History of the Late Polish Revolution and the Events of the Campaign

by Joseph Hordynski

General Dwernicki, after reconnoitering the enemy's position, which was commanding, and strengthened in its front by sixteen pieces of cannon [(f), Pl. XV,] thought it expedient to commence with a fire of skirmishers only (a), under cover of which he manœuvred his cavalry (b) upon the Russian wings, with the sole purpose of occupying the attention of the enemy until the detachment of colonel Lagowski should make its appearance. The enemy, on the other hand, commenced a warm fire from his artillery, and threw forward his light troops (d) in every direction. Some hours passed in this manner, the enemy attempting from time to time to force our position. But the hour of his destruction was approaching. General Dwernicki perceiving, from an elevation of ground, the detachment of Lagowski (A) advancing upon the enemy's rear, instantaneously gave orders for the cavalry to concentrate themselves. The signal for advance was then given, and the cavalry having formed on each side of the main road, pressed forward and fell upon the centre of the enemy. At the same moment, a charge was made by the cavalry of Lagowski upon the enemy's rear. The disorder and consternation of the Russian forces was indescribable. In a moment ten pieces of cannon, a thousand prisoners, some hundreds of horses, with many wagons of ammunition and baggage, fell into our hands. The route was general. The enemy fled pell-mell, and his loss was much increased by a fire of grape from the two pieces of artillery of colonel Lagowski, which he placed by the side of the road from Kurow to Lublin, over which the Russians retreated. This road was literally covered with dead. Nothing but the coming on of night saved the enemy from entire destruction. After this battle, the forces of the prince of Wirtemberg ceased to act as a corps. What remained of them, took the direction of Lublin, where the corps of general Dwernicki arrived the next day, having taken prisoners during the whole route. The prince of Wirtemberg barely escaped from our hands, for he was in quarters in that city when our advanced detachments entered it, and was just able to save himself by flight. Such was the end of this Russian corps, which, when it began to act against Dwernicki with his small force of 3,000 men, and ten pieces of cannon, consisted of 15,000 infantry and 24 pieces of cannon. In the course of eleven days, general Dwernicki gave battle to this corps four separate times, viz. at Swierza, Nowawies, Pulawy, and Kurow; and besides the loss he caused them in killed and wounded, he took 8,000 prisoners, 19 pieces of cannon, besides 1,000 horses, with a great quantity of ammunition, baggage, &c. In all these actions the corps of general Dwernicki lost but 500 men, in killed and wounded. The panic which had began to prevail in the Russian forces, in consequence of these disasters, reached such a degree that, at times, the mere sight of our troops was sufficient to put them to flight. The Russian commander in chief deprived the prince of Wirtemberg of his post, and his name was not heard of during the rest of the war.

General Dwernicki, by his victories over this corps, had completely freed the department of Lublin from the presence of the enemy. On arriving at Lublin, he restored the authority of the National Government in that place, and the region about. He made the necessary arrangements for reinforcing his corps, and left for Krasny-taw, in the environs of Zamosc.

While these successful operations of general Dwernicki, in the southern part of the kingdom, were in progress, and by this series of victories, he was approaching the frontiers of Wolhynia and Podolia, our arms were not less successful in the North.

The brave colonel Valentin, with a small detachment of partizans, fought the enemy with success between Modlin and Pultusk. This detachment was thrown into that region, (acting, however, more particularly between the rivers Wkra and Orsyca,) in order to hold in check the operations of the enemy upon Plock. This detachment was to obtain succor, in case of necessity, from the garrisons of Modlin. It was especially destined to intercept the transports which were to come from Prussia upon the road to Mlara, for the relief of the Russian army.

Colonel Valentin was occupying with his detachment the forest near the town of Nasielsk, when he was apprised that a small body of Russian troops, under the order of colonel Schindler, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, a battalion of infantry, and two pieces of cannon, had arrived on the 3d of March, at that town. This detachment had been sent to protect a transport which was to pass there. Colonel Valentin immediately formed a plan to attack it. During the night of the 3d and 4th of March, he approached the town, invested it, and ordered an attack, in which the detachment surprised the enemy, and forced him to quit the city, leaving his two pieces of artillery, and a number of prisoners. Colonel Valentin, thinking that the Russians might possibly return with a superior force, evacuated the city, and took his prisoners to Modlin, in order, by disembarrasing himself of them, to hasten his march and reach the environs of Pultusk, in time to intercept the transport. On the 5th, he took this transport, consisting of eighty vehicles loaded with various kinds of provision, together with twelve loads of equipage, &c., for the Russian generals, which he sent to Warsaw. The detachment of colonel Valentin continued to manœuvre for a long while in those environs without any support.

