History of the Late Polish Revolution and the Events of the Campaign

by Joseph Hordynski

This unsuccessful attack had unfortunate results. The corps of general Sierawski was obliged to evacuate its position, and along its whole retrograde march continual attacks of the enemy were pressed upon it. The peculiar nature of the ground, and the extreme brevity of general Sierawski, a veteran of between sixty and seventy, who, at the head of the detachments of his rear guard always led the charges against the enemy, and held him in check, was all that saved the corps from destruction. At length the corps reached Kazimierz, the point which it had left; and here again, instead of passing the Vistula, Sierawski awaited another attack from the overwhelming force of the enemy, and that too with only the half of his corps, for the other half was sent to pass the Vistula. This course was inexplicable, and excited much remark in the army. On the 18th, the Russians reached Kazimierz. The town was vigorously attacked by them, and their assaults were repeatedly repulsed by the new Kazimierz infantry, under colonel Malachowski, who, with a scythe in his hand, marched at their head. But the death of that brave patriot spread among the ranks of those new soldiers a degree of disorder, and the city was taken by the enemy. We must again thank general Sierawski for having saved the rest of the corps from ruin; having executed the evacuation of the town with such order that he passed the Vistula at the point of Borowa, not far from Kazimierz, without being molested in the attempt. He then took a position on the left bank.

Although the unfortunate affairs of those two days were not attended by severe losses, yet they were deeply afflictive to the general in chief. They threatened the entire disarrangement of his plans, and were followed by the more important disasters of general Dwernicki. The latter general, who, as is known to the reader, commenced his career so gloriously; whose very name, indeed, was a terror to the Russians, and who, by his successive victories over the three corps of Kreutz, Wirtemberg, and Rudiger, had established the strongest claims upon the gratitude of his country,—this general, I must repeat it with pain, finished his great career in the most unfortunate manner. His case should serve as a strong example, that it is not bravery alone which is required in a great general, for in that it would be difficult to find his equal, but that this bravery loses its value when not united with circumspection.

The following are the details of the operations of general Dwernicki. [See Plan No. XXIII.] We cannot well imagine the cause which induced that general to quit Zamosc (1), and the important operations in the palatinate of Lublin, and, neglecting all his instructions and orders, to have crossed the Bug (B) and entered the province of Volhynia, unless it were the reception of some certain news of a fresh insurrection in that province, and of the collection of insurgent forces there, who might be waiting for his approach, and who needed his protection. He might, perhaps, have thought to be able so to accelerate his movement as to avail himself of such new strength before a superior Russian force should arrive in that province to crush such insurrection, and disperse the insurgents. At the moment when Dwernicki might have conceived such a plan, there was, in fact, only a corps of about 12,000 men and some 20 pieces of cannon, under Rudiger, in the province. This corps, Dwernicki perhaps intended to attack, in his way, and crush them, and then attaching the insurgents to his corps, to return to the palatinate, or if circumstances might make it expedient, to follow up his blow into the heart of Volhynia. In fine, on the 15th of April, this general quitted the environs of Zamosc, taking the direction of Uscilog (2), where, on the evening of the 16th, he passed the river Bug. On the 17th he continued his march in the direction of Dubno (3), where the insurgents were perhaps supposed to be awaiting him. On the road to that town he received information that the corps of Rudiger had marched from Radziwilow (4) and was now in the direction of Milatyn (5). General Dwernicki turned immediately from the direction in which he was marching, to throw himself upon this corps, which he found on its march, at the village of Boromel (6), where, without giving the enemy time to take position, he attacked and overthrew him. The enemy was routed, and lost several hundred in killed and prisoners, with eight pieces of cannon. That in this fine, and the last fine battle of Dwernicki, the Russian corps was not wholly destroyed, was owing to the circumstance that a branch of the river Styr (S), over which the bridge had been destroyed, stopped our pursuit. The Russians, during the night of the 18th, evacuated their position, and took the road to Beresteczko (7), where they took a new position. In regard to tactics, the corps of general Rudiger could not have chosen a worse direction than that of the angle formed by the river Styr, and the frontier of Austria (F). General Dwernicki, by a passage to the right bank of the Styr, could have cut off all the enemy's communications with his other corps, and could have again fought him at the greatest advantage. It was here then that our brave Dwernicki committed his great fault, and in place of acting upon the right bank of the river, where he would have had an open field for the most enlarged operations, he chose to follow up the attack; and as he saw that the enemy could not be safely assailed in front, on account of his strong position between two small lakes, but found that this position was open towards the frontier of Austria,—there it was that the unhappy idea occurred to him, of marching to the environs of Kolodno (8), on the frontier of Austria, and attacking the enemy on that side, feeling sure of victory. But general Rudiger did not wait for this attack. Perceiving his exposed position between the river and the frontier, he was satisfied with being permitted to escape, and declined battle. Upon observing that general Dwernicki was manœuvring upon the frontiers of Austria, general Rudiger repassed the Styr, avoided the attack by this manœuvre, and was in a situation to join himself with all the Russian detachments which might come into the province from the heart of Russia, by the different directions of Krzemieniece, Ostrog, &c., and to act with them in surrounding Dwernicki, who was confined in this above described angle. This is what in fact took place.

