The plan of our generalissimo was to throw himself upon the detached corps of the enemy, under Rott and Rudiger, and afterwards to act upon his main body. For this end an attack was ordered upon the corps of Rudiger, which was beaten in the environs of Minsk by the corps of general Chrzanowski, in successive actions, on the 14th, 15th, and 16th of July. A third part of his corps being destroyed, a thousand prisoners, four pieces of cannon and all his baggage taken, he was forced to retire behind Kaluszyn. After these new advantages, the general in chief prepared to act upon the rear of the Russian main army, and to attack them while engaged in the passage of the Vistula, which he supposed they would attempt either at Plock, or between Plock and Modlin. But as he was afterwards apprized that the Russians were to attempt the passage at a much more distant point from Warsaw, and beyond his reach while on the right bank, he thought it most expedient to pass the Vistula at Warsaw, and to operate against the enemy on the other side. The Russian army thus passed the Vistula without being intercepted, between the 12th and the 20th of July. Having reached the left bank, the enemy took the direction of Lowicz, where, on the 27th, the head-quarters of general Paszkewicz were established, and whither our army marched to meet him.

At this important moment, when the operations of the enemy had taken a new face, and seemed, in the eyes of the people, by his near approach to Warsaw, to menace the utmost danger—made more threatening in their imaginations by the recent discovery of the conspiracy of Jankowski and the news of the misfortunes in Lithuania;—at this anxious moment, the nation demanded a council of war, and called on the National Government to make an inquisition into the conduct of the general in chief, to demand of him full explanations of his purposes, and a submission of all his plans of operation to the examination of such a council. Such a council of war was instituted by the government and directed to be attached to the person of the general, and to be initiated into all his designs, in order to be enabled to tranquillize and re-assure the minds of the nation, which had so naturally become distrustful and suspicious, after the events which had taken place.

The council having been organized, and having taken an oath of secrecy, general Skrzynecki laid before them all the plans of operation that he had hitherto followed, as well as those which he had in contemplation, and gave a full exposition of the reasons for each. This council then published to the nation an address, announcing their entire confidence in the patriotic intentions of the general in chief, and assuring them that the crisis was by no means as dangerous as they apprehended. By these proceedings the minds of the people were much tranquillized, and this tranquillity was increased by the arrival of the corps of general Dembinski from Lithuania after its glorious retreat; which arrival not only cheered them by the addition which it brought to our forces, but by the more encouraging accounts than had before been received, which it gave of the state of Lithuania, authorizing some hope of a renewal of the insurrection in that province at a more propitious hour.

FOOTNOTES:

[81] A few details of the history of the two generals who were the cause of these fatal disasters, may gratify the curiosity of the reader. General Gielgud was born in Lithuania, at Gielgudyszki, (the place at which he crossed the Niemen in 1831). Passing over his early life, which presents nothing noticeable, he commenced his military career in 1812, when Napoleon entered Lithuania. In a moment of patriotic fervor, he formed a small detachment at his own expense, and joined the ranks of the supposed deliverer of Poland; and this perhaps was the most praise-worthy act of his life. During the campaign of 1812, 13, and 14, he was in no way distinguished either for good or bad conduct. At the end of the Russian campaign, in 1815, he was made colonel. As during that year, Poland came under the Russian government, our army was subjected to a change of organization, and as many officers of high rank, who were in independent circumstances, gave up their commands, Gielgud then obtained the rank of general, at about the age of thirty. This rapid advancement, as was natural to a man of weak character, inspired him with an extreme of arrogance and pretension; qualities which were encouraged in his intercourse with the Russian generals, with whom he was much associated. It was this arrogance which uniformly lost him the esteem of those under his command.

