Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of Air

by Joseph Priestley

This conjecture is likewise favoured by my observation, that respiration and putrefaction affect common air in the same manner, and in the same manner in which all other processes diminish air and make it noxious, and which agree in nothing but the emission of phlogiston. If this be the case, it should seem that the phlogiston which we take in with our aliment, after having discharged its proper function in the animal system (by which it probably undergoes some unknown alteration) is discharged as effete by the lungs into the great common menstruum, the atmosphere.

My conjecture suggested (whether supported or not) by these facts, is, that animals have a power of converting phlogiston, from the state in which they receive it in their nutriment, into that state in which it is called the electrical fluid; that the brain, besides its other proper uses, is the great laboratory and repository for this purpose; that by means of the nerves this great principle, thus exalted, is directed into the muscles, and forces them to act, in the same manner as they are forced into action when the electric fluid is thrown into them ab extra.

I farther suppose, that the generality of animals have no power of throwing this generated electricity any farther than the limits of their own system; but that the torpedo, and animals of a similar construction, have likewise the power, by means of an additional apparatus, of throwing it farther, so as to affect other animals, and other substances at a distance from them.

In this case, it should seem that the electric matter discharged from the animal system (by which it is probably more exhausted and fatigued than by ordinary muscular motion) would never return to it, at least so as to be capable of being made use of a second time, and yet if the structure of these animals be such as that the electric matter shall dart from one part of them only, while another part is left suddenly deprived of it, it may make a circuit, as in the Leyden phial.

As to the manner in which the electric matter makes a muscle contract, I do not pretend to have any conjecture worth mentioning. I only imagine that whatever can make the muscular fibres recede from one another farther than the parts of which they consist, must have this effect.

Possibly, the light which is said to proceed from some animals, as from cats and wild beasts, when they are in pursuit of their prey in the night, may not only arise, as it has hitherto been supposed to do, from the friction of their hairs or bristles, &c. but that violent muscular exertion may contribute to it. This may assist them occasionally to catch their prey; as glow-worms, and other insects, are provided with a constant light for that purpose, to the supply of which light their nutriment may also contribute.

I would not even say that the light which is said to have proceeded from some human bodies, of a particular temperament, and especially on some extraordinary occasions, may not have been of the electrical kind, that is, produced independently of friction, or with less friction than would have produced it in other persons; as in those cases related by Bartholin in his treatice De luce animalium. See particularly what he says concerning Theodore king of the Goths, p. 54, concerning Gonzaga duke of Mantua, p. 57, and Gothofred Antonius, p. 123: But I would not have my readers suppose that I lay much stress upon stories no better authenticated than these.

The electric matter in passing through non-conducting substances always emits light. This light I have been sometimes inclined to suspect might have been supplied from the substance through which it passes. But I find that after the electric spark has diminished a quantity of air as much as it possibly can, so that it has no more visible effect upon it, the electric light in that air is not at all lessened. It is probable, therefore, that electric light comes from the electric matter itself; and this being a modification of phlogiston, it is probable that all light is a modification of phlogiston also. Indeed, since no other substances besides such as contain phlogiston are capable of ignition, and consequently of becoming luminous, it was on this account pretty evident, prior to these deductions from electrical phenomena, that light and phlogiston are the same thing, in different forms or states.

It appears to me that heat has no more proper connexion with phlogiston than it has with water, or any other constituent part of bodies; but that it is a state into which the parts of bodies are thrown by their action and reaction with respect to one another; and probably (as the English philosophers in general have supposed) the heated state of bodies may consist of a subtle vibratory motion of their parts. Since the particles which constitute light are thrown from luminous bodies with such amazing velocity, it is evident that, whatever be the cause of such a projection, the reaction consequent upon it must be considerable. This may be sufficient not only to keep up, but also to increase the vibration of the parts of those bodies in which the phlogiston is not very firmly combined; and the difference between the substances which are called inflammable and others which also contain phlogiston may be this, that in the former the heat, or the vibration occasioned by the emission of their own phlogiston, may be sufficient to occasion the emission of more, till the whole be exhausted; that is, till the body be reduced to ashes. Whereas in bodies which are not inflammable, the heat occasioned by the emission of their own phlogiston may not be sufficient for this purpose, but an additional heat ab extra may be necessary.

Some philosophers dislike the term phlogiston; but, for my part, I can see no objection to giving that, or any other name, to a real something, the presence or absence of which makes so remarkable difference in bodies, as that of metallic calces and metals, oil of vitriol and brimstone, &c. and which may be transferred from one substance to another, according to certain known laws, that is, in certain definite circumstances. It is certainly hard to conceive how any thing that answers this description can be only a mere quality, or mode of bodies, and not substance itself, though incapable of being exhibited alone. At least, there can be no harm in giving this name to any thing, or any circumstance that is capable of producing these effects. If it should hereafter appear not to be a substance, we may change our phraseology, if we think proper.