Lee’s fortifications east of Mechanicsville Turnpike. From a contemporary sketch.
Chickahominy swamps. Courtesy, National Archives.
It was a bold feat, and Stuart assured his chief that there was nothing to prevent his turning the Federal right flank. But the daring ride probably helped McClellan more than Lee. Alerted to the exposed position of his right flank and base of supply, McClellan withdrew his whole army south of the Chickahominy, with the exception of Gen. Fitz-John Porter’s corps, which stretched from Grapevine Bridge to the Meadow Bridge west of Mechanicsville. On June 18 he started the transfer of his enormous accumulation of supplies with the shipment of 800,000 rations from White House to Harrison’s Landing on the James River. After Jackson’s success in the Shenandoah Valley at Cross Keys and Port Republic, it was becoming apparent even to McClellan that McDowell probably never would join him, in which case he wanted his base of operations to be the James rather than the York River.
Meanwhile, pressure from Washington for an offensive movement against Richmond was mounting. But because of the wettest June in anyone’s memory, McClellan was having trouble bringing up his heavy siege guns, corduroying roads, and throwing bridges across the flooded Chickahominy swamps. As one bedraggled soldier wrote: “It would have pleased us much to have seen those ‘On-to-Richmond’ people put over a 5 mile course in the Virginia mud, loaded with a 40-pound knapsack, 60 rounds of cartridges, and haversacks filled with 4 days rations.”
Also, McClellan believed erroneously that the Confederates had twice as many available troops as he had. Consequently, his plan of action, as he wrote his wife, was to “make the first battle mainly an artillery combat. As soon as I gain possession of the ‘Old Tavern’ I will push them in upon Richmond and behind their works; then I will bring up my heavy guns, shell the city, and carry it by assault.”
The Seven Days Begins
Lee’s plan of attack. Painting by Sidney King.
McClellan’s plan probably would have succeeded had Lee been willing to stand still for it. But the Confederate commander did not intend to let McClellan fight that type of warfare. As he wrote to Jackson: “Unless McClellan can be driven out of his entrenchments he will move by positions under cover of his heavy guns within shelling distance of Richmond.” It was almost as if Lee had read McClellan’s letter to his wife.