But we said Comedy was a View of common and private Life: Not that the lower Sort of People only are to be represented in it; for Gentlemen, and even Nobility, not only may, but ought sometimes to be introduc'd, if they do not appear in a public Character; but by no Means Princes, or Monarchs, or even Persons of lower Station in Government, as concern'd in public Affairs; Circumstances which are proper for Tragedy, not at all for Comedy. Much less should a Deity be introduc'd; for which Reason, Aristophanes, in his Plutus, and Plautus, in his Amphitryo, break thro' the Rules of Comic Poetry, by bringing Jupiter and Mercury, and other Deities, upon the Stage. There is, indeed, as Comedy has been manag'd, two Sorts of it, the Genteel, and the Low; the one consisting of Persons of Character and inferior Life both together; the other of the Vulgar only; and is not properly Comedy, but Farce, nor so suitable to my Definition of it. For this gives a View but of one Side of private Life, and that the least creditable. Nor yet are Persons of Condition only to be represented, because we should still see but one, tho' the better Side of Life; and because by this Means we should want Mirth and Raillery, and the true Comic Spirit; which are all best kept up by Persons of low Degree, or rather by a mix'd Conversation between those of different Circumstances. Thus Terence, who, in Cæsar's Opinion, wanted somewhat of this Vis Comica, would have had scarce any of it, if we had been entertain'd only with the grave Appearance of his Chremeses and Simo's, Phædria's and Antipho's; and all the lower Characters of Davus, Parmeno, or Geta, and such merry Fellows had been omitted.
An Image of common and private Life takes in the Virtues, Vices, and Follies of Mankind; and represents them in their true Colours; Virtue as amiable, Vice as odious, and Folly as ridiculous. Nor does this at all contradict their Definition of Comedy, which Aristotle has given; where he seems to determine, that whatsoever is truly valuable, and worthy of Commendation, is by no means a proper Subject for Comedy.[406] Ἡ δε κωμωδια, εστιν, ὡσπεσ ειπομεν, μιμησιϛ φαυλοτερων μεν, ου μεντοι κατα πασαν κακιαν, αλλα του αισχρου εστι το γελοιον μοριον. Comedy, as we said, is an Imitation of the worse Part of Mankind, but not thro' all the Enormities of Vice; for it is only some Degree of it that is ridiculous. In this Definition, Aristotle, according to his usual Manner, gives a short and succinct Account of his Subject, not a full and perfect Explication of it. And I may venture to say, that I have offer'd nothing that is inconsistent with this Description, by affirming that Virtue, as well as Vice and Folly, is a proper Subject for Comedy. For when he tells us, that the Characters in Comedy are to be copied from the more ignominious Part of Mankind, he does not say, they are to be copied from them only: Nor does he mean, that none else are to be represented in it, but that none else are to be expos'd, and turn'd to Ridicule. And Vices will always appear the more odious and ridiculous, when they are plac'd in full Light against their opposite Virtues.
Mons. Dacier, who has given us a Translation, and Notes upon this Part of Aristotle, affirms, that Ridicule is the only Subject of Comedy[407]; which is neither true in Fact, nor agreeable to his Author's Meaning. I am sensible that the chief Business of Comedy is Ridicule, but not the only one. Aristotle intimates, indeed, what we not only grant, but contend for, that great and scandalous Enormities, as they raise some Degree of Horror in our Minds, and are proper for Tragedy, are not so for Comic Writers. But they may bring lesser Failings upon the Stage, and perhaps some which are rather odious than ridiculous: Nor does that great Philosopher advance any Thing to the contrary: For in those Words, αλλα του αισχρου εστι το γελοιον μοριον, he only shews, what we readily allow, that the chief Subject of Comedy is Ridicule: And he plainly insinuates, that scandalous and great Crimes are not proper for it, when he defines it an Imitation of the worse Part of Mankind, but not practising every Kind of Vice. And yet Mons. Dacier defends Aristophanes, and other Writers of the old Comedy, who (as Horace observes, in the Verses before mention'd) expos'd the worst Sort of Crimes upon the Stage, tho' he insists, at the same Time, that nothing is to be admitted in Comedy, but what is the Subject of Ridicule. He attempts, indeed, to reconcile their Practice with this Opinion, by observing, that those old Poets painted even the greatest Enormities in that Light which made them rather ridiculous than detestable, and that the Audience were to consider them only in that View: But it is very evident, that horrid and abominable Vices (such were some of those which Horace mentions, and these Writers expos'd) as Murder, for Instance, can by no sort of Colouring be