Fifty Years of Railway Life in England, Scotland and Ireland

by Joseph Tatlow

to a verdict of acquittal, and that no case had been made out for the reversal of railway policy which their colleagues advocated. They added that it would hardly be disputed that the Railways had on the whole conferred great benefits upon Ireland.

On the question of reductions in rates (reductions which the Majority Report strongly urged as necessary), they did not think that reductions were more likely to occur under public than under private ownership. They suggested, further, that the official statistics of various countries showed that the fall in the average rate had been much greater on the privately owned railways of France and the United States than on the State-owned railways of Prussia, which were universally accepted as the most favourable example of State managed railways in the world. They came to the conclusion, after hearing all the evidence, that the management of the principal Irish Companies was not inferior to that of similar companies in England and Scotland. They narrated the many improvements (with which they seemed much impressed) that Irish Companies had in recent years effected for the benefit of the public and the good of the country, and said “they had spent money, and not always profitably, in endeavouring to promote the development of new industries.” They considered the principle of private ownership should be maintained, believing that railways are better and more economically managed by directors responsible to their own shareholders than they would be under any form of State or popular control, and that administration on commercial principles was the best in the public interest.

In their opinion, however, the Irish railway system was faulty by reason of its sub-division into so many independent companies, and they recommended a policy of amalgamation, with the ultimate object of including the principal railways in one single system, and also, that certain lines classed as railways, but which were really tramways serving purely local interests, need not be incorporated with the general railway system. Such amalgamation, they considered, need not be effected at one time, but should be accomplished gradually. Failing amalgamation by voluntary effort within three years, compulsion should be resorted to.

On the whole the Reports were highly satisfactory to the Irish railways.

They showed that the Companies had done their duty to the country honestly and well, and that they had been unjustifiably attacked. The good character of the Irish railways was thus re-established, and they again held their rightful place in public esteem.

Of the two I much preferred the Minority Report. The working of the Irish railways (in accordance with its Recommendations) as business concerns on commercial principles, seemed to me both sound and sensible and the policy best calculated to serve the interests of the country. I cannot, however, say that I concurred in that part of the Minority Report which proposed the welding of all the railways of Ireland into one great system. In my humble opinion, the formation of three large systems—a Northern, a Midland and a Southern—was the desirable course to adopt. This course would, at any rate, keep alive the spirit of emulation which, in itself, is a wholesome stimulant to enterprise and endeavour, as well as to economy.

The Majority Report, which amongst other things said, “We consider it obvious that Irish development will not be fully served by the railways until they cease to be commercial undertakings,” found favour mostly, I think, with those who looked upon Ireland as an exceptional country requiring eleemosynary treatment, and whose railways ought, in their view, to be placed beyond the ordinary healthy necessity of paying their way. Our Chairman, the Honourable Richard Nugent, addressing his shareholders at the time, put the matter rather neatly. He said: “The case, as recommended by the Majority Report, stands thus—the Government to find the money for purchasing the railways; the Government to guarantee the interest on the capital cost; the County Councils to work the railways on uncommercial lines; the Government to pay to the extent of £250,000 a year any deficiency incurred by uncommercial management; and any further annual losses to be paid by the County Councils striking a general rate, which you and I and all of us would be required to pay.” He added, “Does this seem a businesslike proposal?”

The Government took no steps towards carrying out the Recommendations of either Report. Perhaps they thought them so nearly divided, and so almost evenly balanced, that the one neutralised the other. They may

also have thought that each Report made it clear that the Irish railways were well managed, not lacking in enterprise or energy, were doing well for the country; and that, therefore, the wisest course was to “let well alone.”

Were we living in ordinary times, had there been no world-wide war, with its vast upheavals and colossal changes, it would be both interesting and profitable to further discuss the Reports, their conclusions and recommendations; but the war has altered the whole railway situation, and it would be idle to do so now. Victor Hugo says: “Great events have incalculable consequences,” which is unquestionably true in respect of the railways and the war. The vital question now in regard, not only to the railways of Ireland, but to the railways of the whole United Kingdom, is as to their future. It is, however, with the Irish railways I am specially concerned, and of them I may pretend to have a little knowledge, which must be my excuse for saying a few words more on the subject.