor of Sczachowski, and as the first corps attempted to pass the road leading from Radzimin, the latter attempted to force the passage of the two dykes leading from Zombki, and at both points under the cover of a terrible fire of artillery. If the reader will consider that our small force, consisting of only eight battalions and fifteen squadrons, stood their ground against two Russian corps of nearly 40,000 men and 60 pieces of cannon, the efforts which were made on that day may be appreciated. Our plan of action consisted chiefly in allowing a part of the enemy's forces to pass the dykes, and then falling upon and cutting them up by successive charges of cavalry and infantry, supported by an effective fire of artillery. By such efforts this handful of brave men repulsed the attacks of the enemy until night, when his attacks ceased. At the approach of night, general Krukowiecki sent small reconnoitering parties upon the roads from Radzimin and Zombki. These patrols, pushing as far as, and even beyond Zombki, saw nothing of the enemy, and in fact learnt, to their astonishment, from the marauders whom they took, that the two Russian corps had quitted their position, and were on their march across the forest of Kawenzyn, to join the main army. This sudden withdrawal of the enemy's corps was an indication that they had received orders to join the grand army, and that a general attack was in contemplation for the next day. In expectation of this attack, a body of men was sent, during the night, to obstruct, by defences, the three roads leading from Radzimin and Zombki. Small detachments were left on those roads, and the forces which were at Bialolenka quitted their position, to reinforce the larger corps upon the plain of Wavre.

The following was the position of the two armies on the 25th, the day of the memorable battle of Grochow. [See Plans XI and XII]. The Russian army was distributed into eight divisions of combatants, and three divisions of reserves. Those eight divisions consisted of 126,000 infantry (a), 42,000 cavalry (b), and 280 pieces of cannon (c). The three divisions of reserve (E) were composed of 16,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 32 pieces of cannon. This enormous force, which occupied the space between Kawenzyn (A) and the marshes Goclaw (B), a distance of about three English miles, was arranged in two lines of combatants (C, D) and a third of reserve. Their position was as follows: Their left wing was between Wavre (r) and the above marshes of the Vistula, and was composed of four divisions of infantry, of 47,000 men, four divisions of cavalry, 15,700, and 120 pieces of cannon. The centre, opposite the forest of elders, consisted also of four divisions of infantry of 57,000 men, three of cavalry of 10,500 men, and 108 pieces of cannon. The right wing, opposite the village of Kawenzyn consisted of three and a half divisions of infantry of 31,000 men, four divisions of cavalry of 15,750 men, and 52 pieces of cannon. Upon the borders of the great forest opposite the forest of elders, was placed the reserve, commanded by the Grand Duke Constantine.

Against this force our inconsiderable army was posted in the following manner. The right wing (G), formed by the division of Szembek, consisting of about 7,000 infantry (d) and 24 pieces of cannon (f), occupied the space between the road and the marshes above mentioned. The centre (H) occupied the forest of elders, and touched upon the great road. It was composed of two divisions commanded by Skrzynecki and Zimirski, composed of about 15,000 infantry (d) and 60 pieces of cannon (f). The left wing (T) occupied Kawenzyn, consisting of the first division, commanded by Krakowiecki, composed of 6,500 men (d) and 12 pieces of cannon (f). Four divisions of cavalry (g), consisting of 9,500 men, commanded by Uminski, Lubinski, Skarzynski, and Jankowski, were not posted on any fixed point, but stood in readiness to act wherever occasions might offer. Besides these, was a small reserve (K) of four battalions and eight squadrons, in all about 5,400 men, under the command of general Pac.