ridiculous, nor, in the Nature of Things, become the Object of Jest and Merriment. I own there may be some Circumstances attending the greatest Crimes, which may excite rather Contempt or Laughter, than Horror or Detestation, as may be observ'd in the Instances of Theft and Adultery, which Horace mentions: Nor do I deny, that, in this View, they may have a Place in Comedy, provided they are but seldom, and with great Caution, represented: Tho', notwithstanding all the Caution that is possible, they had better be omitted. For, upon the whole, all Things consider'd, such Actions are shocking, and can never be so truly ridiculous, as they are detestable. However, to let them make the most of this Concession, it can never be admitted as an Excuse for those Poets who represent Things and Persons as ridiculous, which are in no Respect whatever the Objects of Ridicule. I mention Persons, as well as Things: For Mons. Dacier defends Plautus for introducing Kings and Gods upon the Stage in his Amphitryo, and yet, notwithstanding, pronounces it to be true Comedy, for this Reason, forsooth, because the Subject (says he) in itself tragical, is by the Poet turn'd into Ridicule. Which is so far from being a just Vindication of him, that it is the very Fault he stands accus'd of. For what is this, but inverting the very Nature of Things? It is not Poetry, but Buffoonry; nor can the Author of such Dramatic Performances be consider'd as a Poet, but a Droll. Such Prodigies may possibly occasion a Laugh among the Vulgar, who think nothing marvellous, but what is monstrous; but Men of Taste, and Judgment, will always treat them with Contempt and Aversion. To return, then, from Persons to Things. If we restrain Comedy from meddling with enormous Vices, do we not seem to contradict Horace's Judgment, who says,
[408] ——Ridiculum acri Fortius & melius magnas plerumque secat res: Illi, scripta quibus Comœdia prisca viris est, Hoc stabant, hoc sunt imitandi.
Great Faults are rounded off with oily Sneer, Not mall'able by Strokes the most severe. This was the Drift of all those ancient Plays, In this they may be follow'd, and with Praise.
Great Faults may, I own, but not the greatest: Follies the greatest, if you will, and sometimes great Crimes, which (as was observ'd before) may have something ridiculous in the Manner of their Commission. Nor did the Writers of the old Comedy always expose the greatest Crimes, but Crimes of a less Note, and Follies of the first Magnitude, and are in this Respect worthy of Imitation. But notwithstanding the ingenious and refin'd Observations of the French Translator, Aristotle's Rule will for ever stand in Opposition to his Sentiments, and exclude such abominable Characters from being introduc'd in Comedy, under Pretence of exposing them.[409]
Το γαρ γελοιον εστιν αμαρτημα τι, και αισχ ανωδυνον, και ου φθαρτικον. Οιον, ευθυϛ, το γελοιον προσωπον αισχρον τι, και διεστραμμενον ανευ οδυνηϛ.
What we laugh at, is only lesser Failings, some Immorality that is not shocking, and attended with no fatal Consequences: As, to use an obvious Instance, a ridiculous Face is ugly, and ill-shap'd, but without any Appearance of Calamity.
And is this Description of Ridicule ever to be reconcil'd with the most heinous Crimes, such as the Writers of the old Comedy have sometimes expos'd? Do such black Offences affect us with no Sorrow; are no fatal Consequences occasion'd by them? I don't then plead the Practice of these Poets against Aristotle's Opinion, (which yet is a Difficulty Mons. Dacier endeavours to guard against) but from the Nature and Reason of the Thing I arraign their Practice: Tho' were the Point to be decided by Authority, I should always have a greater Reverence for the Judgment of Aristotle, than the Example of Aristophanes.
Crimes, then, of this Stamp, can never agree with Comedy; not that we are for running into the other Extream, and asserting (as I observ'd before) that Ridicule is the only, because it is the principal Subject of it. Inferior Crimes, of the more odious Kind, may properly enough be introduc'd upon that very Account, because they are odious: Tho' those that are equally odious, and ridiculous, are much more proper for it; as Avarice, Arrogance, Superstition, and the like. And others, of a different Turn, if represented in private Life, may, nay, ought to be expos'd on the Comic Stage, as Luxury, and the preposterous Affectation of appearing great without a Fortune, provided this is done in a merry Way, and the Humour is not lost in the Discipline. But Murder, Rebellion, ambitious Thirst of Power, and other Vices of that Strain, belong only to Tragedy. But the Follies of Mankind (as they are usually term'd) that are not so much Crimes, as Imperfections, that offend against the Rules of Decency rather than Morality, are merely, and in every View, ridiculous; and, upon that Account, furnish the most proper Matter for Comedy.