"The train that contained the 44th colored regiment, and two companies of the 14th, under command of Colonel Johnson, was delayed near Murfreesboro until Dec. 2nd, when it started for Nashville. But when crossing a bridge not far from the city, its progress was suddenly checked by a cross-fire of cannon belonging to Forest's command. I had become very anxious over the delay in the arrival of these troops, and when I heard the roar of cannon thought it must be aimed at them. I never shall forget the intensity of my suffering, as hour after hour passed by bringing me no tidings. Were they all captured? Had they been massacred? Who could answer? No one. What was to be done? Nothing. I could only wait and suffer.

"The next day Colonel Johnson reached Nashville, reporting that when stopped, he and his men were forced, under heavy fire, to abandon the train, clamber down from the bridge, and run to a blockhouse near by, which had been erected for the defence of the bridge, and was still in possession of the Union soldiers. After maintaining a stubborn fight until far into the night, he withdrew his troops, and making a detour to the east came into our lines, having lost in killed, wounded and missing, two officers and eighty men of the 44th, and twenty-five men of the 14th.

"Just as Captain C. W. Baker, the senior officer of the 14th, was leaving the car, a piece of shell carried off the top of his cap, thus adding immensely to its value—as a souvenir. Some of the soldiers who escaped lost everything except the clothes they had on, including knapsacks, blankets and arms. In some cases they lay in the water hiding for hours, until they could escape their pursuers.

"Soon after taking our position in line at Nashville, we were closely besieged by Hood's army; and thus we lay facing each other for two weeks. Hood had suffered so terribly by his defeat under Schofield, at Franklin, that he was in no mood to assault us in our works, and Thomas needed more time to concentrate and reorganize his army, before he could safely take the offensive. That fortnight interval was memorable indeed. Hood's army was desperate. It had been thwarted by Sherman, and thus far baffled by Thomas, and Hood felt that he must strike a bold blow to compensate for the dreadful loss of prestige occasioned by Sherman's march to the sea. His men were scantily clothed and poorly fed; if he could gain Nashville, our great depot of supplies, he could furnish his troops with abundance of food, clothing and war material; encourage the confederacy, terrify the people of the North, regain a vast territory taken from the South at such great cost to us, recruit his army from Kentucky, and perhaps invade the North.

"Thomas well knew the gravity of the situation, and was unwilling to hazard all by a premature battle. I think that neither he nor any of his army ever doubted the issue of the battle when it should come, whichever force should take the initiative.

"The authorities at Washington grew restive, and the people at the North nervous. Thomas was ordered to fight, Logan was dispatched to relieve him if he did not, and Grant himself started West to take command. Thomas was too good a soldier to be forced to offer battle, until he was sure of victory. He knew that time was his best ally, every day adding to his strength and weakening his enemy. In the meantime the weather became intensely cold, and a heavy sleet covered the ground, rendering it almost impossible for either army to move at all. For a few days our sufferings were quite severe. We had only shelter tents for the men, with very little fuel, and many of those who had lost their blankets keenly felt their need.

"On December 5th, before the storm, by order of General Steadman, I made a little reconnoissance, capturing, with slight loss, Lieutenant Gardner and six men, from the 5th Mississippi Regiment. December 7th we made another, in which Colonel Johnson and three or four men were wounded. On one of these occasions, while my men were advancing in face of a sharp fire, a rabbit started up in front of them. With shouts of laughter, several of them gave chase, showing that even battle could not obliterate the negro's love of sport.

"But the great day drew near. The weather grew warmer; the ice gave way. Thomas was ready, and calling together his chiefs, laid before them his plan of battle.

"About nine o'clock at night December 14th, 1864, I was summoned to General Steadman's headquarters. He told me what the plan of battle was, and said he wished me to open the fight by making a vigorous assault upon Hood's right flank. This, he explained, was to be a feint, intended to betray Hood into the belief that it was the real attack, and to lead him to support his right by weakening his left, where Thomas intended assaulting him in very deed. The General gave me the 14th United States Colored Infantry, under Colonel H. C. Corbin; the 17th U. S. C. I., under the gallant Colonel W. R. Shafter; a detachment of the 18th U. S. C. I., under Major L. D. Joy; the 44th U. S. C. I., under Colonel L. Johnson; a provisional brigade of white troops under Colonel C. H. Grosvenor, and a section of Artillery, under Captain Osburn, of the 20th Indiana Battery.

"The largest force I had ever handled was two regiments, and as I rather wanted to open the battle in proper style, I asked General Steadman what suggestion he had to make. He replied: 'Colonel, to-morrow morning at daylight I want you to open the battle.' 'All right, General, do you not think it would be a good plan for me to—', and I outlined a little plan of attack. With a twinkle in his kindly eye, he replied: 'To-morrow morning, Colonel, just as soon as you can see how to put your troops in motion, I wish you to begin the fight.' 'All right, General, good night.' With these explicit instructions, I left his headquarters, returned to camp, and gave the requisite orders for the soldiers to have an early breakfast, and be ready for serious work at daybreak. Then taking Adjutant Clelland I reconnoitered the enemy's position, tracing the line of his camp fires, and decided on my plan of assault.