History of the Late Polish Revolution and the Events of the Campaign

by Joseph Hordynski

XXI.

BATTLE OF IGANIE. [See Plans XX and XXI.]

On the 9th of April, the Russian army was nearly in the same position as we have last described them. The main body, under marshal Diebitsch, were in the environs of Kock, and the combined corps of Rosen and Giesmar [Plan XX, (a)], were upon the small river Kostrzyn (b), at Boimie. Our army also had not changed its position.

The following were the dispositions for the attack. The reader, on examining the plan, will see that the two corps opposed to our forces, which were at Latowicz (c), were too far advanced, which exposed them to be turned on their left wing, and even taken in the rear, if our forces there should succeed in driving back the forces (e) of the enemy on the road (d) from Latowicz by Wodynie to Siedlce. To execute this movement the order was given that when the first division of infantry (f), supported by twenty-four pieces of cannon, should commence the attack upon the great road opposite Boimie, the third division (g), having with them the brigade of cavalry of Kicki, should leave the position at Latowicz before day-break, and take the direction of Wodynie, to attack the forces which it might find there; but if those forces should be found greatly superior, the division was to remain in a strong position at Jeruzalem (h). If it should succeed in driving back the enemy's forces, it was to take the road on the left, leading from Wodynie through Iganie (i) to Siedlce. Every effort was to be directed to the point of arriving as soon as possible upon the dyke (k) at Iganie, which leads over the marshes of the river Sucha (l). By a prompt manœuvre of this kind, the enemy could not, as we have said, escape being turned. For the better execution of this plan, the enemy was to be harassed on the main road, in order that general Prondzynski, who was to command the expedition to Wodynie, might have time to manœuvre upon the enemy's flank.

A division of cavalry (m), under the command of general Stryinski, was to leave Boimie, and take a direction on the left, towards the village of Gruszki, to pass there the fords of the river Kostrzyn, and in case of the retreat of the enemy, to fall upon his right wing.

Having issued these instructions, and confided the command of the little corps which was to act upon the enemy's left wing at Wodynie, to general Prondzynski, the general in chief left himself for Boimie, to lead the attack in person upon the main road. As was the case in the position at Boimie, [Refer to Plan II,] we were separated from the enemy by the marshes of the river Kostrzyn. The two ruined bridges upon the dyke not permitting either ourselves or the enemy to pass, general Skrzynecki contented himself with opening a fire of artillery upon the Russian position, in order to occupy the attention of the enemy, while preparations were making to repair the bridges sufficiently to admit a passage.

The moment that the work of reconstructing the bridges was to be put in execution, was to be decided by the time and the direction in which the fire of general Prondzynski should be heard. If the latter general should succeed on the enemy's flank, then, of course, the bridges were to be reconstructed, if not, they were to remain in their present state to obstruct the passage of the enemy. Several hours were occupied by this fire of artillery, and slight manœuvres of the light troops, when at last, between eight and nine o'clock, the fire of general Prondzynski was heard, who had evidently passed Wodynie, and had begun acting on the enemy's flank. This was the signal to commence repairing the bridges. General Skrzynecki, with his suite, superintended the work, and several battalions were employed in bringing together the materials. A degree of consternation was observed in the enemy's forces, in consequence of the attack on his flank, and his columns began a movement; but his artillery continued in their position, and commenced a terrible fire upon our men who were engaged in reconstructing the bridges. The presence of mind, however, of the general in chief, who exposed himself at the most dangerous points, encouraged the men to persevere in their labors under this destructive fire of artillery.[53] When the fire on his flank was at its height, the enemy began to withdraw his artillery, and commenced a retreat. By between 10 and 11 o'clock no part of the enemy's forces were remaining upon the plain of Boimie; but, although the work of repairing the bridges was pressed to the utmost, it was near two o'clock before they could be brought to such a state as to admit the passage of artillery; and although several battalions of the infantry had passed over before this, they were not able, without too much exposure, to overtake the enemy, who was in rapid retreat, leaving his cavalry as a rear guard. It was not until the last mentioned hour, that the whole division passed the bridges, and pressed forward at a rapid pace in the pursuit, the cavalry advancing upon the trot. While this was taking place upon the great road to Boimie, general Prondzynski [Plan XXI, (A),] who, according to his instructions, advanced to Wodynie, found there a division of sixteen squadrons of Russian cavalry, whom he drove from their position: he pursued them in the direction of Siedlce, and reached the environs of Iganie, where he saw the corps of Rosen and Giesmar (B) in full retreat. At this moment the position of general Prondzynski was also critical; for, as the reader is already aware, our main army was not in a condition to follow the enemy, on account of the obstruction from the broken bridges. If the enemy had thrown himself upon Prondzynski, they could have crushed him, and with their other forces could have safely passed the dyke (a) at Iganie, before our main forces, retarded as they were, could have arrived. This danger was perceived by Prondzynski, and he therefore contented himself with driving the division of Russian cavalry (C) from a position they had taken upon the heights of Iganie, (a task which was bravely executed by the cavalry of Kicki, and in which the colonel Mycielski was wounded) and occupying that position himself, placing there the brigade of Romarino to defend it.

It was between four and five o'clock that Prondzynski first perceived our lancers (D) advancing upon the main road. A great part of the enemy, particularly of their cavalry, had not yet passed the dyke (a), being obstructed by their artillery. Generals Prondzynski and Romarino, dismounting from their horses, with carbines in their hands, placed themselves at the head of their columns, and commenced a fire of artillery, to apprize our advancing cavalry of their position. At the sound of this fire, the cavalry of Lubinski raised the hurrah, rushed forward, and as they approached near the brigade of Romarino, threw themselves at the charge upon that portion of the enemy's rear guard which had not yet passed the dyke. Our infantry and cavalry thus fell simultaneously upon them, the enemy were terribly cut up, and the battle was gained. Nearly five Russian battalions, amounting to 4,000 men, with their officers, amounting to near one hundred, their standards, and eight pieces of cannon of large calibre, were taken. Six regiments of cavalry were dispersed, many of them were lost in the marshes of the river into which they were driven, and several hundred men and horse were taken prisoners there. In this battle, which may be counted one of the finest in the campaign, the circumstance that our main force was retarded by the state of the bridges, alone saved the enemy from total ruin. It is to be remarked that the 2d division of cavalry of general Stryinski, did not improve its time, and effected nothing upon the right flank of the enemy, as the instructions contemplated. The negligence of that general was inexcusable, and the commander in chief deprived him of his command. We lost in this battle about five hundred men, in killed and wounded. The brave general Prondzynski was slightly wounded. Before night the two armies were not at the distance of a cannon-shot from each other, but all was tranquil. The disorder and consternation of the enemy may be imagined, when it is stated that our columns took position before their eyes, on the field of Iganie, without being in the least disturbed by them.