Dwernicki remained, for what reason we cannot conceive, at Kolodno until the 23d of April, whence, following along the frontiers of Austria, he took the direction of Wereszczaki (9). There dispersing a Russian detachment, he arrived on the 26th at Knielce and Wielkie (10). Knowing that the Russians were observing him, he determined to remain there and take advantage of a strong natural position. He wished in this position to await the enemy and give him battle, hoping by a victory to free himself from the contracted space in which he was confined. In fact, on the next day, the corps of general Rudiger (b) made its appearance, having come in the direction of Krzemienic (11). The battle commenced, and in the midst of the action another Russian corps (c) was seen approaching in the direction of Proskirow (12) and Stary-Konstantynow (13) under the command of general Rott, acting thus upon the right wing and even the rear of general Dwernicki's corps. To avoid being turned, general Dwernicki retired in such a manner as to lean his right wing upon the Austrian frontier. The Russians, not regarding this, passed that frontier, and proceeded to push their attack upon his flank. This obliged general Dwernicki to withdraw his left wing, and indeed his whole front, upon the Austrian territory, where, in fact, the line was not distinctly marked, all the while being engaged with the enemy. The action having continued thus for some hours, a detachment of Austrian cavalry, under colonel Fac, approached and threw themselves between the combatants, calling on them to respect the neutrality of the territory. In this manner the combat ceased. General Dwernicki gave his parole to discontinue hostilities, and consented to advance farther into the interior, and, placing himself in camp, waited the result of the decision of the Austrian government upon what had occurred. The Russian corps, which had just passed the frontier, and which had in fact entered it with its whole force, was permitted to leave freely. The first duty which general Dwernicki thought imposed upon him in his present situation, was to make a full and true report of what had occurred to the National Government and the general in chief, which he was permitted to do. He also sent a letter to the commander in chief of the Austrian forces in Gallicia, explaining how it was that, in a necessary manœuvre he had passed over a point of land on the Austrian territory without the intention of occupying it. Having done this, he supposed that he would be permitted to remain in camp, retaining his own arms, those taken from the enemy, and his prisoners, until conferences between the governments should decide respecting the course to be taken. But the Austrian government, far from giving such a reasonable permission, collected a strong corps in the environs of Tarnopol, and the Austrian commander in chief demanded of general Dwernicki to surrender both his own arms and those taken from the enemy. General Dwernicki, although this Austrian corps was not formidable to him, yet being anxious to avoid the serious political consequences which might possibly follow resistance, submitted to this unjust demand, which will be an eternal reproach to the Austrian government. The Austrians returned their arms to the Russian prisoners, whom they liberated, and retained the arms of the Polish troops. The whole corps was conducted into the interior, and thus ended the career of that important body of our forces.[55]

The conduct of Austria, in regard to the corps of Dwernicki, I am sure will excite the indignation of the reader. If general Dwernicki had entered upon the Austrian territory, he was forced to do it by the Russian corps, which had already passed the frontier; and that cannot be regarded as an intentional invasion of the frontiers which was done without design, and was a mere transition over an indistinct line, made necessary by the position which the enemy had taken. Such a case certainly should have formed an exception to a general rule. To the Russian corps all the prisoners were returned, without any consent obtained from our government, to whom they, in fact, belonged, and should have been considered as belonging, until the end of the war.

It was in this manner that those intriguing cabinets repaid the debt of gratitude which they owed to Poland. They had forgotten the times of John Sobieski, who, in 1683, delivered their capital, and their whole territory, from destruction at the hands of the Turks. They had forgotten that they thus owe their very existence to Poland.

At present, regardless of all obligations of justice, they concert with our enemy for our ruin. But if by this unjust treatment of their benefactors, the Austrians may have gained some temporary advantages, the reader will acknowledge that in reference to their ultimate good, they have acted with a most short-sighted and mistaken policy. The aggrandizement of Russia can never be an advantage to Austria.

There were few more melancholy events in our war than this. The disaster of this corps grievously paralyzed all the fine plans of the general in chief. It reinforced the Russian superior force by 40,000 men;—for the different corps of Kreutz, Witt, Rudiger and Rott, could now rejoin their main army without obstruction.