When the revolution broke out, general Gielgud was at the town of Radom, and his life was in great danger from the suspicions of which he was naturally the object, but he was protected by some of the patriots, on the assurances which he gave of his patriotic dispositions. Still, however, the military demanded his removal from his post, and, in fact, for some weeks he was without command. The dictator, Chlopicki, whose modes of action were, as the reader knows, too often inexplicable, restored him to his command, persuading himself that he was one of the best of patriots, and that if his exterior was offensive, he was right at heart. In the war,—having first commanded a brigade, and afterwards a division,—while he was attached to the grand army, his conduct was not marked by any very great faults; indeed, in the battle of Minsk he performed his part well. It was such occasional exhibitions of good conduct which kept him in some consideration.

After having taken command of the corps of Lithuania, and when he was removed from the observation of the army, he exhibited himself in his true character. He was giddy with the distinction, and feeling himself the absolute master of his own conduct, he gave himself up to all the suggestions of his vanity.

His first act of folly was to surround himself with a numerous suite, (it was in number four times that of the commander in chief,) in which suite those individuals were held in greatest esteem, who were most fertile in resources for amusement. It was to this love of personal gratification that we can attribute those delays which were sacrificing the cause of the country. At Gielgudyszki the general gave a fête to his officers; and it is not impossible that it was a motive of mere personal ostentation which induced him to make the passage of the Niemen, at that place, by which two days' march were given to the retreating enemy, time was allowed him to concentrate his forces in Wilno, and that capital was lost to us!

This general was never seen to share the privations, fatigues, and exposure of his subalterns. In his personal deportment he neglected the true means of gaining the confidence and attachment of his troops. On the eve of a battle, in moments of danger and anxiety, it is cheering to the soldier to see the face of his commander, and to hear from him a few words of encouragement. These are apparent trifles, but they are in reality of most serious consequence. They are the secret keys by which every thing can be obtained from the soldier. The personal attachment of the soldier to his commander, is worth more than the finest combinations in strategy and tactics. The commander, who succeeds in gaining the affection of the soldier, inspires him with a new impulse for exertion. To his other motives is added the dread of forfeiting the confidence and esteem of a friend; and perhaps, with the mass of an army, such a motive would yield to no other in efficiency. To the modes of conduct which would have secured this result, general Gielgud was an entire stranger. Instead of freely approaching the soldier and endeavoring to gain his attachment, he treated him with uniform coldness and reserve. It is on the whole a matter of just surprise, that a man with such glaring faults of character should have been appointed to so responsible a trust.

General Chlapowski commenced his military career also in 1812. In the Russian war he advanced to the rank of officer, and was made aid-de camp of prince Poniatowski. While in this situation he advanced to the rank of a staff officer, in which rank he left the army in 1815, and retired to his estates in the grand duchy of Pozen, where he married the sister of the princess of Lowicz, the wife of the Grand Duke Constantine. The entrance of this general into the revolutionary ranks excited considerable surprise. But as he joined himself to the squadrons of Pozen, which were formed of the bravest and most patriotic materials, there was no distrust felt of him. His successes in traversing the department of Bialystok, entitled him to the highest praise. It was this fine expedition which gained him the confidence of the Lithuanian corps, and after the battle of Wilno, they were unanimous in inviting him to take the chief command. The nominal command, as we have related, he declined, but took a post which gave him the superintendence of all the operations. While he was thus in the direction of affairs, the greatest faults, as we have seen, were committed, for which no adequate explanation can be given. We will recapitulate some of them.—They were, 1. The sending of the sappers to build the bridge over the Niemen. 2. The ill-arranged attack on Szawla. 3. His not succoring general Rohland in the combat of Powenduny. 4. The inexplicable secrecy which he kept upon his intention of passing the Prussian frontier; having left Kurszany for that object, whilst all his officers were given to understand that the separation of the corps at that place was with the view of marching to act in the environs of Kowno. These are points upon which this officer has yet to answer at the bar of his country. Chlapowski was a more dangerous person even than Gielgud, for Gielgud was a man of such undisguised arrogance, that he repelled the confidence of others; but Chlapowski, with all the faults of Gielgud, had an exterior of dissimulation which won insensibly upon those who had not thoroughly studied his character. But none who had observed and known him well, could ever yield him their esteem.