On the other hand he made careful preparation for the campaign at Vienna. The first thing to do was to discover the aims and intentions of the four great Powers, and that did not take him long. The treaties that had knit together the coalition against Napoleon were based on a partition of the territory to be wrested from him. Napoleon’s ruthless clipping and maiming of Austria and Prussia had to be amended, and those Powers demanded a heavy discount. Prussia hoped to get Saxony, Lower Pomerania, part of Poland, and the Rhine districts from Mayence to Holland. The Tsar, whose plans were sufficiently revealed to Talleyrand during the few weeks’ stay at the Hotel St. Florentin, desired the whole of Poland (with a separate constitution, but under the Russian Crown). Thus the claims of the two most covetous Powers were inconsistent with each other and inacceptable to Austria, who was especially unwilling to compensate the King of Saxony in Italy. England had already secured Hanover and the independence of the Netherlands, and was not further interested in Europe, except in the balancing of the Powers against each other; but she was bound by the treaties signed.
Talleyrand fully informed himself of the views of the Powers, and formed the plan he afterwards followed with brilliant success. He would pose as the dignified and disinterested representative of principle in this game of grab. Partly under directions from the King, partly from reasons of personal regard or interest, he determined to frustrate Prussia’s design on Saxony and to secure the restoration of Naples to Sicily. Here the opportunist and democratic Talleyrand would plead the principle of legitimacy. As England was the least interested of the Powers he would win her first to his new fervour for principles, and Austria, with her interests mainly southern and a natural concern at any undue growth of Prussia and Russia, might be drawn with them against the northern Powers. But the first difficulty was to get a hearing. By one of the earlier treaties (Chaumont) the four Powers had agreed to exclude France from the deliberations respecting the division of the territory won from her. Prussia was bent on having this condition carried out, and Russia and Austria had no reason as yet to depart from it. Talleyrand prepared the way for his attack on this formidable obstacle to his plans by a close and assiduous cultivation of England. He impressed effusively on the English Ambassador, first Sir Charles Stuart and then Lord Wellington, the identity of the interests, or the disinterestedness, of France and England, and brought about a feeling of cordiality. Castlereagh himself stopped at Paris for a few days on the way to Vienna, and was much interviewed.
The next step was to prepare the personnel of the French party and the indirect machinery of diplomacy. He chose Dalberg, partly as a small reward to his friend and partly “to let out secrets” at Vienna, and La Besnardière to do the substantial work of the legation. Of the two royalists who accompanied him, the Count de Noailles (a moderate) and M. de Latour du Pin, he says that as he knew he would have to take some of the Court party to watch him, he preferred to have them of his own choosing. The latter would be able “to sign passports.” He also took his nephew’s charming and tactful wife, the Countess Edmond de Périgord, to entertain for him. She proved “very useful” in breaking down the social boycott with which hostile ministers tried to support their resolve to exclude Talleyrand from the settlement. They rented the Hotel Kaunitz at Vienna, and some of the most brilliant fêtes and most attractive dinners of the ensuing winter were given there.
The last point was to obtain suitable instructions from the King, or, rather, give sober instructions to Louis XVIII. He therefore drew up a long memorandum and programme, and got it signed by the King without difficulty. The French representatives at the Congress were to see that things were done in order and on principle. The Congress would have to settle what States should be represented in it, what its objects were, and how they were to be attained. In this regard the Treaty of May 30th must be followed, which promises a general Congress. The idea of a “Power” must be taken in a wide sense, and all the States, large or small, that took part in the war must be admitted. The small German States should be formed into a confederation, and the Congress cannot accomplish this without their assistance. In the distribution of territory it must be remembered that modern Europe does not recognize that sovereignty may be obtained by mere conquest, and without the abdication of the conquered sovereign. “Sovereignty is, in the general society of Europe, what private ownership is in a particular civil society.” On this principle Saxony and the other German States must be dealt with. The Congress has to dispose of the territory renounced by France, and the principles of public right must guide the distribution. Balance of power does not mean equality of force. Small States must be preserved, and, à fortiori, Saxony, whose king has been a father to his people, a beneficent ruler. France must protect the little States against the larger; must see that Prussia does not get Mayence or any territory left of the Moselle, and so on. Poland is to be reconstructed, on condition that its restoration is entire and complete. England being equally conservative with France as to the state of Europe must be cultivated as an ally. In the end the memorandum lays down four chief points on which the representatives of France must insist, whatever concession they make apart from them. These are: 1. That Austria shall not obtain the States of the King of Sardinia for one of its princes; 2. That Naples shall be restored to Ferdinand IV.; 3. That the whole of Poland shall not pass under the sovereignty of Russia; 4. That Prussia shall not get Saxony—“at least, not the whole of it”—nor Mayence.
Had these four points been submitted to any other ambassador at the Congress beforehand he would have smiled. We have now to see how Talleyrand secured every one of them in the face of tremendous opposition.[54]
CHAPTER XV
A DIPLOMATIC ROMANCE
Talleyrand and his party arrived at Vienna on September 23rd. He immediately saw the representatives of the other great Powers, found that his anticipation of their resolve to restrict his action was correct, and opened his campaign. It was not a difficult task to induce the ministers of the secondary Powers to make common cause with the ablest diplomatist at the Congress. The Spanish Minister, Labrador, was urged to press the disputable claim of his country to be considered a first-class Power, and support Talleyrand in his manœuvres. The smaller States were fully disposed to have their feeble voices swelled into a respectable protest by fitting them into Talleyrand’s scheme. The representatives of Prussia (Prince Hardenberg and Baron Humboldt), of Russia (Nesselrode, Stakelberg and Rassoumoffsky), of Austria (Metternich), and of England (Castlereagh and Stewart), were in constant correspondence. Talleyrand waited and watched. At last he inquired of Metternich why there was no indication of the opening of the Congress, which had been fixed for October 1st. After some discussion between the four Powers, Metternich and Nesselrode obtained that Talleyrand and the Spanish Minister should be invited to assist at a preliminary conference on September 30th, and the diplomatic struggle begins.