[52] Every military reader, who shall follow, with strict attention, the plans of our general in strategy and tactics, will be astonished, perhaps, that after such victories as those of the 31st of March and 1st of April, he should have abandoned the advantages which he might have gained, in following up, immediately, his operations upon the two corps of Rosen and Giesmar, and then throwing himself rapidly upon the superior forces of Diebitsch, which, after those corps were cut off, could, by a simultaneous diversion upon Zelechow and Lukow, [See Plan], have been attacked on both sides, and thrown into confusion. Although I cannot give a satisfactory explanation of this apparent fault, it must be considered, that those subsequent events which give a color to the imputation, could not, perhaps, have then been reasonably anticipated by the general; and the talent so uniformly displayed by Skrzynecki should force us to suppose that there were some conclusive objections to such a course, occurring to his mind, which are not now apparent to the observer.
[53] No terms can express the admirable conduct of our commander and his suite, who directed the work of reconstructing these bridges, in person. The general and his officers all labored with their own hands at this important task. Some of them were wounded. Our brave soldiers, witnessing the fine example of their chief, shouted their patriotic songs, as they worked, under this destructive fire. While a party were placing some trunks of trees, a shell fell among them. To have left their labor in order to avoid the danger, would have delayed the work, they therefore remained in their places, and with the noise of the explosion was mingled the shout of 'Poland forever!' Providence granted that in that exposed labor our loss was very inconsiderable.
[54] I cannot pretend to give the reader an accurate idea of the number of prisoners which were taken during the first days of April. From the battle of Wawr to that of Iganie, not a day passed in which great numbers of them, with baggage and effects of all kinds, were not brought in. They must have amounted in that interval to full 16,000. Those prisoners arrived generally without escort, and it was often the case that old men and even women of the peasantry were seen leading them, or rather showing them the way,—two or three peasants, perhaps, with twenty prisoners. This continual influx of prisoners gave a name in fact to that interval of time, which was referred to, as 'the Period of the Prisoners.' The inhabitants of Warsaw found an amusement in witnessing this continual arrival of the captured Russians. 'Let us go to Praga, to see the prisoners brought in,' was a proposition often made, as referring to an ordinary recreation which might be counted on with perfect certainty. If, for a half day, no prisoners appeared, the complaint would be sportively made, 'What is Mr John about, (referring to Skrzynecki) that he sends us no prisoners to-day?'
The great number of the prisoners engaged the attention of the national government. It was impossible to leave them all at Warsaw; and they were at first divided into three parts, one of which remained in Warsaw to work upon the fortifications, and every soldier was paid for his labor. The second part being also employed upon wages, labored on the great roads leading from Warsaw, in a direction opposite to the seat of the war. The third part were dispersed among the farmers in the proportion of one Russian for three farmers; and these were also paid for their labor. At stated times, an assemblage of the prisoners was held, in which they were addressed in such a manner as to produce a moral effect upon them. They were instructed in the true nature of their political rights, the real causes of the contest were exhibited to them, and they were made to be convinced that it was for their advantage as well as our own that we were fighting.
The greatest harmony reigned between the Poles and their prisoners; and I am sure that those Russians will remember the days they passed as prisoners, as the happiest in their lives. With us their prison was a state of freedom and tranquillity, in which they received a liberal reward for their labor, while in their own country they were the slaves of despots, great and little, to whom obedience was enforced by the knout.
Position of the two armies after the battle of Iganie.—Plan of a simultaneous attack upon the Russian forces upon opposite sides.—Instructions to the different corps.—Operations on the enemy's front.—Unfortunate operations of general Sierawski, and the first defeat.—Details of those operations.—Operations of general Dwernicki.—He defeats Rudiger; but by a false operation exposes himself to be attacked disadvantageously by two Russian corps.—In the course of the action the Austrian frontier is passed by the combatants.—An Austrian force interposes, and general Dwernicki consents to go into camp.—His arms and prisoners are taken from him, while the enemy is permitted to leave the territory freely.—Reflections on the conduct of Austria.—Consequences of the loss of Dwernicki's corps.—The cholera makes its appearance in the two armies.
The positions of the two armies, [See Plan XXII,] were now as follows:—The Russian army was divided into four principal bodies, having no communication with each other. First, their main body (a), consisting of about 60,000 men and 130 pieces of cannon, were between Lukow (1) and Cock (2). Secondly, the remains of the corps of Rosen and Giesmar (b) were at Siedlce (3). They could be counted at about 20,000 men and perhaps 50 pieces of cannon. Thirdly, at Ostrolenka (4) was the Imperial guard (c), consisting of 18,000 men and 36 cannon. Fourthly, in the palatinate of Lublin, were the combined corps of Witt and Kreutz (d), consisting of 30,000 men and 60 pieces of cannon. Their different scattered detachments might be counted at 10,000 men. This separation of their different corps invited a sudden attack on either, before it could receive succor from the others.