"The Poets did the same Thing in Morality, which the Divines did in Theology. That infinite Variety in the divine Actions and Operations, so much above our Understanding, forc'd them, as it were, upon dividing the single Idea of the one, and uncompounded divine Essence, into several Persons, under the Names of Jupiter, Juno, Neptune, and the rest: On the contrary, the Nature of Moral Philosophy being such as never lays down Rules for any particular Thing, has oblig'd the Epic Poets to unite in one single idea, in one and the same Person, and into one Action, which appear'd extraordinary, all that look'd like it in different Persons, and in different Actions, which might be thus contain'd as so many Species under their Genus.
"Therefore, when Aristotle says[475], φιλοσφωτερον, και σπουδαιοτερον ποιησιϛ ιστοριαϛ ισιν, That Poetry is more philosophical, and more serious, than History, he says this, not so much to magnify the Excellence of this Art, as to explain the Nature of it. Poetry, says he, teaches Morality, not by a bare Recital, as an Historian, who tells us what Alcibiades did, or suffer'd, (which is Aristotle's own Instance;) but by proposing all that a Person, let the Poet call him by what Name he pleases, ought either necessarily, or most probably to have said, or done, upon such an Occasion. It is in this Manner, that it lays down either the unhappy Consequences of ill-judg'd Designs, and wicked Actions; or else the Rewards of good Actions, and the Satisfaction one receives from a Design form'd by Virtue, and conducted by Prudence. Thus in Epic, according to Aristotle, let the Names be what they will, yet the Persons and the Actions are feign'd, allegorical, and universal, not historical and particular.[476] Ἡ μεν Ποιησιϛ μαλλον τακαθολου ἡ δ' ιστορια τα καου ἑκαστον; λεγει, i.e. Poetry represents Things rather in general, but History in particular. Horace is likewise of the same Mind, who is not satisfy'd with saying, that Poets teach Morality full as well as Philosophers; but prefers Homer to all of them:
[477] Qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non, Plenius, ac melius Chrysippo, & Crantore dicit.
Who has what's base, what's decent, just and good, Clearer than Crantor, or Chrysippus show'd. Creech.
"The Reason why Poets excel Philosophers in this Respect is, that every Sort of Poem is an Imitation. Now Imitation is extremely natural, and pleases every Body; and therefore nothing is more likely to engage the Passions, and the Attention, of an Audience. Besides, Imitation is Instruction by Examples, and Examples are the most proper Methods of Persuasion; because they prove that such or such a Thing is feasible. In short, Imitation is so much the Essence of Poetry, that the Art it self, as Aristotle informs us, owes its very Original to it. And Horace recommends it very particularly to the Poet, which he is forming:
[478] Respicere exemplar vitæ, morumque, jubebo Doctum imitatorem, & veras hinc ducere voces.
Those are the likeliest Copies, which are drawn By th' Original of Human Life. Roscommon.
"But tho' the Poets become moral Philosophers, they do not cease to be Divines; on the contrary, the Morality they treat of, does indispensably oblige them to have a Vein of Theology run thro' all their Works: Because the Knowledge, the Fear, and the Love of God, in a Word, Piety and Religion are the chief, and most solid Foundations or the other Virtues, and of all Morality.
The Presence of the Deity, and the Superintendence which so august a Cause has over the Action, obliges the Poet to represent this Action as great, important, and manag'd by Kings and Princes. Hence Horace:
[479] Res gestæ regumque, ducumque.