"Just previous to this he had been re-enforced by a detachment of three hundred men of the 18th Iowa Infantry, and one hundred additional cavalry, commanded by Capt. Duncan, of the 18th Iowa.
"In order to prevent any surprise, all detached foraging parties were called in, and the original command placed in the advance, leaving the rear in charge of Captain Duncan's command, with orders to keep flankers well out and to guard cautiously against a surprise. Colonel Williams at the front, with skirmishers and flankers well out, advanced cautiously to a point about one and a half miles distant, sometimes called Cross Roads, but more generally known as Poison Springs, where he came upon a skirmish line of the enemy, which tended to confirm his previous suspicion of the character and purpose of the enemy. He therefore closed up the train as well as possible in this thickly timbered region, and made the necessary preparations for fighting. He directed the cavalry, under Lieutenant Henderson, of the 6th, and Mitchell, of the 2nd, to charge and penetrate the rebel line of skirmishers, in order to develop their strength and intentions. The movement succeeded most admirably in its purposes, and the development was such that it convinced Colonel Williams that he had before him a struggle of no ordinary magnitude.
"The cavalry, after penetrating the skirmish line, came upon a strong force of the enemy, who repulsed and forced them back to their original line, not, however, without hard fighting and severe loss on our part in killed and wounded, including in the latter the gallant Lieutenant Henderson, who afterwards fell into the hands of the enemy.
"The enemy now opened on our lines with ten pieces of artillery—six in front and four on the right flank. From a prisoner Colonel Williams learned that the force of the enemy was from eight to ten thousand, commanded by Generals Price and Maxey. These developments and this information convinced him that he could not hope to defeat the enemy; but as there was no way to escape with the train except through their lines, and as the train and its contents were indispensable to the very existence of our forces at Camden, who were then out of provisions, he deemed it to be his duty to defend the train to the last extremity, hoping that our forces at Camden, on learning of the engagement, would attack the enemy in his rear, thus relieving his command and saving the train.
"With this determination, he fought the enemy's entire force from 10 a. m. until 2 p. m., repulsing three successive assaults and inflicting upon the enemy severe loss.
"In his report Colonel Williams says:
'The conflict during these four hours was the most terrific and deadly in its character of any that has ever fallen under my observation.'
"At 2 p. m. nearly one-half of our force engaged had been placed hors de combat, and the remainder were out of ammunition. No supplies arriving, the Colonel was reluctantly compelled to abandon the train to the enemy and save as much of the command as possible by taking to the swamps and canebrakes and making for Camden by a circuitous route, thereby preventing pursuit by cavalry. In this manner most of the command that was not disabled in the field reached Camden during the night of the 18th. For a more specific and statistical report of this action, in which the loss to the 1st Colored alone was 187 men and officers, the official report of Colonel J. M. Williams is herewith submitted:
'Camden, Arkansas. April 24, 1867.
'Captain:—I have the honor to submit the following report of a foraging expedition under my command: