The historian of the corps says:

"The division on the 21st of May was covering Fredericksburg, and the roads leading hence to Bowling Green. On the 22nd it marched toward Bowling Green, and on the 23rd it moved to Milford Station. From that date to the 27th it protected the trains of the army in the rear of the positions on the North Anna. On the 27th, the division moved to Newtown; on the 28th, to Dunkirk, crossing the Maltapony; on the 29th, to the Pamunkey, near Hanovertown. On the 1st of June the troops crossed the Pamunkey, and from the 2nd to the 6th, covered the right of the army; from the 6th to the 12th they covered the approaches from New Castle Ferry, Hanovertown, Hawe's shop, and Bethusda Church. From the 12th to the 18th they moved by easy stages, by way of Tunstall's New Kent Court House, Cole's Ferry, and the pontoon bridge across the James, to the line of the army near Petersburg. The dismounted cavalry were left to guard the trains, and the 4th Division prepared to participate in the more active work of soldiers. Through the remainder of the month of June, and the most of July, the troops were occupied in the second line of trenches, and in active movements towards the left, under Generals Hancock and Warren. While they were engaged in the trenches they were also drilled in the movements necessary for an attack and occupation of the enemy's works. A strong feeling of pride and esprit de corps sprung up within the hearts of the blacks, and they began to think that they too might soon have the opportunity of some glory for their race and country."

How natural was this feeling. As we have seen, their life for more than a month had been one of marching and counter-marching, though hazardous and patriotic. When on the 18th, they entered upon the more active duty of soldiers, they found the 3rd Division of the 18th Corps, composed of the Phalanx of the Army of the James, covered with glory, and the welkin ringing with praises of their recent achievements. The men of the 4th Division chafed with eager ambition to rival their brothers of the 18th Corps, in driving the enemy from the Cockade City. General Burnside was equally as anxious to give his black boys a chance to try the steel of the chivalry in deadly conflict, and this gave them consolation, with the assurance that their day would ere long dawn, so they toiled and drilled carefully for their prospective glory.

But the situation of the Phalanx before Petersburg was far from being enviable. Smarting under the thrashing they had received from Hinks' division, the confederates were ever ready now to slaughter the "niggers" when advantage offered them the opportunity. A steady, incessant fire was kept up against the positions the Phalanx occupied, and their movements were watched with great vigilance. Although they did not raise the black flag, yet manifestly no quarter to negro troops, or to white troops that fought with them, was the confederates' determination.

"Judging from their actions, the presence of the negro soldiers, both in the Eighteenth and Ninth Corps," says Woodbury, "seemed to have the effect of rendering the enemy more spiteful than ever before the Fourth Division came. The closeness of the lines on the front of the corps rendered constant watchfulness imperative, and no day passed without some skirmishing between the opposing pickets. When the colored soldiers appeared, this practice seemed to increase, while in front of the Fifth Corps, upon the left of our line, there was little or no picket firing, and the outposts of both armies were even disposed to be friendly. On the front of the Ninth, the firing was incessant, and in many cases fatal."