In the vicinity of Warsaw, along the banks of the Vistula, both above and below the city, small skirmishes almost daily occurred. On the fourth of March, the brave lieutenant Berowski, passing the Vistula opposite Jablonna with his platoon, surprised a squadron of cossacks, and took a hundred prisoners and as many horses. The battalion of volunteer chasseurs of colonel Grotus, posted in the environs of the villages Siekierki, and Wilanow, brought in, almost every day, parties of Russian prisoners, by surprising the different detachments of the enemy placed upon the island of Saxe, opposite to the above mentioned places. This same battalion burnt two batteaux, in which were a party of Russian troops, who were sent during the night with combustibles to burn the bridge between Warsaw and Praga. These boats were sunk, and the Russians who escaped drowning, were taken prisoners. In the environs of the small town of Gora, about twenty miles from Warsaw, a considerable body of workmen who were sent by the enemy to prepare the materials for building a bridge, were surprised by a battalion of the 2d regiment of light infantry. A hundred pioneers and sappers were taken prisoners, and many hundred male and female peasants set at liberty, who had been forced to work for the enemy.

At about the 8th of March, marshal Diebitsch demanded the capitulation of the fortress of Modlin, for which object he despatched colonel Kil. This officer was entrusted with a letter to the count Leduchowski, written by the marshal's own hand. His proposition was rejected.[46]

Some days after this answer, a part of the garrison of this fortress, sent as a reinforcement to colonel Valentin, surprised the Russians in the town of Serock. They had passed the river Bug, and the Narew opposite that town, to make requisitions of forage in the country around. By a prompt arrangement, the batteaux of the enemy were taken by our troops; and his forces, suddenly attacked and defeated, were compelled to evacuate their position, leaving a thousand prisoners in our hands, which were immediately carried to Modlin, and thence to Warsaw.

In this state of things, and while circumstances were continually occurring with uniform advantage to the Polish arms, general Skrzynecki, with the most sincere wish to finish a bloody struggle, and anxious to show that the Poles were always ready to hold out the hand of reconciliation, wrote, with the permission of the provisional government, a communication to marshal Diebitsch, with propositions of that purport. But as these offers of conciliation were rejected by the marshal, the contest was recommenced.[47]

On the 10th of March, the operations of the campaign were recommenced. The 2d division, the command of which, after the death of general Zimirski, was given to general Gielgud, and a division of cavalry, under the command of general Jankowski, received orders to make a strong reconnoissance upon the right bank of the Vistula. This division was ordered to pass the bridge in the night, and at break of day to commence the attack upon whatever force of the enemy they might find on the plains of Grochow or Kawenczyn, and, by this manœuvre, to harass the right wing of the enemy. But general Jankowski arrived late. It was near eight o'clock, A.M. before he approached with his division, at which time the two divisions united left Praga to commence their attack, but this operation being thus retarded, could not be made effective. The enemy, seeing our movement, had time to prepare themselves to counteract it. Our forces having advanced a mile or two upon the main road, commenced a fire of tirailleurs, and the enemy began to retire. As it was designed to act upon Kawenczyn, a battalion was sent to attempt an attack on the forest of elders, well known to the reader; but as the enemy was quite strong at that point, and particularly in artillery, a fire from which was immediately opened upon our force, the attack was not made, and our battalion was ordered to withdraw. The Russians, at about mid-day, began to show a stronger force upon the plains of Wawr. Their artillery, also, opened a fire upon the main road. This fire had continued an hour, when our generals, not perceiving that the artillery was protected by cavalry, decided to make a charge upon them with the regiment of Mazurs, and the 3d regiment of light cavalry. This brigade of cavalry, under the command of the brave colonels Blendowski and Miller, threw themselves with courage upon that artillery, when, at the moment of the charge, two regiments of Attaman Cossacks, which were posted in a wood adjoining, displayed their front, and advanced to charge our cavalry upon the flank and rear. Our attack therefore failed, and it was owing to good fortune alone that by a rapid bending of our flank, this body of cavalry was saved from total ruin. This unfortunate affair cost us a heavy loss of men, and of both of the brave colonels who commanded the attack. At about 2, P.M. as the enemy began to debouch from the great forest with increased forces, it was decided to return to Warsaw, and thus ended this reconnoissance, which had it been executed by more skilful generals, might have had the best success, for all the Russian regiments which had advanced towards Praga, at a considerable distance from their main forces, might have been taken. A reprimand was publicly given to the two generals, Gielgud and Jankowski, for their remissness in executing their instructions. The only advantage which was gained by this reconnoissance, was the taking of a great quantity of fascines and other materials prepared for a storm of Praga, and the collection from off the field of a considerable quantity of arms, which had been left there by the enemy, after the battle of the 25th.[48]