My clear conviction is that the adoption of the Treaty by the Senate with reservations would put the United States as clearly out of the concert of nations as a rejection. We ought either to go in or stay out. To stay out would be fatal to the influence and even to the commercial prospects of the United States, and to go in would give her the leadership of the world. Reservations would either mean nothing or postpone the conclusion of peace, so far as America is concerned, until every other principal nation concerned in the Treaty had found out by negotiation what the reservations practically meant and whether they could associate themselves with the United States on the terms of the reservations or not. Moreover, changes in the Treaty seem to me to belong to the powers of negotiation which belong to the President and that I would be at liberty to withdraw the Treaty if I did not approve of the ratifications. I do not think it would be wise for me to wait here for the appropriation bills. I hope to sail on the twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth and suggest that you consider the plan of sending a vessel to meet me.
WOODROW WILSON.
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Cablegram
The White House, Washington,
June 23, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
Your cable concerning reservations in ratification would make fine statement for the public. The country would stand back of you in this. Can I use it in this way or can I at least furnish copies to Senator Hitchcock and Mr. Taft? If you allow me to make public use of it may I change Quote leadership of the world End Quote to Quote a notable place in the affairs of the world End Quote. This in order to avoid possibility of hurting feelings of other nations. Now is time to issue statement of this kind as Lodge has practically withdrawn Knox resolution and opponents seem to be concentrating on Quote reservations End Quote.
TUMULTY.
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Cablegram—Paris.