[59] The capture of the town of Bielsk and its garrison was marked with such singular circumstances, that I think that some of the details will interest the reader. The small corps of general Chlapowski arriving suddenly before this town, on the 22d of May, was informed that it had a garrison of two battalions of infantry, and that near the town was a body of a thousand cossacks, in camp. The advanced guard of our small corps, with which was the general and several of his officers, approached the barriers of the town. The Russian sentinel observing our party, and seeing a general officer among them, did not recognize them as enemies, but called the guard to give them the honors of the place. General Chlapowski, on the approach of the guard, commanded them to lay down their arms, which they did. The same ceremony was gone through with the grand-guard in the square of the town, and the Russians mechanically obeyed these orders, in a state of amazement. General Chlapowski fearing that he might be surrounded by the cossacks, left his infantry volunteers to disperse any detachments of the enemy in the town that might rally to oppose him, and led all the artillery and cavalry against the camp of the cossacks. The Russian infantry who attempted to make a resistance in the town, were dispersed at the point of the bayonet, and, with the assistance of the inhabitants, they were all made prisoners; while by the attack of the artillery and cavalry, the encamped cossacks were entirely dispersed, and several of them taken prisoners. General Chlapowski left his prisoners in the care of the inhabitants, taking with him only those who were Poles, and who volunteered their services.
[60] The officer announced to general Lubinski that the whole Russian army had occupied Ciechanowiec, that the advanced guard was already at Czyzew, and that those circumstances ought to satisfy him that his communications with his friends were entirely cut off, and that therefore he would do well to lay down his arms and throw himself upon the magnanimity of the Emperor. To this proposition general Lubinski replied, that although such might be his situation, he could not think of surrendering himself without a struggle; and to satisfy the aid-de-camp that this was not his individual feeling alone, but that it was partaken by the whole body of his soldiers, he would present him to them, and enable him to satisfy himself personally on this point. The aid-de-camp was then conducted to the front of the line, and he addressed himself to the troops, exhibiting the circumstances under which they were placed, assuring them that the bravest resistance would be hopeless, and inviting them to surrender. This address was interrupted by a universal shout of indignation from the soldiery, and they commanded him to leave their presence. This division was composed of two regiments of old light infantry, and two recently formed regiments of Mazurs.
[61] Marshal Diebitsch must by this time have become satisfied that the operations, both in strategy and tactics, of the Polish commander, were the result of extensive and just combinations. General Skrzynecki, in contriving this plan (with the valuable assistance of general Prondzynski,) of surprising and defeating the Russian guard, had satisfied himself of the practicability of returning to Ostrolenka without being intercepted.
[62] The question might be asked by some, whether this battle was necessary, and why general Skrzynecki did not pursue his route to Warsaw, as he could have done without molestation. In the course which he took, he had two objects in view; the one was, to cause this destructive passage of the Narew, and thus diminish the forces of his enemy; the other was, by thus occupying general Diebitsch to give time to general Gielgud to leave Lomza in safety for Lithuania. (See Plan XXIX.)
[63] This fire of the Russian artillery might almost be compared to the terrible fire of the 25th of February, at Grochow, in the attack on the forest of elders.
[64] This manœuvre, of bringing the artillery so near the columns of the enemy, and under the terrible fire of the Russian artillery, was one of those bold and hazardous steps which were necessary for the object of reducing the immense superiority of the enemy's force. The personal agency of general Skrzynecki was demanded for a blow like this; and in executing it he displayed equally the qualities of the soldier and the general. The admiration of his soldiers was excited by seeing him dismount and place himself with the utmost coolness at the head of this battery of artillery, exposed to the incessant fire of that of the enemy. Neither the fear of the enemy, nor the entreaties of his officers, who begged him, on their knees, to withdraw and to reserve his valuable life for his country, could induce him to move from his place, until he had seen the successful termination of this effort.
[65] For those who have asserted that general Gielgud was cut off from the main body of the Polish forces and compelled to escape into Lithuania, the sending of these two squadrons of lancers to join him, will be a sufficient answer. The division of general Gielgud could have even remained at Lomza for as many as three days after this battle.