Of course the negro people about the city of Richmond heard of the proposition to arm and emancipate them if they would voluntarily fight for their old masters. They discussed its merits with a sagacity wiser than those who proposed the scheme, and it is safe to say that they concluded, in the language of one who spoke on the matter, "It am too late, de Yankees am coming." There were those among them, however, known as the free class, who stood ever ready to imitate the whites, believing that course to be an evidence of their superiority over the slaves. They were very anxious to enlist.
On February 8th Senator Brown, of Mississippi, introduced a resolution which, if it had been adopted, would have freed 200,000 negroes and put them into the army; but on the next day it was voted down in secret session. Upon this very February 9th, when Senator Brown's resolution was lost, Mr. Benjamin, Secretary of State, addressed a large public meeting at Richmond. He made a very extraordinary speech, setting forth the policy of President Davis and his cabinet. Emissaries of Mr. Davis had just returned from the Peace Conference at Fortress Monroe, where they met representatives of the United States government, and learned that the conditions upon which the Southern States could resume their relations were those which they were compelled to accept finally. During Mr. Benjamin's speech he said:
"We have 680,000 blacks capable of bearing arms, and who ought now to be in the field. Let us now say to every negro who wishes to go into the ranks on condition of being free, go and fight—you are free. My own negroes have been to me and said, 'Master, set us free and we'll fight for you.' You must make up your minds to try this or see your army withdrawn from before your town. I know not where white men can be found."
Mr. Benjamin's speech created an intense excitement among the slave-holders. The situation seemed to have narrowed itself down to a disagreeable alternative. They must either fight themselves or let the slaves fight. Doubtless many would have preferred submission to Lincoln, but then they could not save their slaves. Immediately following Mr. Benjamin's speech on the 11th, a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives authorizing the enlistment of 200,000 slaves, with the consent of their owners. As a test of its strength a motion was made for the rejection of this bill, and the vote not to reject it was more than two to one. There was every indication that the bill would pass. It was while this measure was under discussion that General Lee wrote the letter which follows in answer to one of inquiry from a member of the House:
"Headquarters Confederate State Armies,
"February 18th, 1865.
"Hon. Barksdale, House of Representatives, Richmond.
"Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th inst. with reference to the employment of negroes as soldiers. I think the measure not only expedient but necessary. The enemy will certainly use them against us if he can get possession of them, and as his present numerical superiority will enable him to penetrate many parts of the country, I can not see the wisdom of the policy of holding them to await his arrival, when we may, by timely action and judicious management, use them to arrest his progress. I do not think that our white population can supply the necessities of a long war without overtaxing its capacity, and imposing great suffering upon our people; and I believe we should provide resources for a protracted struggle, not merely for a battle or a campaign.
"In answer to your second question I can only say that, in my opinion, under proper circumstances the negroes will make efficient soldiers. I think we could at least do as well with them as the enemy, and he attaches great importance to their assistance. Under good officers and good instructions I do not see why they should not become soldiers. They possess all the physical qualifications, and their habits of obedience constitute a good formulation for discipline. They furnish a more promising material than many armies of which we read in history, which owed their efficiency to discipline alone. I think those employed should be freed. It would be neither wisdom nor justice, in my opinion, to require them to serve as slaves. The best course to pursue, it seems to me, is to call for such as are willing to come with the consent of their owners. Impressment or draft would not be likely to bring out the best class, and the use of coercion would make the measure distasteful to them and to their owners. I have no doubt if Congress would authorize their reception into service, and empower the President to call upon individuals or States for such as they are willing to contribute with the condition of emancipation to all enrolled, a sufficient number would be forthcoming to enable us to try the experiment.
"If it proves successful, most of the objections to the matter would disappear, and if individuals still remained unwilling to send their negroes to the army, the force of public opinion in the States would soon bring about such legislation as would remove all obstacles. I think the matter should be left as far as possible to the people and the States, which alone can legislate as the necessities of this particular service may require. As to the mode of organizing them, it should be left as free from restraint as possible. Experience will suggest the best course, and would be inexpedient to trammel the subject with provisions that might in the end prevent the adoption of reforms, suggested by actual trial.