There is no proportion between the natural and the supernatural, and it would be a contradiction to say that mere nature can span the chasm separating the two orders. To assume the existence of a strict meritum naturae for it, would be to deny the gratuity as well as the supernatural character of grace. To deny these would be to deny grace itself and with it the whole supernatural order that forms the groundwork of Christianity. We know, on the other hand,[428] that grace is absolutely indispensable for the performance of salutary acts. Hence, to deny the gratuity of grace would be to credit nature with the ability to perform salutary acts by its own power, or at least to merit grace by the performance of naturally good deeds. In the first hypothesis grace would no longer be necessary for salvation; in the second, [pg 139] it would be proportionate to natural goodness, and therefore no grace at all. Consequently, the gratuity of grace cannot be consistently denied without at the same time denying its necessity.[429]
Thesis II: There is no naturally good work by which unaided nature could acquire even so much as an equitable claim to supernatural grace.
This proposition may be technically qualified as fidei proxima saltem.
Proof. The Semipelagians held that, though nature cannot merit grace in strict justice, it can merit it at least congruously, i.e. as a matter of fitness or equity.[430] This contention was rejected by the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529), which defined that “God works many good things in man that man does not work, but man works no good deeds that God does not give him the strength to do.”[431] And again: “[God] Himself inspires us with faith and charity without any preceding [natural] merits [on our part].”[432] The phrase “without any preceding merits” (nullis praecedentibus meritis) excludes both the meritum de condigno and the meritum de congruo.
a) The Scriptural argument given above for thesis I also covers this thesis.
The Semipelagians quoted Matth. XXV, 15 in support of their teaching: “To one he gave five talents, and to another two, and to another one, to every one according to his proper ability.”[433] But this text is too vague to serve as an argument in such an important matter. Not a few exegetes treat it as a kind of rhetorical figure. Others, following the example of the Fathers, take “talents” to mean purely natural gifts, or gratiae gratis datae, while by “ability” (virtus) they understand the already existing grace of faith or a certain definite measure of initial grace.[434] But even if virtus meant natural faculty or talent, it cannot be identical with “merit.” Considering the common teaching of theologians that the angels were endowed with grace according to the measure of their natural perfection,[435] we may well suppose that man receives grace likewise according to his natural constitution (gratia sequitur naturam)—a predisposition or aptitude which God ordained in His infinite wisdom to be the instrument through which His graces should operate either for personal sanctification or the good of others.
b) St. Augustine and his disciples, in defending the orthodox faith against the Semipelagians, strongly insisted on the gratuity of the grace of faith, and above all of the initial gratia praeveniens.
α) St. Augustine comments on 1 Cor. IV, 7 as follows: “Nothing is so opposed to this feeling as for any one to glory concerning his own merits in such a way as if he himself had made them for himself, and not the grace of God,—a grace, however, which makes the good to differ from the wicked, and is not common to the good and the wicked.”[436] And in another place he says: “For it would not in any sense be the grace of God, were it not in every sense gratuitous.”[437]
β) Certain of the Greek Fathers have been suspected of Semipelagian leanings because they appear to assign the chief rôle in the business of salvation to nature.[438] A careful study of their writings, however, shows that these authors had in mind co-operating, not prevenient grace. The general teaching of the Orientals on the gratuity of grace is sufficiently indicated by the demand made at the Council of Lydda (A. D. 415), that Pelagius be compelled to retract the proposition: “Gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari.” The Fathers who have been accused of Semipelagian sympathies merely wished to emphasize free-will and to incite the morally indifferent to co-operate heartily with divine grace.
St. Chrysostom, in particular, expressly asserts the absolute gratuity of grace when he says of faith: “That which is a merit of faith, may not be ascribed [pg 142] to us, for it is a free gift of God,”[439] and directly contradicts Cassian and the Massilians when he declares: “Thou hast it not of thyself, thou hast received it from God. Hence thou hast received whatever thou hast, not only this or that, but all thou hast. For it is not thine own merit, but the grace of God. Although thou allegest the faith, thou hast received it by vocation.”[440]