"General Potter, in his report, mentions that, when his division occupied the front, his loss averaged some fourteen or fifteen officers killed and wounded per diem. The sharpshooters on either side were vigilant, and an exposure of any part of the person was the signal for the exchange of shots. The men, worn by hard marching, hard fighting and hard digging, took every precaution to shield themselves, and sought cover at every opportunity. They made fire proofs of logs and earth, and with tortuous covered ways and traverse, endeavoring to secure themselves from the enemy's fire. The artillery and mortars on both sides were kept almost constantly at work. These were all precursors of the coming, sanguinary struggle for the possession of Cemetery Hill. Immediately in front of the salient occupied by the Ninth Corps, the rebels had constructed a very strong redoubt, a short distance below Cemetery Hill. In the rear of the redoubt ran a ridge nearly at right angles with the rebels' lines, to the hill. It appeared that if this redoubt was captured, the enemy's line would be seriously threatened, if not entirely broken up. A feasible plan for the destruction of the redoubt, was seriously discussed among the soldiers of the corps; finally Colonel Pleasants, of the 48th Pennsylvania Regiment, devised a plan to run a mine under the intervening space between the line of the corps and the redoubt, with the design of exploding it, directly under the redoubt. To this plan General Burnside lent his aid, and preparations were made for an assault upon Cemetery Hill, at the time of its explosion. The work of digging and preparing the mine was prosecuted under the most disadvantageous circumstances. General Meade reluctantly gave official sanction, and the work of excavation proceeded with, despite the fact that General Burnside's requisitions for supplies were not responded to. Nevertheless, in less than a month the mine was ready, and after considerable discussion, and not without some bickering, the plan of attack was arranged, which, in brief, was to form two columns, and to charge with them through the breach caused by the explosion of the mine. Then to sweep along the enemy's line, right and left, clearing away the artillery and infantry, by attacking in the flank and rear. Other columns were to make for the crest, the whole to co-operate. General Ferrero, in command of the Phalanx division was informed, that in accordance with the plan of attack, he was to lead in the assault, when the attack was made, after the mine had been fired. He was ordered to drill his troops accordingly. After a careful examination of the ground, Ferrero decided upon his methods of advance,—not to go directly in the crater formed by the explosion, but rather upon one side of it, and then to take the enemy in flank and reverse. When he informed his officers and men that they would be called upon to lead in the assault, they received the information with delight. His men, desirous of emulating their comrades of the Third Division of the Eighteenth Corps, felt that their cherished hope,—the opportunity for which they had prayed,—was near at hand; the hour in which they would show themselves worthy of the honor of being associated with the Army of the Potomac. They rejoiced at the prospect of wiping off whatever reproach an ill-judged prejudice might have cast upon them, by proving themselves brave, thereby demanding the respect which brave men deserve. For three weeks they drilled with alacrity in the various movements; charging upon earthworks, wheeling by the right and left, deployment, and other details of the expected operations. General Burnside had early expressed his confidence in the soldierly capabilities of the men of the Phalanx, and now wished to give them an opportunity to justify his good opinion."

His white troops, moreover, had been greatly exposed throughout the whole campaign, had suffered severely, and had been so much under the fire of the sharpshooters that it had become a second nature with them to dodge bullets. The negro troops had not been so much exposed, and had already shown their steadiness under fire in one or two pretty severe skirmishes in which they had previously been engaged. The white officers and men of the corps were elated with the selection made by General Burnside, and they, too, manifested an uncommon interest in their dark-hued comrades. The demeanor of the former toward the latter was very different from that of the other corps, of which that particular army was composed. The 9th Corps had seen more service than any other corps in the Army of the Potomac. Its operations in six States had given to the men an experience calculated to destroy, very greatly, their race prejudice; besides a very large portion of the regiments in the corps came from the New England States, especially Massachusetts, Vermont and Rhode Island, where race prejudice was not so strong; consequently the treatment of the men in the 4th Division was tempered by humanity, and pregnant with a fraternal feeling of comradeship. And then there was a corps pride very naturally existing among the white troops, which prompted a desire for the achievement of some great and brilliant feat by their black comrades. This feeling was expressed in more than one way by the entire corps, and greatly enhanced the ambition of the Phalanx to rout the enemy and drive him out of his fortifications before Petersburg, if not to capture the city.

These high hopes were soon dissipated, however. General Meade had an interview with General Burnside on the 28th; the subject was fully discussed as to the plan of the assault, as proposed by General Burnside, and made known to Meade by Burnside, in writing, on the 26th. It was at this meeting that General Meade made his objections to the Phalanx leading the assault. General Burnside argued with all the reason he could command, in favor of his plans, and especially for the Phalanx, going over the grounds already cited; why his white troops were unfit and disqualified for performing the task of leading the assault, but in vain. Meade was firm in his purpose, and, true to his training, he had no use for the negro but as a servant; he never had trusted him as a soldier. The plan, with General Meade's objection was referred to General Grant for settlement. Grant, doubting the propriety of agreeing with a subordinate, as against the commander of the army, dismissed the dispute by agreeing with Meade; therefore the Phalanx was ruled out of the lead and placed in the supporting column. It was not till the night of the 29th, a few hours before the assault was made, that the change was made known to General Ferrero and his men, who were greatly chagrined and filled with disappointment.