"Our men went forward with enthusiasm equal to anything under different circumstances; but, in going through the fort that had been blown up, the passage was almost impeded by obstacles thrown up by the explosion. At the same time, we were receiving a most deadly cross-fire from both flanks. At this time, our lieutenant-colonel (E. W. Ross) fell, shot through the left leg, bravely leading the men. I immediately assumed command, but only to hold it a few minutes, when I fell, struck by a piece of shell in the side. Capt. Robinson, from Connecticut, then took command; and, from all we can learn, he was killed. At this time, our first charge was somewhat checked, and the men sought cover in the works. Again our charge was made, but, like the former, unsuccessful. This was followed by the enemy making a charge. Seeing the unorganized condition and the great loss of officers, the men fell back to our own works. Yet a large number still held the fort until two p. m., when the enemy charged again, and carried it. That ended the great attempt to take Petersburg.
"It will be thus seen that the colored troops did not compose the first assaulting, but the supporting column; and they were not ordered forward until white troops in greater numbers had made a desperate effort to carry the rebel works, and had failed. Then the colored troops were sent in; moved over the broken ground, and up the slope, and within a short distance of the parapet, in order, and with steady courage; but finally broke and retreated under the same fire which just before had sent a whole division of white regiments to the right-about. If there be any disgrace in that, it does not belong exclusively nor mainly to the negroes. A second attack is far more perilous and unlikely to succeed than a first; the enemy having been encouraged by the failure of the first, and had time to concentrate his forces. And, in this case, there seems to have been a fatal delay in ordering both the first and second assault."
An officer in the same engagement says:
"In regard to the bravery of the colored troops, although I have been in upwards of twenty battles, I never saw so many cases of gallantry. The 'crater,' where we were halted, was a perfect slaughter-pen. Had not 'some one blundered,' but moved us up at daylight, instead of eight o'clock, we should have been crowned with success, instead of being cut to pieces by a terrific enfilading fire, and finally forced from the field in a panic. We had no trouble in rallying the troops and moving them into the rifle-pits; and, in one hour after the rout I had nearly as many men together as were left unhurt.
"I was never under such a terrific fire, and can hardly realize how any escaped alive. Our loss was heavy. In the Twenty-eighth (colored) for instance, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Russell (a Bostonian), he lost seven officers out of eleven, and ninety-one men out of two hundred and twenty-four; and the colonel himself was knocked over senseless, for a few minutes, by a slight wound in the head; both his color-sergeants and all his color-guard were killed. Col. Bross, of the Twenty-ninth, was killed outright, and nearly every one of his officers hit. This was nearly equal to Bunker Hill. Col. Ross, of the Thirty-first, lost his leg. The Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth (colored), all charged over the works; climbing up an earthwork six feet high, then down into a ditch, and up on the other side, all the time under the severest fire in front and flank. Not being supported, of course the storming party fell back. I have seen white troops run faster than these blacks did, when in not half so tight a place. Our brigade lost thirty-six prisoners, all cut off after leaving the 'crater.' My faith in colored troops is not abated one jot.'"
The Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War investigated the affair, before which General Grant testified. He was severe upon General Ledlie, whom he regarded as an inefficient officer; he blamed himself for allowing that officer to lead the assault. General Grant also testified:
"General Burnside wanted to put his colored division in front; I believe if he had done so it would have been a success."
On the morning of the 13th of August, 1864, a brigade of the Phalanx, consisting of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 29th Regiments, crossed from Bermuda Hundreds to the north side of the James river, on pontoons, near Jones' landing, and bivouacked for the night. General Grant was led to believe that General Lee had sent a portion of his troops, at least three divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, from the front of Petersburg, to re-enforce Gen. Early, then operating in the valley. Consequently he thought it a favorable opportunity to threaten Richmond, and ordered Hancock with the 2nd, and Birney with a part of the 10th Corps, with Gregg's Cavalry, to attack the confederate works on the north side of the James. The object was two-fold: to prevent Lee from re-enforcing Early, confronted by Sheridan's troops; and likewise to drive the confederates from out their works. The troops crossed the James on the 13th, the 2d Corps going to Deep Bottom by transports, the other troops crossing the river by pontoons, and advancing, found the enemy in force. Several spirited engagements took place, after which the main forces withdrew again across the river, to the front of Petersburg. The following account applies to the brigade as well as the 7th Phalanx Regiment, from whose record it is extracted:
"During the forenoon of the 14th the (7th) Regiment acted as reserve, moving forward occasionally as the line advanced. Most of the work of the day was done to the right, little being done in the immediate front except skirmishing. About 5 p. m. a portion of the Seventh and Ninth, forming line in the edge of some timber, moved across an open field and charged upon reaching the farther side and captured the enemy's line of rifle-pits. The companies of the Seventh pushed on some distance further toward their second line, but were met with so severe a fire that they fell back to the captured line; which was held. This charge, known as the action of Kingsland Road, was made in fine style. The battalion of the Seventh was commanded by Capt. Weiss—Col. Shaw having been detailed as Corps Officer of the day, and Lieut.-Col. Haskell being temporarily in command of the brigade. Our losses were two men killed, and one officer (Lieut. Eler) and thirty-two men wounded.
"About 10 o'clock p. m., the troops moved down the road to the right, and at 1 o'clock Col. Shaw withdrew the pickets of the corps, re-crossed the pontoons, where we had crossed in the morning, and moved down the neck. Then followed four hours of the most wearisome night-marching—moving a few rods at a time and then halting for troops ahead to get out of the way; losing sight of them and hurrying forward to catch up; straggling out into the darkness, stumbling and groping along the rough road, and all the time the rain coming down in a most provoking, exasperating drizzle. About daylight crossed back to the north side and halted for coffee, and then moved forward some four miles and rejoined the corps, taking position behind the crest of a hill. The Eighth and Twenty-ninth were left in a work on the hill.