History of the Late Polish Revolution and the Events of the Campaign

by Joseph Hordynski

XXXV.

XXXIII.

The battle commenced on the morning of the 19th of June. The enemy was dislodged from his first position, which was about one mile from the city. Their retreat was caused by a spirited charge, by the 1st regiment of lancers, upon the Russian artillery, and the columns of infantry in the centre. The enemy, on quitting this position, took another of great strength on the heights called Gory-Konarskie (B). This strong position was already covered with fortifications. The right wing of the enemy (C), composed of strong columns of infantry (a), rested on the river Wiliia; the centre, (A), embracing all their artillery, which consisted of 50 pieces of cannon (b), occupied the heights above mentioned; the declivity of those heights was covered with sharp-shooters (d), concealed behind small heaps of earth, thrown up for this purpose. The left wing of the enemy (D) was entirely composed of cavalry (e).

After driving the Russians from their first position, our artillery (f) was brought forward and placed opposite the enemy's centre. This is to be regarded as a great fault. At the same time that our artillery was thus disposed, our left wing received orders to attack the right wing of the enemy. The columns of our infantry (g), composed in part from the new Lithuanian levies,[74] threw themselves with such fury upon the enemy, that they did not give them even time to fire, but fought them hand to hand: an immense slaughter ensued, and the Russians began to give way before this desperate assault; but at this very moment, our artillery, who could not sustain themselves under the overpowering fire of the enemy from his commanding position, began to fall back; and gave time to the Russians to send fresh bodies of infantry to support their right wing. Our left wing, being unable to sustain a conflict with the reinforced strength of the enemy, and apprehensive of being cut off, to which hazard they were exposed by the retreat of our artillery, began to give way also, and upon that a retreat commenced along our whole line, under the protection of the cavalry (h). The cavalry, both old and new, performed prodigies of valor, in executing this duty. Single squadrons were obliged to make charges against whole regiments of the enemy, who constantly pressed upon us, with the object of throwing our forces into disorder. All the efforts of the enemy were thwarted, by this determined bravery. The Russians themselves have borne testimony to the unparalleled efforts of our cavalry on that occasion. Our lancers seemed to feel the imminent danger of permitting the Russian cavalry to fall upon our ranks, and they fought with the energy of desperation. They repelled the attacks of a cavalry three times superior in force, and which was in part composed of regiments of the imperial guard.

The enemy having been thus foiled in his attacks, our forces repassed in safety the bridge of Oyrany, leaving it destroyed.

The battle of Wilno, so disastrous to us, was our greatest fault in the expedition to Lithuania; and it was the first of a series of disasters. The evil consequences of this battle did not rest with ourselves; they fell heavily upon the inhabitants of Wilno, whose hopes of acting in concert with us were disappointed. At the sound of our cannon, a revolt of the inhabitants was commenced, and after the repulse of our forces, arrests and imprisonments of course followed. This unfortunate battle, in fine, disorganized all the plans of the main army, and had a most discouraging effect upon the spirits both of the army and the nation. An attack upon Wilno, at a time when all the enemy's forces were concentrated there, should only have been made upon the basis of the most extensive and carefully adjusted combinations. A successful attack on Wilno would have been a difficult achievement, even by a force equal to that of the enemy, when the strong positions of the place are considered. What then shall we say of an attack, with a force amounting to but one third of that of the enemy, and made also, in broad day, upon the most defensible point of the enemy's position?

But, as if these disadvantages were not enough, general Dembinski, after having been compromitted at Myszggola, instead of being enabled to aid in this attack, was, by the orders of general Gielgud, at the very moment of the attack, marching in the direction of Podbrzeze, [(9) Plan XXXIV,] and was also by this separation exposed even to be cut off by the enemy, who could easily have done it, by sending a detachment for this object on the road from Wilno to Wilkomierz.

This succession of inconceivable faults arrested the attention of the corps, and created a universal dissatisfaction. The removal of general Gielgud, and the substitution of general Chlapowski in the chief command, who had distinguished himself so much in the departments of Bialystok and Grodno, was loudly called for. General Chlapowski was unwilling to take the chief command, but, to satisfy the wishes of the corps, he consented to take the office of chef d'etat major, a post in which he was virtually chief, having the exclusive responsibility of every operation. To this arrangement general Gielgud readily consented. It took effect on the evening of the 20th. From that day general Chlapowski was the director of all our operations.